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The nature of modem markets dictates certain parallel conduct areas among oligo-
polists, irrespective of law, of the existence of conspiracies or of business intent.1
A complete generation of economists has pointed out the idiocy of the charge of
conscious parallelism.2
"Conscious parallelism" is nothing more than a very fancy term to describe the
situation where two (or more) persons are doing the same thing with the knowl-
edge that the other is following similar policies or has made a similar decision....
"Conscious parallelism" does not prove a conspiracy in the absence of other evi-
dence which shows the seller's pricing was not explainable in terms of their indi-
vidual self-interest and their independent business judgment.8
A. INTRODUCTION
One of the most perplexing problems in competition policy and in the
general area of public policy toward industrial concentration arises with res-
pect to the behaviour of industries in which a relatively small number of
firms account for a large proportion of output4 and develop a strong bond of
mutual dependence. In closely coordinated oligopolies, both the interfirm
behaviour and economic performance may deviate significantly from that
expected under competitive market conditions because firms in such oligo-
polies are able to act upon their interdependence.
If the firms are selling a relatively undifferentiated product, it is likely
that all firms will charge almost the same prices or set prices which reflect dif-
ferences in the value of services provided, including intangible services such
as provision of a dependable source of supply. Little price deviation is ex-
pected. No firm will attempt to charge more than the established industry
price since, under normal circumstances, no customers will pay the higher
price. Producers will be discouraged from charging less by an awareness that
major competitors, faced with the threat of market share erosion, will im-
mediately match the lower prices. As Donald Eldon points out, "the simple
awareness of the probable actions of competitors . . . tend[s] to limit price
competition in markets of a few sellers." 5 This type of industrial structure
will normally produce identical list prices and virtually identical transactions
prices. Price adjustments upward may occur almost simultaneously, without
any formal agreement.
1 R. E. Low, Modern Economic Association (Homewood: R. D. Irwin, 1970) at
255.
2 Martin Shubik, Strategy and Market Structure (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
1959) at 285-86.
8 E. E. Pollock, Commentary (1975), 44 Antitrust LJ. 235 at 236.
4 In manufacturing, mining, finance, food retailing and other sectors oligopoly or
concentrated industries are all but ubiquitous. See, for example, Industrial Organization
and Concentration in the Manufacturing, Mining and Logging Industries, 1972, Cata-
logue 31-402 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1977); E. P. Neufeld, The Financial System
of Canada (Toronto: MacMillan, 1972); Reference Paper No. 6, Bruce Mallen, A
Preliminary Paper on the Levels, Causes and Effects of Economic Concentration in the
Canadian Retail Food Trade: A Study of Supermarket Market Power (Ottawa: Food Prices
Review Board, 1976) and C. Marfels, Concentration Levels and Trends in the Canadian
Economy, 1965-73 (Ottawa: Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration, 1977).
5 Donald Eldon, The Oligopoly Problem in Competition Policy, Background Study
for the Interim Report on Competition Policy (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada,
1970) at 151 (mimeo).
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In industries where there are a sufficient number of firms to minimize the
effect of interdependence, there is less need to closely coordinate interfirm
behaviour. The large number of competitors also makes coordination more
difficult. Under such circumstances, more formal arrangements are usually
necessary to coordinate the firms' behaviour and to provide assurance that
participants in the agreement abide by it. Such express agreements are sus-
ceptible to attack under existing anti-combines legislation. Formal meetings
and/or the exchange of documents are likely to be involved; these are the
elements usually relied upon to prove the existence of a criminal conspiracy.
Even where an express agreement is not found, it may be possible from the
circumstantial evidence to infer an agreement.
However, some of the most serious instances of the joint exercise of
market power by a small number of firms involve behaviour which may not
constitute an agreement within the definition of a criminal conspiracy. This
is the phenomenon of conscious parallelism in which the behaviour of the
leading firms in an oligopoly is closely coordinated without overt collusion
or agreement.
1. Definition of Conscious Parallelism
The term "conscious parallelism" does not have a single definition. Eco-
nomist R. B. Hefiebower states that "'[conscious' refers to awareness of
rivalry with particular firms and of their action, or nonaction, from which
emerges 'parallelism', or the advisability of doing as rivals do." 6
The U.K. Monopolies Commission, in its report on parallel pricing,
described the phenomenon in a very general way "as the practice by which
two or more sellers change their prices at or about the same time and by the
same or similar amount or proportion."'7 The Commission points out that in
oligopolies, "[p]rice changes may be initiated only when there is good reason
to expect that all sellers will benefit from a similar change, whether the change
is upwards or downwards."" This is in contrast to markets populated by a
large number of sellers, where "each will change his prices independently if
it is in his own best interests to do so without conscious consideration of the
decisions of others."
In an oligopoly, the awareness of interdependence by the leading firms
is well-recognized. "However, the crucial fact which the sellers must face
when each has a significant share of the market is that the decisions of all
the sellers in the industry are interdependent, but information about rival
sellers' intentions is imperfect."' 0 The Monopolies Commission report argued
6 R. B. Hefiebower, "Conscious Parallelism and Administered Prices" in Almarin
Phillips, ed., Perspectives on Antitrust Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1962) at 91.
7 United Kingdom Monopolies Commission, Parallel Pricing: A Report on the
General Effect on the Public Interest of the Practice of Parallel Pricing, (1973, Cmnd.
5330) at 2.
8Id. at 3.
AId.
10 Id. at 6.
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that it is this need for information about rivals' intentions that may result
in the domination of the common interest over the interest of individual firms.
I P. Dunn emphasizes the point that firms, through conscious parallel-
ism, seek to coordinate their behaviour without an agreement in the legal
sense.
... [C]onscious parallelism means action by one competing enterprise, A, similar
in detail to that of another business, B, or other businesses, B and C, each one, A,
B and C, relying on the fact that such action is similar and that it will be in the
interest of each to continue that behavior, and yet refrain from communicating
directly with the other for the purpose of entering into a full-blown agreement. 11
In the absence of communication, Dunn argues, the behaviour does not con-
stitute an agreement that is subject to the usual conspiracy provisions. B. F.
Turner also defines conscious parallelism as interfirm coordination without
agreement, i.e., it is "the conscious or knowledgeable adoption of uniform
business practices, without any agreement or understanding, by competitors
in a particular market."' 2
We do not wish to overemphasize the point that closely parallel be-
haviour by oligopolists always refers to situations where an agreement (in
the legal sense) is present. In fact, we shall develop the argument, formu-
lated by Carl Kaysen, that, "[1long continued uniformity of action, extended
through a variety of situations amid changing circumstances, can.., be taken
as a basis for inferring, with a high degree of certainty, the existence of at
least an 'agreement to agree."'l
2. The Problem for Competition Policy
Milton Moore defines the conundrum for competition policy when he
states:
The key assumption in the analysis of their behaviour is that most oligopolies en-
gage in conventional pricing practices that are indistinguishable from the tacit
collusion that is almost universally disapproved.' 4
Moore then points out:
Formal collusion is susceptible to regulation, but conscious parallel action is ex-
tremely difficult to detect and even more difficult to prove, and it is impossible to
prevent independent action on the recognition of mutual dependence. But the
effects of all three are similar.' 5
While the practice of conscious parallelism may not exhibit predatory
content or the customary elements of a formal or even tacit agreement, as
11John Purinton Dunn, Conscious Parallelism Reexamined (1955), 35 Boston
U.L.Rev. 225 at 228.
1 B. F. Turner, Conscious Parallelism in the Pricing of Gasoline (1960), 32 Rocky
Mountain L. Rev. 206 at 211.
13 Carl Kaysen, Collusion Under the Sherman Act (1951), 65 Quarterly Journal of
Economics 263 at 268.
34 Milton Moore, How Much Price Competition? (Montreal and London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1970) at 3.
'5 Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
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defined by the courts, the economic effects may be as pernicious as those asso-
ciated with the more traditional price or market conspiracy. Prices may be
maintained, over considerable periods of time, at a level significantly above
those which would result if the industry were effectively competitive.,' Innova-
tion and technological change may be inhibited or introduced at a slower rate.' 7
Excess capacity may continue to exist over long periods of time, not only
constituting a burden to the consumers of the industry's output, but also act-
ing as a barrier to entry to new competitors. In addition, conscious parallel-
ism may have the effect of shifting the major firms' cost curves upwards due
to inefficiency in production and distribution because of the absence of com-
petitive pressures.' 8 This results in a loss to society as a whole as more re-
sources are used than are necessary with the best available production process.
Even in the absence of technical inefficiency, there is a "deadweight burden"
to society that occurs when oligopolists jointly restrict output below the com-
petitive level.' 9 In addition, in many cases of oligopoly, the firms involved
must invest considerable sums to attain or defend their position of market
power. Such expenditures may take the form of advertising and product
differentiation activities, and lobbying efforts to obtain or maintain favourable
antitrust legislation. As Professor Tullock has remarked, "As a successful
theft will stimulate other thieves to greater industry and require greater in-
vestment in protective measures, so each successful establishment of a mono-
poly or creation of a tariff will stimulate greater diversion of resources to
attempts to organize further transfers of income. . . . T]he total costs of
monopoly should be measured in terms of the efforts to get a monopoly [more
generally, a position of market power] by the unsuccessful as well as the suc-
'6 Fortunately, in most markets the ability to maintain supra-competitive prices is
constrained by a variety of market forces. These constraints on pricing include the
elasticity of product demand, availability of substitute products, possibility of entry by
new domestic firms, threat of imports, costs of communications, cost differences among
firms, product heterogeneity, lumpiness and infrequency of orders, and technological
change.
There can be little doubt that these factors impose constraints on the ability of even
closely-coordinated oligopolists to extract supra-competitive prices on a continuous long
term basis. However, the fact that there may be some limits is little consolation to
Canadian consumers who must pay supra-competitive prices over an extended period of
time. Heflebower, supra, note 6 at 93, points out:
There is one unequivocal meaning of competitive price behaviour: each firm,
without a significant degree of concern about rivals' reactions, adjusts its volume
and prices so as to maximize its profits in a very short span of time.
17 There is considerable uncertainty about this point. See Morton I. Kamien and
Nancy L. Schwartz, Market Structure and Innovation: A Survey (1975), 13 Journal of
Economic Literature 1.
18W. S. Comanor and H. Liebenstein, Allocative Efficiency, X-Efficiency and the
Measurement of Welfare Losses (1969), 36 Economica 304 and C. K. Rowley, Antitrust
and Economic Efflciency (London: MacMillan, 1973), Chap. 5 at 25-32. This view is
questioned by David Schwartzman, Competition and Efficiency: Comment (1973), 81
Journal of Political Economy 756.
19 See D. R. Kamerschen, An Estimation of the "Welfare Losses" from Monopoly
in the American Economy (1965), 4 Western Economic Journal 221 at 236; F. M.
Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1970), Chap. 17.
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cessful." 20 It should be apparent that the resources expended in seeking or
maintaining market power represent a social waste.
B. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF CONSCIOUS PARALLELISM
When the size distribution of firms in an industry is such that a small
number account for a relatively high proportion of industry sales, assets,
employment or value added, individual firm behaviour is constrained by each
firm's need to be sensitive to the interdependence of its interest and that of
the group. The actions of a single firm can no longer be viewed in isolation.
The impact of its pricing and distribution policies is of such a magnitude that
other firms in the industry can be expected to react readily to its marketing
initiatives. In such a situation of mutual dependence, firms will tend to adopt
parallel policies, particularly if the product is undifferentiated. Within limits,
they will match price initiatives of each other. One rival will not initiate a
price increase unless he expects others to match; failure of others to match
price initiatives will almost certainly result in prompt revocation of the price
increase by the initiating firm.
Before a firm initiates a price increase, it may communicate indirectly
with its rivals. An example of this type of behaviour is found in "indepen-
dent"'' 2 statements by executives of various companies in a market to the
media or to trade groups pointing out the need for price increases. Often such
statements are phrased in terms of the pressure of rising costs and coincide
with new wage settlements in the industry. If there are no expressions of dis-
sent, one of the firms may proceed to initiate the price increase. If the others
do not follow, the initiating firm will be compelled by the threat of erosion
of its market share to drop back to previous price lists.
Businessmen, and often economists, argue that parallel action by oli-
gopolists, particularly in the case of homogeneous products, is necessary and
evidences the forces of competition. For example, in their joint submission on
Bill C-42, the Stage II amendments to the Combines Investigation Act,22
twelve of Canada's largest corporations stated that conscious parallelism "may
be the result of acts which are completely independent and which are under-
taken by persons engaged in active competition by similar means. ' 23 The
brief of the Canadian Pacific group of companies stated that conscious paral-
lelism "connotes both a normal and a natural feature of competition in the
marketplace. True competitors ordinarily seek unilaterally to meet or match
20 G. Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft (1967), 5
Western Economic Journal 224 at 231-32.
21 Ile meaning of "independent behaviour" in the context of a concentrated oli-
gopoly will be discussed below.
2 2 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23 as am. c. 10 (lst Supp.); c. 10 (2d Supp.); 1974-75-76,
c. 76; 1976-77, c. 28.
23 "Submission of Abitibi Paper Company, Algoma Steel Corporation, Canada
Packers, Cominco, John Labatt, Macmillan Bloedel, The Molson Companies, Moore
Corporation, Noranda Mines, Power Corporation, The Steel Company of Canada, with
respect to Bill C-42" (1977, mimeo) at 35.
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as much as possible each other's prices, terms and products."2 4 The Invest-
ment Dealers Association brief argued, "competitive considerations dictate
parallel policies within many oligopolies .... -25 The brief of Imperial Oil
Limited stated:
In an oligopoly market, firms normally must recognize their mutual interdepend-
ence because of their fewness. They also are often compelled to follow "closely
parallel policies or closely matching conduct." For example, if they are selling in
the same market, any seller must match a lower price offered by a competitor or
risk losing customers. If demand is buoyant and costs rising, a seller who does not
follow a competitor in raising prices risks losing profits. If one seller advertises
in a market, his competitors normally must do so also.26
These themes were repeated in at least a dozen other briefs.
1. Interfirm Coordination in an Oligopoly
To this point, we have minimized the difficulty experienced by the lead-
ing firms in an oligopoly in reconciling conflicting perceptions of industry
conditions, differences in costs of production and distribution, and oppor-
tunities for independent behaviour not available to rivals, to arrive at a mu-
tually satisfactory solution in respect of price and other variables. It is not
immediately apparent that a group of mutually dependent firms will be able to
move smoothly toward the maximization of collective industry profits. The
essence of oligopoly is that the firms possess at least a modicum of discre-
tionary economic power. Failure to coordinate their behaviour effectively can,
in the extreme, result in bouts of commercial "warfare" in which the price,
profit and output of the oligopoly closely resemble that of a competitive in-
dustry. On the other hand, perfectly coordinated behaviour can result in a
cartel which exhibits the performance characteristics of a monopoly.
Unlike the accepted theory of perfect competition or that of pure mono-
poly, there are many theories of oligopoly behaviour. To the extent that they
are deterministic, they rely upon unrealistic assumptions. To the extent that
they are behaviourally rich in their assumptions, they are non-deterministic
in terms of the price, profit and level of output they predict. R. B. Heflebower
writes:
Economists have not been able to develop a theory of price behaviour for [manu-
facturing industries with few sellers] for when sellers are few they tend to be "joint-
ly acting oligopolists" because of the "conjectural interdependence" among them.
Each seller's behaviour is restrained by his expectations as to how his rivals will
react to a price-change by him. There is a circularity in sellers' reactions and there
is no definitive theory of how the circle is broken except by some collusive device. 7
In Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance,28 F. M. Scherer
24 "Brief of the Canadian Pacific Group of Companies on Bill C-42" (1977,
mimeo) at 22.
25 "Submission by the Investment Dealers Association of Canada to the Hon.
Anthony C. Abbott, Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs" (May 17, 1977,
mimeo) at 14. (emphasis added).
20 "Submission of Imperial Oil Limited re Bill C-42" (1977, mimeo) at 111.10.
27 Heflebower, supra, note 6 at 89-90.
28 Scherer, supra, note 19, Chapters 7 and 8.
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purposely did not review a number of the models of oligopoly. Rather, his
approach was to describe the conditions which facilitate oligopolistic coordin-
ation and those which limit it.
So far we have argued that in a concentrated industry, where firms are
interdependent, firms will be reluctant to cut the price in the hope of increas-
ing their output and profits. Such an action will have a discernible effect on
rivals' sales and these rivals will retaliate. Matching price reductions by all
the leading sellers will result in reduced profits for all of the firms. As Posner
emphasizes, this formulation of the problem depends upon certain assump-
tions:2 (a) that there is no appreciable time lag between the initial price
cut and the responses of rivals; (b) that the price cut cannot be concealed,
at least for some time; (c) that rivals will respond without hesitation by
matching the price cut;30 and (d) that the price cutter is not able to practice
price discrimination, i.e., cut the price to some of his customers but not
others. In actual fact, however, many of these assumptions do not hold.
Posner also argues that, depending on the price elasticity of demand, a
proportion of the price cutter's increase in sales volume will come from new
customers formerly outside the market as well as from those of his rivals.3 '
He also points out that a relatively large increase in a leading firm's output is
needed to produce a significant effect on the market shares of rivals. Further,
the reluctance of oligopolists to reduce price is a matter of concern only if
the existing level of prices results in supracompetitive profits.3 2 Scherer spells
out a fairly large number of other conditions which limit oligopolistic coor-
dination: (i) the number and size distribution of sellers, i.e., as the number
of sellers increase, the probability that individual sellers will ignore their rivals
increases as do the odds of getting a maverick. The presence of a competitive
"fringe" inhibits coordination among the leading firms; (ii) product hetero-
geneity, i.e., the greater the heterogeneity, the more difficult coordination;
(iii) the dynamic implications of cost structures, i.e., where overhead costs
are high, pricing discipline tends to break down during recessions; (iv) the size
and frequency of orders, i.e., close coordination is easier if orders are small,
frequent and regular; and (v) the nature of the industry's social structure.3
To the extent that some of the conditions which limit oligopolistic co-
ordination exist in the real world, the simple interdependence theory of inter-
firm coordination alone resulting in consistent supracompetitive pricing and
profits is subject to challenge.3 4 If interdependence, although recognized, is
insufficient to overcome the conditions that inhibit coordination, what other
techniques are available?
2 9 Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust LMVs: A Suggested Approach
(1969), 21 Stan.L.Rev. 1562 at 1566.30 There is also a question as to how rapidly the firm can expand output after it has
decided to do so, e.g., the extent of its excess capacity.
3l Supra, note 29 at 1567.
82 Id. at 1568.
3s Supra, note 19 at 183-212.
34 Supra, note 29 at 1569.
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There are a wide variety of means which oligopolists may use to obtain
greater benefits from their market power. These include collusion, both
overt and tacit, conscious parallelism (often reinforced by the use of "plus
factors"), mergers to reduce the number of competitors, various forms of
price leadership and even cutthroat competition to eliminate competitors and
to reinforce the need for less aggressive forms of interaction. Overt collusion
is almost universally condemned by antitrust law. 5 Tacit collusion is both
harder to effect and harder to detect, but is also condemned by the conspiracy
provisions of the antitrust laws. Mergers represent the ultimate form of inter-
firm coordination, but they, too, come under the baleful eyes of the antitrust
authorities-particularly in the United States. Price wars to discipline aggres-
sive competitors are an expensive way to induce "harmony" in an oligopoly.
Since the distinction between the various forms of price leadership and con-
scious parallelism is not great, we will consider them together. We focus on
conscious parallelism because it is a common form of interfirm coordination
in oligopoly, and, per se, is immune from prosecution by the U.S. and Cana-
dian anti-trust authorities. 6
But parallel behaviour is insufficient to ensure the stability of those cir-
cumstances which produce supracompetitive prices and profits. Posner em-
phasizes this point when he states, ".. . the conventional formulation of the
oligopoly problem, which holds that oligopolists are interdependent as to price
and output, is inadequate.... [Voluntary actions by the sellers are necessary
to translate the bare condition of an oligopoly market into a situation of non-
competitive pricing."37 Although he is a lawyer, Posner takes an economic
approach to the matter of collusion among oligopolists. He sees it as "a ra-
tional and effective business strategy only if its returns exceed its costs." 38
These costs include those of "bargaining to agreement and of enforcing the
agreement to prevent cheating. 839 Posner is correct when he asserts, ". . . it
seems improbable that prices could long be maintained above cost in a market,
even a highly oligopolistic one, without some explicit acts of communication
and implementation." 40 Donald F. Turner, formerly head of the U.S. Anti-
trust Division, agrees. He notes that in most situations, the economic condi-
tions facing specific firms are not identical. For example, their cost functions
are not identical, product/service combinations are not completely standard-
ized, and information about competitors is imperfect. In such circumstances,
Turner points out, "[fjor a pattern of noncompetitive pricing to emerge...
35 Criminal condemnation has not, of course eliminated the existence of collusion.
Between 1889 and 1974/75 the Crown brought 83 cases of conspiracy to fix prices
before the courts and won 70 of them. See Paul K. Gorecki and W. T. Stanbury,
Canada's Combines Investigation Act: The Record of Public Law Enforcement (paper
presented at the National Conference on Competition Policy, University of Toronto,
May 12, 13, 1977), Table 10. In the fiscal year 1975/76, the Crown laid charges in
another four conspiracy cases and in 1976/77 it did so in seven cases.
86 This point will be discussed in Section D, below.
87 Supra, note 29 at 1575.
a8 Id. at 1569.
39 Id. at 1571.
40 Id. at 1574.
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requires something which we could, not unreasonably, call a 'meeting of
minds,' or to use Professor Kaysen's phrase, an 'agreement to agree.' ",41
Posner's conclusion for public policy, with which Turner might not
agree, is as follows:
Perhaps in an extreme case no explicit acts of collusion or enforcement are neces-
sary for [the translation of interdependence into noncompetitive pricing], only a
tacit understanding on restricting output [thus raising price], and perhaps in a
larger number of cases explicit acts are necessary but completely concealable.
There is no need to distinguish these categories. Both can be considered forms of
tacit collusion (or, synonymously, noncompetitive pricing by oligopolists), since
that is how they would appear to a trier of fact. The essential point, in any event,
is that tacit collusion thus defined is very like express collusion.42
Posner argues that the following types of behaviour are proof of the existence
of tacit collusion as he defines it:43 joint systematic price discrimination (in-
cluding highly simplified systems which fail to reflect cost differences); pro-
longed excess of capacity over demand; relatively low frequency of changes
in price; disproportionate response of price to changes in cost; abnormal profits;
price leadership (the last two in a qualified form); the existence of fixed
market shares; identical sealed bids for nonstandard items; refusal to offer
discounts in the face of substantial excess capacity; the announcement of price
increases far in advance without legitimate business justification for so doing;
and public statements as to what a seller considers the right price for the
industry to maintain.
The need for interfirm coordination in an oligopoly is greatest in dis-
equilibrium situations. Heflebower points out that the response by oligopolists
to a disequilibrating development
... may be delayed or averted by direct communication among rivals or by 'props'
that have been erected by [conscious act or evolution] on the market stage-pricing
systems and price leadership are examples-or signals made by the players. The
latter include publicized statements as to what ought to happen, and announce-
ments of cutback in output. But where sellers are very few and have similar costs
and the product is standardized and sold to expert buyers, such procedures are less
necessary [to avert price competition], for 'quasi-agreement' by conjectural inter-
dependence alone is relatively easy.44
As one moves along the marketplace continuum from perfectly competitive
towards duopoly, attempts at nonformal "agreements" become more probable
but also more difficult. Heflebower indicates that a variety of "devices," "spe-
cial props" and "signalling devices" will be found such as, for example, trade
association activities, block booking by film distributors, zone pricing of
durable goods, delivered pricing, and functional discounts. 45 He points out
such practices tend to be institutionalized and generally have a stabilizing
41 D. F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act. Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal (1962), 75 Harv. L.Rev. 655 at 664.
42 Supra, note 29 at 1575.
43 d. at 1578-82. See also his article, A Program for the Antitrust Division (1971),
38 U. of Chic. L.Rev. 500 at 516-23.
44 Supra, note 6 at 105.
45 Id. at 111.
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influence on prices and market shares. For example, a sort of "quasi-agree-
ment" on the base price level may not be too difficult to achieve, but it is the
props which enshrine the price structure and which could not exist in the ab-
sence of a consciously parallel course of action.40
In summary, when one examines cases of conscious parallelism more
closely one is likely to find that the close coordination of interfirm behaviour
has been aided by one or more "plus factors" designed to ensure that inde-
pendent behaviour is minimized.
2. Parallelism and Independent Decisions
Businessmen argue that parallel action or matching conduct should not
be subject to legislative sanctions because it is the result of the independent
decisions of the firms involved. Unless there is a proven agreement among
the leading firms to adopt closely parallel policies, it is argued, business firms
should not be subject to civil or criminal penalties for independent decisions
to match the price or other behaviour of rivals. But this begs the question:
what is meant by "independent" decision-making in the context of an oligopoly?
The dilemma for anti-combines enforcement is that the parallel be-
haviour which is witnessed when all the firms in an industry announce iden-
tical price changes within a short period of time may be a reflection of a
formal conspiracy, or it may simply reflect a series of independent decisions
in the market. For example, costs of materials may have risen for all firms
in an industry such that a price increase is necessary if a reasonable profit
is to be maintained. All firms are aware that costs have risen and a price
increase is deemed necessary. One firm announces a price increase; all others
follow the lead and raise their prices, aware that if they are selling substan-
tially similar products, their prices must be comparable. No conspiracy in the
legal sense has occurred. Each firm has made its own decisions, but it has
done so in response to a common motivating factor, fully aware of the inter-
dependence of the major firms in the market. On the other hand, the process
may only be a facade, a means by which to maintain supracompetitive prices,
using the announcement of increased costs as a coordinating device. Typically,
there is no assurance of which is the correct interpretation. How is the policy
maker to deal with the problem?
Discussions of conscious parallelism usually stress that the situation is
immune to attack because each firm has acted independently and there is no
evidence of an agreement in the legal sense. It is argued that there is not even
a tacit agreement and, moreover, that one cannot even infer a tacit agreement
from the existence of conscious parallelism. But we must examine more
closely the theory of independent decision-making in the context of an oligop-
oly. At least two quite different interpretations arise: each firm makes the
best decision it can, taking full account of the context in which the firm oper-
ates, without any attempt to communicate with other members of the industry,
or, alternatively, each firm makes the best decision it can without reference
to its position of interdependence. Depending on what is meant by "inde-
pendent," this latter proposition results in a non sequitur in the case of an
46 Id. at 112.
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oligopoly. Among the dictionary definitions are the following: "not subject
to the authority of another; autonomous; self determining; not dependent on
or part of some large group [or] system; not affected or influenced in action,
opinion etc ...... ,47 The essence of an oligopoly is that the number of firms
is sufficiently few that they are mutually dependent; a change in the price or
output of any firm has a detectable effect upon all the firms in the relevant
market. Plainly, if an oligopolist is going to exist over time he cannot be
"self-determining" or "autonomous." He is, in fact, dependent on and is part
of some larger group or system. He is affected by and influenced in his choice
of action by others, namely the other members of the industry.
Turner argues that "conscious parallelism is devoid of anything that
might reasonably be called an agreement when it involves simply the inde-
pendent responses of a group of competitors to the same set of economic facts
-independent in the sense that each would have made the same decision for
himself even though his competitors decided otherwise. '4 It is the last part
of the sentence which is crucial to the distinction between behaviour which
might properly be called a tacit agreement and that which should be called
rational decision-making by an oligopolist.
We conclude that, in the context of an oligopoly, "independent" be-
haviour by the individual firms can only mean that they make their decisions
without any attempt to communicate with other firms in the industry-except
by their actions, which of course contain information. To ask an oligopolist
to behave independently in the sense of not taking into account the actions
and reactions of his competitors is to ask him to behave irrationally.
To prohibit oligopolists from matching the prices of rivals is to signifi-
cantly revise the established rules of the marketplace and might simply cause
firms to adopt insignificant price spreads to be offset by marginal service
differentials.
In industries in which a standardized product is sold, buyers with some
monopsonistic power will often try to put pressures on list prices, but in most
cases the quoted off-list prices also turn out to be identical. This similarity
may be due to the fact that sales representatives of major companies instruct
customers to contact them for a new price quotation before buying at lower
prices quoted by a competitor. In either case, to prohibit the publication of
list prices does not solve the fundamental problem, though it is possible that
price stability in some industries would be undermined by such a requirement.
3. Phillips" Model of Interfirm Coordination
In more highly concentrated oligopolistic markets, interfirm coordination
is characterized by tacit, rather than overt or express, agreements. There is
recognition of a group identity and an acknowledgement that for industry
47Funk and Wagnall's Standard College Dictionary (Toronto: Fitzhenry and
Whiteside, 1974) at 684.
4 8 Supra, note 41 at 663.
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stability to be attained, some decisions must be group decisions.49 As such,
they are likely to be based on compromise among the participants. Generally
speaking, the study of group behaviour has been eschewed by economists and
left to the sociologists, social psychologists and other behavioural scientists.
However, since the writing of Chamberlin,50 there has been an appreciation of
the element of mutual dependence in most industrial markets. Henderson ex-
plains the ubiquitous nature of interdependence in other than perfectly com-
petitive markets:
There may be thousands of grocers, yet each grocer will be intimately affected
by a very small number of neighboring grocers-who may be close geographi-
cally, or similar in the type of customer to whom they cater. Among dozens of
makers of electrical machinery, each will have his own small group of particular
rivals. An industry is like a forest: each tree is far from almost all the rest, but
each has some close neighbors. What looks, at first sight, like an imperfectly
competitive industry turns out to be a series of linked oligopolies. 51
Almarin Phillips has borrowed from the literature of the sociologists and
applied group theory to explain the behaviour of firms in an oligopolistic
market. 52 According to Phillips' model, special recognition of interdependence
develops within oligopolistic markets in which parallel action reflects realiza-
tion by the producers, or sellers, that they are members of a group. Within
the group, a leader emerges, and a written or unwritten code develops which
establishes rules of conduct for the group members vis-A-vis each other and
non-group members. Conflict within the group is likely to be closely regulated
by the code. Thus within the oligopoly, price leadership is common, and
there is likely to be a noticeable absence of the most threatening form of
intra-group conflict: price competition. However, non-price competition, as
a form of benign rivalry, may be accepted. The industry as an organization,
like the firm as an organization, is perceived to have rules; this is not to say
that failure and success for individual participants are considered undesirable.
This market stabilizing behaviour may result in either shared monopoly or
market segmentation with each firm exercising dominance in a sub-market.
In Phillips' framework:
The group, as opposed to its individual members, does have a general objective-
the objective of providing and enforcing such standards of conduct as will elimi-
nate the indeterminacy which accompanies markets in which firms are mutually
interdependent. Without some such group action, each firm will be worse off in
terms of its own subgoals. Thus, while the group goal may be closely related to
the firms' subgoals, being a member of the market group involves the surrender
49 The U.K. MVonopolies Commission writes, "Parallel pricing behaviour is the
outcome of an appreciation by the sellers in an [oligopolistic] industry that the interests
of each member of the group might be best secured by the co-ordinated pursuit of the
interests of the group as a whole." Supra, note 7 at 34.
50 Edward Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1933).
51 Alexander Henderson, The Theory of Duopoly (1954), 68 Quarterly Journal of
Economics 565 at 565.
S2 Almarin Phillips, Market Structure, Organization and Performance (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1962).
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of some amount of the firm's sovereignty and of its freedom to seek its own
subgoal to the detriment of other firms.6S
But Phillips goes on to point out:
Unilaterally pursued, more profit to one frequently means less to another; a larger
market share for one, a smaller share for another. Retaliatory action-rivalry-may
mean that the subgoals of none are achieved. The interfirm organization-tacit
and informal in the case of simple oligopoly-acts to resolve these conflicts to
the mutual advantage of all if to the unique advantage of none.64
Within this group framework, an increase in the size of the group will
threaten the effectiveness of implicit agreements, and increase the need for a
formal agreement. In Canada, the most elaborate conspiracies have involved
eight or more parties. 55
Some problems of cohesion may be overcome by the existence of a group
leader. Differences in power positions can potentially provide a stable social
order within the group. Leadership becomes a substitute for formal organiza-
tion and assures the subordination of subgroup goals to group goals.50
Phillips' behavioural orientation and acceptance of the logic and, indeed,
the desirability of establishing reasonable rules of the game for group be-
haviour, is aptly reflected in his observation that:
The important questions in conscious parallelism cases do not concern whether
the firms involved have reached an "agreement" or whether they have "com-
municated" with respect to price and other matters of rivalry. Because of the
smallness of the group of firms in simple oligopolistic markets, the conclusion is
certain (if an obvious price war is not in existence) that the firms have--in a
behavioural sense-communicated and, to a degree, agreed on certain aspects of
conduct. Rivalry is bound to be limited within the group and behaviour is directed
and tempered by their informal interfirm organization. Their agreement, while
varying in subject matter, duration and effectiveness, may be as complete as that
reached through the use of explicit and overt communication and a formal organi-
zation in markets in which firms are many. The important questions, then, relate
to the effectiveness of the organization in restraining rivalry and to the probable
impact such restraint has on market performance.57
To Phillips, the focus of oligopolistic group behaviour is on cooperative
competition: the limiting of the boundaries of rivalry and the avoidance of
excessive or destructive rivalry. In an oligopoly, the participants recognize the
53 Id. at 28.
54 Id. at 29.
55 Of the 48 conspiracy convictions in Canada between 1889 and 1974/75 resulting
in fines, excluding those in which only individuals or an association was the subject of
the prosecution, twenty-one involved eight or more firms. In some of the more elaborate
conspiracies a considerably larger number of firms were convicted, as in Container
Materials, Ltd. v. The King, [1942] S.C.R. 147; 1 D.L.R. 529; 77 C.C.C. 129, in which
nineteen firms were convicted. See also, Howard Smith Paper Mills, Limited v. The
Queen, [19571 S.C.R. 403; 8 D.L.R. (2d) 449; 118 C.C.C. 321; 26 C.R. 1 (twenty-eight
firms); R. v. Abitibi Power and Paper Company, Limited (1961), C.C.C. 201; 36
C.P.R. 188 (seventeen firms); R. v. Canadian Coat & Apron Supply Ltd. (1967), 2 Ex.
C.R. 53; 2 C.R.N.S. 62; 52 C.P.R. 189 (eighteen firms); and R. v. St. Lawrence Corp.
Ltd., [1969] 2 O.R. 305; 5 D.L.R. (3d) 263; C.C.C. 263; 59 C.P.R. 97 (twenty firms).
56 Supra, note 52 at 31.
571d. at73.
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importance of the behaviour of each of the major firms to the other firms with
a significant market share. Appreciating their mutual dependence, they will
individually recognize that mutual benefit is to be derived from the adoption
of non-competitive pricing conduct. A unity of purpose or a common design
and understanding emerges and a collective monopolization ensues without
overt agreements. For Phillips, consciously parallel behaviour is natural be-
haviour which may not be detrimental to the public interest.
C. REVIEW OF THE CANADIAN CASES
Before commencing a detailed review of the relevant cases, it should be
noted that conscious parallelism cases, more so than ordinary conspiracy
cases, turn on the precise nature of the facts rather than the interpretation of
the law, although it is evident that old law is being interpreted in the light of
new economic facts.
1. R. v. Canada Cement Lafarge
Not until 1973, over three-quarters of a century since the passage of the
first anti-combines legislation in Canada, did the issue of conscious parallelism
become the subject of a judicial proceeding.5 s In the first case, R. v. Canada
Cement Lafarge Ltd.,59 four cement producers were discharged at a prelimin-
ary hearing concerning an alleged violation of section 32 (1) (c) of the Com-
bines Investigation Act. Provincial Court Judge Camblin ruled that:
the resulting prices set by the companies are the result of conscious parallelism
and the companies are therefore discharged.60
He apparently based his ruling on a speech given in October, 1962 by D. H. W.
Henry, then Director of Investigation and Research under the Combines In-
vestigation Act. Mr. Henry said, in part:
Conscious parallelism, if conducted without collusion among the members of the
industry, is not an offence. This is because if such collusion is not present, there is
not the element of agreement or arrangement necessary to constitute the offence
of conspiracy. I must emphasize, however, that this is so only in the absence of
collusion.61
Mr. Henry stepped out of his appointed role as chief investigator of restraints
of trade in Canada to make a pronouncement on the law which was to have
wider implications than he might have expected. Some months after he made
the 1962 speech, the Canadian Steel Warehousing Association published a
pamphlet entitled "Permissible Trade Practice in Conformity with the Com-
bines Investigation Act" in which his discussion of oligopoly and conscious
58 In the U.S., the conscious parallelism cases date from the 1940's.
G9 R. v. Canada Cement Lafarge Ltd. (1973), 12 C.P.R. (2d) 12.
6o Id. at 17.
61 Id. at 15. The speech was originally given to the Public Buyers Group of British
Columbia (Vancouver: October 12, 1962; mimeo) at 8. The entire quotation in thejudgment consisted of almost two pages of fine print. In his Report of the Director of
Investigation and Research, Combines Investigation Act, for the year ended March 31,
1961 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1961) at 23-24, Mr. Henry dealt in similar terms with
the problem of identical tenders submitted by oligopolists producing homogeneous
products.
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parallelism is cited.62 Over a decade later, in the Alcan case, 8 the decision
of Camblin J. was relied upon in the discharge of four aluminum extruders.
The words of Mr. Henry dealing with price leadership without collusion were
quoted by the judge in that case.64
The facts of the Canada Cement Lafarge case are interesting in that they
provide a profile of a concentrated oligopoly producing a homogeneous prod-
uct (Portland cement) in a regional market (Ontario). Camblin J. pointed
out that Canada Cement had about forty per cent of the market, while the
other three major producers had about twenty-five per cent, twenty per cent
and twelve per cent respectively. He indicated that between 1955 (when the
investigation began) until the middle of 1959, "one finds the marketing ar-
rangements to be in a somewhat chaotic condition due, among other problems,
to the incongruous freight allowances.... [C]ommencing in 1959, an element
of harmony was detected."65 Identical tenders were received for large govern-
ment contracts and the prices charged by all the major companies in different
areas were, with very few exceptions, found to be identical. The Crown
alleged that such harmony was the result of an illegal conspiracy. Camblin J.
concluded:
Defence counsel, I am sure, will agree that the Crown has established that the
companies involved are using a base freight factor pricing which did not come
about by mere coincidence.C6
He then went on to quote Mr. Henry's words on the nature of oligopoly, con-
scious parallelism (which Henry defined to be "the tendency on the part of a
small group of firms constituting an industry to act more or less in a uniform
manner") ,67 and the ubiquity of identical tenders and identical selling prices.
Although he appears to have concluded that the mutual adoption of a basing
point pricing scheme occurred as a result of an illegal agreement (tacit or
overt), Camblin J. proceeded to adopt Mr. Henry's views in deciding that
conscious parallelism is not prohibited by the Combines Investigation Act.08
Primarily because the alleged conspiracy to establish the basing point
scheme (which would result in identical prices by all suppliers to any cus-
tomer) occured in 1959, and because the information was not laid until
December 1, 1972, the Crown did not proceed by way of preferred indictment.
This decision must be viewed as at least a minor victory for users of a basing
point pricing scheme.
62 R. v. Armco Canada Ltd. (1974), 6 0.R. (2d) 521; 21 C.C.C. (2d) 129; 17
C.P.R. (2d) 211; at (C.C.C.) 148, 149, 150.
63 R. v. Aluminium Co. of Canada Ltd. (1975), 22 C.P.R. (2d) 216. (Preliminary
Hearing).
64 Id. at 221.
65 Supra, note 59 at 14.
60Id.
671d.
68 The case was reported in an American academic journal: (1974), 19 Antitrust
Bulletin 55.
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2. R. v. Armco Canada Ltd.0
To date, the most significant combines decision in Canada with respect
to conscious parallelism is that of Mr. Justice Lerner in the Armco case,
handed down on September 19, 1974.
a. Summary of the Facts
Ten corporations were charged with violating section 32 (1) (c) of the
Combines Investigation Act in a conspiracy to fix the price of corrugated
metal pipe culverts throughout Ontario and Quebec during the period Novem-
ber 1962 through August 1967. Eleven individuals, a trade association and
five firms were named as co-conspirators. The case provides an excellent illus-
tration of the process by which competitors in an oligopoly move, through
"spontaneous coordination" aided by exhortations to follow an "open pricing
policy," from the recognition of their mutual dependence to the ability to act
upon the recognition of their interdependence.
In 1958, sales of metal culverts in Canada (in tons) increased by six
per cent over the previous year. In 1959 they increased by eleven per cent,
but in 1960 they fell by over seventeen per cent relative to the 1959 output.
Total Canadian sales in 1961 were up almost eighteen per cent over the 1960
output. 70 In November of 1961, the Corrugated Metal Pipe Institute was in-
corporated. By late 1962, nine eastern producers and one western firm were
active members and three large steel makers, suppliers of the basic raw ma-
terial, were associate members. Apparently, significant overcapacity existed in
the early 1960's. In 1957, there were fifteen producers operating thirty-seven
plants; in 1962 there were twenty-two producers with forty-nine plants. An
Armco executive testified that, in 1963, the industry was operating at only
thirty per cent of capacity. He also indicated the ease of entry: a capital in-
vestment of only $40,000 to $50,000 was required, indicating that "this kind
of manufacturing could even be carried on in a barn. '7 1 The president of the
Institute, who was also president of Armco, the largest producer, described
the situation as "cutthroat competition." Lerner J. concluded that, in the fiscal
years of 1962 and 1963, the contracts awarded by the Department of High-
ways of Ontario (DHO) "reflect active competition among the corrugated
steel pipe producers. . ". ."72 The Restrictive Trade Practices Commission
(RTPC) reported "the relative positions of firms having their head offices in
Ontario in the Canadian market" in 1963 as follows: Armco 42.3 per cent,
Rosco 14.2 per cent, Westeel 12.5 per cent, Robertsteel 7.5 per cent, Pedlar
7.1 per cent, Ontario Culvert 3.5 per cent and six others whose shares ranged
from 0.8 per cent to 1.5 per cent.73 Apparently competition was intensified by
the fact that concrete pipe producers were making inroads in the supply of
pipe for sewers and drainage.
69 Supra, note 62.
70 The Metal Culvert Industry, Ontario and Quebec (Ottawa: Restrictive Trade
Practices Commission, 1970).
71 Supra, note 62 at (C.C.C.) 136.
72 Id. at 135.
73 Supra, note 70 at 29.
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In November of 1962 an executive of Robertsteel, Mr. Turney, intro-
duced the subject of an open price policy at a meeting of the Corrugated
Metal Pipe Institute. Subsequently, in a letter to the directors of the Institute,
Mr. Turney proposed that the Institute might follow a similar policy to the
one employed by the Canadian Steel Warehousing Association, of which
Robertsteel was a member. Lerner J. described the policy in this way:
The "open price policy" advocated that each firm openly set out its prices in
written or printed form, including discounts, terms of credit, and make these avail-
able to all customers, competitors and the public.74
But, as the judge pointed out, the real objective was, in Turney's words, "that
prices will adjust themselves to the requirements of the individual producers
and ultimately reflect the true state of the market through the natural forces
of known competition. '75 Lemer I., however, recognized this attempt to
frustrate the mechanisms of a free market: "an 'open price policy' would be
the means of preventing price-cutting competition by all manufacturers for
customers. s7 6 Not only would active price competition be abolished, but in
the open price policy the Institute would have found a legal means of ob-
taining the desired result. This point was stressed in a speech by Mr. Yeo,
the president of the Canadian Steel Warehousing Association, the text of
which was sent, with Turney's letter, to the major metal culvert manufacturers.
Yeo's words indicate the problem of conscious parallelism for competition
policy:
The test [of legality] is whether the uniform price has come about by the freely
competitive and independent actions of the individual members of an industry,
and not by agreement 77
In other words, if the firms are able to coordinate their actions spontaneously
without collusion or a conspiracy or even tacit agreement, they cannot be
convicted under the existing section 32. Lerner J. articulated the prosecution's
problem: ".... any finding of an agreement... would have to be from infer-
ences to be drawn based on the rule in Hodge's Case7 8 ... that there was a
74Supra, note 62 at (C.C.C.) 138.
75 id.
76 Id.
77 d. at 141.
78 Hodge's Case (1838), 2 Lewin 227; 168 E.R. 1136.
While the Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Cooper (1977), 37 C.R.N.S. 1,
held that it is no longer "an inexorable rule of law in Canada" that the trial judge
must direct the jury according to the rule in Hodge's Case, (per Ritchie J. at 18),
there is nothing to prevent the trier of fact from continuing to evaluate circumstantial
evidence in the light of that rule. In R. v. Mitchell, [1964] S.C.R. 471 the Court held
that "[tihe direction in Hodge's Case [does] not add to or substract from the requirement
that the proof of guilt in a criminal case must be beyond a reasonable doubt." (per
Spence J. at 479). In Cooper, Laskin C.J.C. (dissenting on another point) said "The
time has come to reject the formula in Hodge's Case as an inexorable rule of law in
Canada. Without being dogmatic against any use of the formula of the charge in
Hodge's Case, I would leave the matter to the good sense of the trial judge ... with
the reminder that a charge in terms of the traditional formula of required proof beyond
a reasonable doubt is the safest as well as the simplest way to bring a lay jury to the
appreciation of the burden of proof resting on the Crown in a criminal case." (at 21-
22). (We are indebted to Prof. M. T. MacCrimmon for this point).
[VCOL. 15, NO. :3
Conscious Parallelism
tacit agreement between or among the accused. ' 79 The crux then is the appli-
cation of that rule, which provides that when the proof of a conspiracy must
be inferred from circumstantial evidence, the inferences drawn from the acts
and words of the accused or their agents must be consistent only with the
establishment of an illegal or unlawful arrangement or agreement and be in-
consistent with any other rational conclusion.
Having promoted the open price policy before the Steel Warehousing
Association, A. D. Russell of Russell Industries addressed the Corrugated
Metal Pipe Institute on the same subject in February 1962. He exhorted his
audience of fifty, representing fifteen companies, to see the benefits of price
stabilization, describing competitive price cutting as "unintelligent competition
... and no theory of economics nor any law in the country requires unintel-
ligent competition."s0 He pushed the idea that open price lists disclosed facts
which businessmen were entitled to use in the formulation of their own mer-
chandising decisions, but he also indicated they were not entitled to use them
with competitors "in the formulation of joint merchandising decisions how-
ever intelligent they may seem."81 It seems clear that businessmen recognize
the value of such open price lists as a device to facilitate the coordination of
interfirm behaviour and so enable them to act on the recognition of their
mutual dependence. Mr. Russell alluded to the words of John Donne in trying
to convince the members of the industry to act on the recognition of their
interdependence:
. .. [Ilt becomes necessary through a process of education within an industry to
establish clearly in the minds of all members that no man is an island unto himself
and that every action great or small will eventually cause a counteraction .... 82
He concluded that "the right of price leadership . . . does not belong to a
select few but can be assumed at will, even by the smallest and weakest mem-
ber."83 There is much economic sense in Mr. Russell's remarks. As Milton
Moore reminds us, the price leader in the context of a homogeneous-good
oligopoly is the firm least disposed to raise prices and most disposed to lower
them.84
In the month following Russell's speech, Mr. B. C. Pepper, counsel for
the Institute, wrote a letter to D. H. W. Henry in which he, in Lerner J.'s
terminology, "put up a trial balloon." Pepper had told the members of the
Institute that "they would be on dangerous ground to endeavour to introduce
the [open price] policy by tacit or express agreement."8 5 He went on to say
with respect to firms not adopting the policy: "It is one thing to educate or
to exhort. It is quite another to persuade by inducement or compulsion."80
79 Supra, note 62 at (C.C.C) 141-42.
80 Id. at 144.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 145.
83 Id. at 146.
84 Supra, note 14 at 31-36.
8 5 Supra, note 62 at 146.
861d.
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The legality of the emergence of an open pricing policy was put by Mr.
Pepper as follows:
If all the members of the metal culvert industry publish identical prices and subse-
quently make identical tenders, how does one persuade the objective outsider, that
is to say a Supreme Court judge, that those prices have been arrived at inde-
pendently and not by collusion?8 7
Prior to Mr. Pepper's letter, Mr. Russell consulted with Mr. Henry "be-
cause some members of the Canadian Steel Warehousing Association were
not adhering to the open price policy in that industry and Mr. Russell was
concerned as to how far he might be able to go in dealing with dissidents."' 8
What better place to go to get advice on the matter than to the head of the
agency charged with enforcing the anti-combines legislation?" Mr. Henry
replied in part that, "efforts to educate must not involve any attempts at col-
lusion or at coercion or threat of reprisal." 90
It is worth examining this statement closely. It appears to imply that, if
through "education," the members of the industry are able to establish com-
mon prices, the Director of Investigation and Research assures them they are
beyond the reach of the law. Could such advice not be construed as a tacit
invitation to engage in extensive efforts at education to facilitate "spontaneous
coordination" in a way that would not involve an illegal conspiracy?
However, Mr. Henry did point out to Mr. Russell that a court may find
a collusive arrangement to exist on the basis of
inference from surrounding circumstances rather than from an examination of
direct evidence of agreement or understanding. In such circumstances, successive
steps, each of which looked at independently and in isolation might be regarded
as lawful, can bring the participants closer to the brink of illegality.0 1
Mr. Henry went on to say,
It seems to me that once the activities of the Association go beyond education
and explanation and take the form of direct persuasion and implied coercion of
individuals, it can scarcely be said that the industry members have independently
adopted the policy in question.92
In the same letter, Henry criticized Mr. Russell's address to the Steel Ware-
housing Association.
It is one thing for such oligopoly characteristics [price leadership or conscious
parallelism] to develop of themselves without collusion; it is quite another matterfor members of an industry to make a conscious effort collectively to bring them
about.9 3
On May 2, 1963 the directors of the Corrugated Metal Pipe Institute met and
87 Id.
88 Id. at 147.
89 See Report of the Director of Investigation and Research, Combines Investiga-
tion Act, for the year ended March 31, 1965 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1965) at 15.
90 Supra, note 62 at (C.C.C.) 147.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 147-48.
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discussed the merits of an open price policy. The Institute's counsel, Mr.
Pepper, "strongly pointed out that such pricing had to be reached 'individ-
ually and independently' by each member, but that the Institute was within
its legal rights to undertake 'purely educational' action on benefits of such
policies to the industry."94 A formal resolution was passed which averred that
"potential benefits could be derived by individual members of the industry
from the adoption of the open pricing policy."9' 5 Shortly thereafter, a memo
implying that the Institute had completed its investigation of the matter and
proposed to take no further action went to all existing and prospective mem-
bers of the Institute. It was accompanied by a copy of Turney's "Report of
Investigation into an Open Price Policy for the Highway Drainage Industry,"
the pamphlet prepared by the Steel Warehousing Association on the open
price policy, and a copy of Mr. Henry's letter to Mr. Russell. Despite the ex-
tensive communications aimed at achieving conscious parallelism, Lerner I.
stated:
At this stage of the chronology . . .an agreement or tacit agreement to lessen
competition unduly by instituting an open price policy could not be inferred
beyond a reasonable doubt.96
In June 1963, at the urging of Mr. Turney, Robertsteel published an
open price list. But Robertsteel was a leader without followers as Armco con-
tinued to give discounts. The largest producer and the first to produce heli-
cally formed pipe, Armco offered to sell up to twenty-four inch diameter pipe
for five per cent less than its previous list prices and offered quantity dis-
counts. While Anxco did not follow the leader, Ontario Culvert wrote to
Carleton Culvert, "The enclosed Robertsteel price lists will be used, effective
immediately until further notice."97 One week later this was retracted. Robert-
steel's effort to establish price leadership with an open price policy had not
succeeded.
Some time after September 2, 1963, two vice-presidents of Dofasco and
Stelco, two of Canada's largest steel companies, who were also directors of
the Institute, undertook to do a report on the problems of the metal culvert
industry. Their report, described as the Craig-Allan report, was sent by Mr.
Allan directly to all members of the Institute. The report began by stating that
it was "a review by an impartial source of the market problems presently con-
fronting the producers of corrugated metal pipe in Canada .... 98 The authors
of the report were not indicated in the body of the report. Lerner J. remarked,
"If there was no design to lead the industry into an agreement on the open
price policy, it would not have been necessary to try to give this report cred-
ibility by indicating that it was from an impartial source."9 9 He noted that
"Dofasco and Stelco had a real interest in developing the corrugated pipe
94 ld. at 148.
95 Id.
06 Id. at 148-49.
97 Id. at 152.
98 Id. at 155.
99 Id.
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industry."' 00 The report advocated open pricing as the means to avoid the
evils of price cutting.
Price stability is synonymous with published pricing and the latter must be adopted
and cherished by this industry . . . . It is the only legal way of communication
among members of the industry providing it is done without collusion.101
How the benefits of this policy were to be achieved was specified as follows:
It should be possible with a series of changes in published prices and appropriate
leadership by certain management relative thereto that proper price levels ... can
be achieved within two to three months.102
Lerner J. indicated that he saw the report as an exhortation to price leader-
ship-followership103 Presumably to ensure uniform prices to various custom-
ers, the report recommended delivered pricing by area.
Clearly, executives in the industry realized that the independent issuance
of uniform price lists and identical tenders by all producers and the voluntary
adoption of an open price policy were implausible. As Mr. Campbell, the
president of Armco, said in a handwritten memorandum found in Robertsteel's
offices, this was "[a] rather ideal condition to expect without persuasion or
coercion from others.' u04 These words had been stroked out.
On December 2, 1963, Robertsteel published another price list. It was
immediately adopted by all members of the Corrugated Metal Pipe Institute.
Of particular interest to Mr. Justice Lerner was the fact that ten days later,
several manufacturers bid on a Ontario Highways contract on the basis of
Robertsteel's price per lineal foot well in advance of the effective date of their
own or any other company's published price list.105 For almost four years,
uniform prices prevailed in the market for corrugated metal pipe, during
which period several changes and increases in price were accomplished smooth-
ly. With respect to the construction projects of the Department of Highways
of Ontario, only three contracts out of 342 during this period "contained un-
equal, different or a variety of bids."'1 6 The vagaries of different plant and
buyer locations and freight costs were carefully taken into account. Lerner J.
states:
. .. [the] producers divided Ontario into three zones and all prices quoted were
a "delivered" price in each zone rather than FOB plant. All prices were uniform
in any zone regardless of the distance of the plant of the particular manufacturer
from the geographical point of delivery.107
It was not until TPL Industries entered the market late in 1967 and began
selling at prices considerably less than the industry prices from 1964 to 1967
that the uniformity of prices was broken.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 156.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 157.
104 Id. at 158.
lo5 Id. at 159.
106 Id. at 162.
107 Id. at 173.
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b. The Inference of an Agreement
Mr. Justice Lerner ruled that a tacit agreement had to have been made(presumably between June, 1963, when the first attempt at open price leader-
ship failed, and December of that year when it succeeded) in order for the
industry to have maintained identical prices and tenders from December 1963
to September 1967.108 He inferred the existence of an agreement for three
reasons: first, the fact that it was Robertsteel who published the December 2,
1963 price list, having published a similar list in June and having seen that it
was not followed by most of its competitors. He said: "Repetition by Robert-
steel reinforces the inference that the others were aware that Robertsteel was
about to do this again and that they had agreed on 'followership' .. ,109
Second, Mr. Turvey of Armco, the firm which had previously set prices
reflecting its superior efficiency, admitted that his firm suddenly altered its
strategy on December 12, 1963 and "adopted the position of followership" in
order to "make a contribution towards the stabilization of price to the Depart-
ment of Highways .... "" 0 In addition, the firm stopped giving DHO a volume
discount. The judge also pointed out that while other executives had been
proponents of the open pricing policy, "nowhere in the evidence can it be
found that [Mr. Turvey] was originally a proponent of the open price policy."
He concluded, ".. . there had to be dialogue between Armco and Turney of
Robertsteel some time in the latter half of 1963, before Robertsteel would try
to experiment again, since Armco had been an earlier holdout to the open
price policy." '
Third, the executives who, for about a year, had campaigned for the in-
dependent but universal adoption of the open pricing policy by means of
"open discussion short of agreement," failed to obtain the desired result by
"proselytizing." Therefore, a tacit agreement had to be the means by which
the arrangement came about.1 2
c. The Evolution of Conscious Parallelism
Does it follow that establishment of the open price policy, which was
adopted by all the producers of metal culverts almost immediately after
Robertsteel published its second price list on December 2, 1963, had to occur
as a result of a tacit agreement? Clearly it did not. Let us consider the prob-
lem in a slightly larger context.By what means can conscious parallelism,
resulting in identical prices over a considerable period of time, occur in an
oligopoly producing a homogeneous good, characterized by easy entry and
extensive excess capacity? It could come about by at least three means:" 3
10 8 Id. at 179.
109 Id. at 178.
110 Id.
Mt~ Id. at 180.
112 Id. at 179. One wonders why Lerner J. described the relationship between the
accused as a "tacit" agreement; why not simply an agreement? There was evidence of
direct communication between the parties.
1 This list is not meant to be exhaustive, but indicative of possible ways that
conscious parallelism may evolve.
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(i) Collusion: The firms involved may make an express or tacit agreement
to follow a designated price leader or to jointly adopt a specified price
structure.
The persistence of identical tender prices for a period of over three
years in an industry where entry was easy and the number of competitors
exceeded a dozen, together with the multiple-zone delivered pricing sys-
tem, necessarily leads to the conclusion that almost perfectly parallel ac-
tion came about by collusion. Accordingly, Mr. Justice Lerner drew the
correct conclusion.
(ii) Exhortation and Successive Attempts at Price Leadership: Conscious
parallelism may be accomplished without agreement in the legal sense
following an active campaign of education and exhortation by industry
participants or by third parties (in Armco, by the suppliers of the basic
raw material). Having experienced the costly process of the action-
reaction and competitive price cutting, firms soon realize the advantages
of acting in recognition of their interdependence. When one firm pub-
lishes its price list for all to see, it is an invitation to follow. The an-
nouncement of the open price list by one firm may have the effect of
stopping the process of competitive price cutting rather than speeding it
up. Where significant excess capacity exists and firms exhibit differential
costs of production, several unsuccessful attempts at leadership (perhaps
by different firms) may be required before stability (identical prices) is
obtained. The important point in this case is that no agreement, tacit or
express, is necessary. Firms make independent decisions to lead or fol-
low as the case may be. But they do so having been "educated" to see
the folly of playing the action-reaction game and the potential benefits
of price stability.
(iii) Collective Self-Instruction: Conscious parallelism may be accomplished
without an attempt by industry members or by outsiders to campaign for
an open price policy. Nor is there any need for an agreement, tacit or
express. Instead, the major firms in an industry (in the metal culverts case
the top four firms accounted for about 76 per cent of total sales) having
expericened competitive price cutting and periods of short-term price sta-
bility, not only recognize their interdependence but also seek ways to be
able to act on it. The learning process may take many months or even a few
years to occur. During the process, perhaps by chance, "quasi-agree-
ments" (but not in the legal sense) occur, then they break down. Per-
haps aggressive "mavericks," i.e., corporations most willing to cut prices
and least willing to raise them, have to be replaced with more accom-
modating types following periods of "cutthroat" competition. In any
event, and entirely without direct communication, the major participants
are looking for a way out of their dilemma characterized by low and un-
stable prices and profits. Independently, one firm makes a move, e.g.,
ublishing its prices, hoping the others will follow. Some firms may not
follow-as Armco did not in the first instance. Price stability is not
established. The same or another firm makes a similar attempt, again
without even tacit understandings with the others. It may take several
"failures" before the firms finally adopt common prices. This process of
spontaneous coordination results in conscious parallelism as leadership-
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followership is firmly established. Where entry is easy, excess capacity
persists, and the number of competitors exceeds a handful, stable inter-
firm coordination may never come about or, at most, will be ephemeral.
A related issue is the interpretation of identical tenders. In addition to
drawing the inference that there had been a tacit agreement among the firms
to follow Robertsteel's December 2, 1963 price list, Mr. Justice Lerner con-
cluded that the very high percentage of identical tenders was hardly the
result of chance.
The identical tenders to D.H.O. and others are remarkable because the great
detail required for same would force one beyond any reasonable doubt to the
conclusion that there was a complete exchange of information and understanding
with meticulous attention that all bids on all tenders be identical.11 4
His reasoning is not flawless. Once all the culvert manufacturers adopted
Robertsteel's detailed price list, the "complex" tenders usually broke down
to being able to identify each item properly, take its posted unit price, multi-
ply and add up the total. Since the list specified delivered prices in each of
the three zones, the failure to attain identical bids would only occur if someone
could not multiply, add or type correctly or the tender required a bid on an
item not on the pricelist, i.e., some custom-made product unique to the buyer.
In 1963, Hydro Quebec received six identical tenders of $14,394,537.12 for
4800 miles of ACSR cable. Despite an intensive investigation, the Director
of Investigation and Research could not find evidence of collusion."15 What
had happened, apparently, was that each bidder took the appropriate unit
price from its price list, identical to all firms, and correctly multiplied by the
required volume to arrive at the amount of the bid.
The conclusion that identical sealed bids can occur without collusion ap-
plies only to circumstances where all firms quote list prices for standard items
sold from inventory. If some installation cost must be incurred, which surely
varies from job to job, or the product is an infrequently-bid, non-standard
item, identical bids are usually indicative of collusion.
d. Parallelism and the Nature of the Arrangement
The cumulative effect of all of the evidence convinced Lemer J. "that
there was a tacit agreement to maintain identical prices."" 06 He very rightly
asked:
[Wihat possible purpose could this whole effort towards establishing the open price
policy be if it were not to arrange something that would achieve stability of
prices, eliminating competition and resulting in orderly marketing as against what
was presently the situation that the industry found intolerable?llr
Mr. Justice Lemer discussed at length the topic of "open price policy
and conscious parallelism." At the outset he observed that:
The "open price policy" is an ambitious theory and if effected and if carried out
114 Supra, note 62 at (C.C.C.) 182.
115 Report of the Director of Investigation and Research, Combines Investigation
Act, for the year ended March 31, 1968 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968) at 43-46.
116 Supra, note 62 at (C.C.C.) 183.
117 Id. at 184.
1977]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
successfully, would achieve the ultimate and still not offend the Combines In-
vestigation Act. Even if it were to result in unduly lessening competition, it would
not offend the Act because there would have been no agreement or arrangement,
direct or tacit. Once all members of the industry understood and recognized the
value of this approach to marketing there would be a universal conscious effort
on the part of all to actively follow the price lists and ancillary or collateral
marketing devices [e.g. delivered pricing] of the "leader". There would result a
conscious effort to "parallel" or follow the leader.118
The judge then summarized the testimony of Dr. I. A. Sherbaniuk n1 9 on the
nature of a homogeneous good oligopoly, which appears to have been couched
in terms very similar to Mr. Henry's. But on one very important point Lerner
J. was unsatisfied:
If price stability would come (if not naturally), then by the economic forces as
expressed by Mr. Sherbaniuk in this ideal oligopoly situation, it suggests the query
(which I find was never answered by the defendants) - why was it necessary
for the Institute, Campbell, Turney, et al., to spend the several months in 1962
and 1963, ... to bring the results that form the basis of this prosecution?120
While the judge rejected the theory that the "leadership" and "followership"
occurred without conspiracy, we may posit another, but perhaps less likely,
answer to his question. The purpose of the exhortation and education by
Campbell, Tumey and others was to provide the catalyst which would bring
about the desired effect of price stability. Price cutting in an industry charac-
terized by easy entry and excess capacity is expensive to the firms. The advo-
cates of the open price policy were attempting to quicken the awareness of
mutual dependence and the advantages relating thereto. Lerner J. concluded
that 'the advocates became impatient with mere exhortation and the failure
of the firms to coalesce around Robertsteel's published prices in June 1963;
accordingly they arranged a tacit understanding that all members of the in-
dustry would adopt Robertsteel's price list on the second attempt (December
2, 1963). Lerner J. said, ...... by way of obiter, economists to the contrary,
I fail to see on a common-sense basis how conscious parallelism could be
achieved without a conspiracy on the part of the accused to come to an agree-
ment or arrangement beforehand."'' 1 He then restated his conclusion:
After the il-month period had passed with no effective results, suddenly without
any other explanation "leadership" and "followership" appeared. I am con-
vinced ... that there had to be an understanding, arrangement or agreement to
adopt the open price policy. This conclusion is the only rational inference that I
can draw from the evidence and which is inconsistent with any other rational con-
clusion on the evidence.1=
The period of exhortation and education was not without some effect. First,
118 Id. at 187.
119 In the judgment Sherbaniuk is incorrectly referred to as "Cherbaniuk." See
lames Sherbaniuk, Identical Bids Usually Result of Market Forces, Financial Post, May
5, 1973 at C-1, C-2.
120 Supra, note 62 at 188.
121 Id.
1= Id. at 189. Note the application of the rule in Hodge's Case in the last sentence.
James Leavy, Market Power and Public Policy: A Comparison of North American and
European Legislation (1977), 9 Ottawa L.Rev. 1 at 15, n. 74, states: "the Court specifi-
cally refrained from equating conscious parallelism with conspiracy."
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Lerner J. cited evidence that a number of executives in the course of the
eleven months became proponents of the open price policy. 2 3 Second, in
June of 1963 Robertsteel tried to initiate the scheme by publishing its price
list. Some firms adopted it, but because Armco did not, the first attempt did
not "take." Both of these occurrences might be interpreted as helping to set
the stage for the next attempt to arrive at parallel behaviour. As we discussed
above, a number of "trials" may be necessary before the conscious parallelism
comes about. However, in view of the specific characteristics of the metal
culvert industry at the time (excess capacity, easy entry and Armco's position
as technological and cost leader) and in view of the relative complexity of the
parallel policies adopted (the three-zone delivered pricing scheme), the evi-
dence was sufficient to overcome the "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden,
notwithstanding the circumstantial nature of the evidence.
Not only did Mr. Justice Lerner infer a conspiracy entirely on the basis
of circumstantial evidence but he also sought to extend the Canadian law by
borrowing the broader concept of "arrangement" from an English combines
case, British Basic Slag Ltd. v. Registrar of Restrictive Agreements.2 4 Lerner
J. quoted the words of Willmer L.J. in that decision:
For when each of two or more parties intentionally arouses in the others an
expectation that he will act in a certain way, it seems to me that he incurs at
least a moral obligation to do so. An arrangement as so defined is therefore some-
thing "whereby the parties to it accept mutual rights and obligations."-2 5
In the same case, Diplock L. J. first quoted from the judgement of Cross J.
in the High Court:
[AiU that is required to constitute an arrangement not enforceable in law is that
the parties to it shall have communicated with one another in some way, and as
a result of the communications each has intentionally aroused in the other an
expectation that he will act in a certain way.' 6
Then Lord Diplock gave his own definition of an "arrangement":
[IUt is sufficient to constitute an arrangement between A and B, if (1) A makes a
representation as to his future conduct with the expectation and intention that such
conduct on his part will operate as an inducement to B to act in a particular way,
(2) such representation is communicated to B, who has knowledge that A so ex-
pected and intended, and (3) such representation or A's conduct in fulfilment of
it operates as an inducement, whether among other inducements or not, to B to
act in that particular way.'2 7
As we shall see, the adoption of these definitions by Mr. Justice Lerner was
rejected by the Appeal Court, although his decision was upheld.
e. The Appeal Court Decision
On February 2, 1976, the Ontario Court of Appeal unanimously upheld
the Trial Court's decision with respect to seven of the ten corporations
123 Supra, note 62 at (C.C.C.) 180.
'24 British Basic Slag v. Registrar of Restrictive Agreements, [1963] 1 W.L.R. 727.
125 Id. at 739, quoted in Armco, supra, note 62 at 191.
126 Id. Diplock LJ. was quoting Cross J.'s decision in the case at the High Court
(Chancery) level: Re British Slag Ltd.'s Agreements, [19621 3 All E.R. 247 at 255.
127 Supra, note 124 at 747, quoted in Armco, supra, note 62 at 191.
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(lowering the fine imposed in one instance) in a judgment written by Houl-
den J.A.128 However, the importance of the case lies in the ruling of
Houlden J.A.:
If, however, the parties have acted in the manner described by the English Court
of Appeal in British Basic Slag, there is not necessarily an "arrangement" within
the meaning of s. 32(1)(c) ... for s. 32(l)(c) there must be the mutual arriv-
ing at an understanding or agreement, and under the British Basic Slag test, this
element of mutuality is not necessarily present.' 20
While concluding that the trial judge was "wrong... to refer to the British
Basic Slag definition,"' 30 the Appeal Court would not overturn the judgment.
Houlden J.A. cited eight specific passages from Lerner J.'s judgment in which
the trial judge "had made clear and unequivocal findings that the parties had
entered into an agreement or arrangement to prevent or lessen competi-
tion."''1 He ruled that the reference to the British Basic Slag definition of
arrangement was "mere surplusage"'' 2 and "was unnecessary and did not
affect the result at which [the trial judge] arrived." 183
The corporations also attacked, in their appeal, the application of
the rule in Hodge's Case, saying Lerner J. drew incorrect or improper in-
ferences from the evidence. Houlden J.A. ruled that while some of the find-
ings of fact and inferences drawn "might have been more aptly expressed and
some are undoubtedly wrong (it would have been astounding if this were not
so in a trial of this magnitude), there is still an abundance of circumstantial
evidence to support the trial Judge's conclusion that an agreement or an
arrangement had been entered into to prevent or lessen competition un-
duly."'31 4 The rule in Hodge's Case had been correctly applied.
3. The Atlantic Sugar Case
On December 19, 1975 Mr. Justice Kenneth Mackay handed down his
decision in R. v. Atlantic Sugar Refineries Co. Ltd.33 in which he acquitted
the three largest sugar refiners in Eastern Canada of violating section 32(1)
of the Combines Investigation Act. Part of his decision dealt with the issue
of conscious parallelism. In particular, it was argued, as part of the second
count alleging an undue lessening of competition as opposed to the unreason-
able enhancement of price involved in the first count,
[that in 1960, Redpath [formerly Canada and Dominion Sugar] adopted the
base stock system for the pricing of refined sugar. This was derived from match-
ing the refined sold with the replacement cost of a similar quantity of raw sugar
on the day of the sale, plus freight, duty, the preferential premium of 75 cents
per hundredweight and a refiners' margin. To this was then added freight charges
from the refinery nearest the customer to the latters' plant or warehouse. The
1 2 Re The Queen and Armco Canada Ltd. (1976), 24 C.P.R. (2d) 145.
129 Id. at 153.
130 Id. at 154.
3.1 Id.
322 Id.
133 Id. at 155.
134 Id. at 156.
185 The Queen v. Atlantic Sugar Refineries Co. Ltd. (1976), 26 C.P.R. (2d) 14.
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price list based on this formula was invariably, simultaneously and exactly fol-
lowed, item by item, by the other two accused, although actual freight costs dif-
fered for each refiner.'8 6
With respect to this charge of price fixing during the period 1960 through
May 1973, Mr. Justice Mackay set out the Crown's argument as follows: 8 7
1. The accused agreed with the Commonwealth sugar producers' cartel to price
raw sugar on the basis of the London Daily Price, a price which was unrelated
to the actual market price of sugar.
2. They also agreed that a preference clause be included in raw sugar contracts
fixing the preferential premium at 75 cents and recognizing that figure as a
non-negotiable factor, thus preventing the amount of the preference rebated to
the producers from being established by competition between buyer and seller.
3. They adopted a unique system of pricing their refined sugar-the base stock
system-which was based on raw sugar prices unrelated to the market price.
4. The accused, who controlled at least 90% of the eastern Canadian market,
arranged to adopt identical price lists based on this pricing system and the
result was undue prevention or lessening of competition.
He then summarized what he believed to be the defence theory: 138
1. The L.D.P. is an internationally recognized index for the determination of the
price of raw sugar on the free world market
2. The preference clause was written into raw sugar purchase contracts by both
buyer and seller and was never intended to freeze the premium at 75 cents
but was simply intended to protect the accused under existing contracts,
should the tariff preference have been reduced before delivery, by limiting
the rebate to 75%.
3. The base stock system, regardless of its merits, was conceived solely by Tate
and Lyle and its subsidiary, Redpath, and was simply copied by the other two
accused.
4. Identical price lists are not necessarily evidence of collusion to fix prices; they
may be, as in this instance, an example of price leadership without prior ar-
rangement, tacit or otherwise.
Mackay J. noted that both sides agreed that the Commonwealth Sugar
Association is a cartel which its members euphemistically call a "club." As
early as 1954, it had limited price competition on sales to Canada in order to
maintain a 75 cents per hundredweight preference (premium) above the
world price. Prior to 1960, raw sugar was priced on a cargo-by-cargo or
parcel-by-parcel basis. In the early 1960's, the system of deferred pricing of
raw sugar was introduced under which the Canadian buyer would pay the
London Daily Price (LDP) plus 75 cents per hundred pounds less a freight
equalization factor. The result was that raw sugar could be priced at the
time it was drawn from the refiner's warehouse, or at the time the contract
was signed or the date the raw sugar was delivered whichever was most ad-
vantageous to the refiner. The adoption of this new system by the three big
eastern refiners was negotiated by a senior official of Tate and Lyle, the giant
English sugar producer and refiner, which in 1959 had obtained effective
136 Id. at 61.
137 Id. at 90.
138 Id. at 91.
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control of Redpath Industries. The new formula permitted hedging by the
refiners to reduce the risk of changes in the price of raw sugar. 3 9 The pricing
of raw sugar on a deferred basis was also incorporated into the pricing of
refined sugar.
The judge acknowledged, "[i]t may well be true that the L.D.P. is not an
accurate reflection of the actual market price of raw sugar, since spot sales
form a very small proportion of the 5,000,000 tons traded annually on the
London Exchange."'' 40 Yet he went on to conclude, "even if, as the Crown
contends, the L.D.P. is an artificial price it is a universally accepted index for
pricing raw sugar and no blame can accrue to the accused for using it."''41
Since the price for refined sugar is calculated directly from the LDP
for raw sugar and all the refiners follow Redpath's refined sugar price list,
agreement to follow the LDP constitutes the first step in establishing the
whole plane of prices for refined sugar. Furthermore, the LDP is influenced
by the fact that Tate and Lyle is not only a major producer of raw sugar, but
also dominates the market for refined sugar in the United Kingdom. The im-
portance of Tate and Lyle's activities as a producer became apparent when the
judge observed that while the other two eastern Canadian refiners made "stre-
nuous efforts... continually to chisel away"'14 at the 75 cents preference
paid to Commonwealth producers of raw sugar, Redpath, owned by Tate and
Lyle, did not do so. The judge said Redpath "was anxious to preserve for the
producers 75 cents of the [original $1.00] preference .... 11,
In 1960, the base stock system of pricing refined sugar was introduced
at Redpath by Tate and Lyle representatives. It replaced the average cost
of inventory method, which continues to be used by United States refiners. 44
Redpath's price of refined sugar under the base stock system is calculated as
follows: 145
Redpath's price of LDP price of raw freight, in- import
refined sugar FOB = Isugar per 100 lbs. + surance, and + duties
Toronto and Montreal j CIF (includes 75 + discharge 8.7 perbasing points preference) costs 100 lb
['justment for Ffing -+ 17loss on re- J + Imarm /
Because of the deferred pricing of raw sugar purchases, the Canadian
refiners were able to purchase their raw sugar at the LDP price on the date
when the raw sugar was to be refined even though they had contracted for
139 Id. at 105-08. It also permitted the firms to amass huge profits in offshore corpo-
rations (beyond the reach of Revenue Canada) from trading in raw sugar futures.
140 Id. at 93.
,41 Id.
142 Id. at 94.
248 Id. at 59.
14 aId. at 95.
'14 Id. at 58-59.
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the raw sugar months earlier. Even if all refiners adopted the same formula
their price of refined sugar would not be the same, for as Mackay J. pointed
out, "refining and other expenses would not normally have been identical for
each refinery.' u 46 Redpath, which had been the admitted industry price leader
between 1949 and 1959,147 continued to hold this position because the other
refiners set their list prices exactly parallel to Redpath's. Mackay J. described
the method of price determination from 1960 to 1973 as follows:
[the other refiners'] sales managers said that instead of making their own price
calculations, they simply followed Redpath's price lists which were posted each
day in the lobby of Redpath's offices and were communicated to them by sugar
brokers, customers or even telegraph company employees with whom they had
friendly relations or others unidentified. Whenever they learned of changes in
Redpath's prices, they immediately issued new price lists of their own.1 4 8
It should be noted that the base stock pricing system, a device for com-
municating appropriate price changes for refined sugar in a fluctuating market
for raw sugar, was adopted by Redpath shortly after the refiners were the
subject of a Restrictive Trade Practices Commission report; the report con-
cluded "that the practices engaged in by the three eastern refiners with respect
to common basis prices, equalized freight rates, common packages differen-
tials and the use of price concessions have limited competition in the eastern
sugar refining industry to the detriment of the public."' 49 In addition, there
was evidence that the refiners conspired with foreign suppliers to restrict the
importation of refined sugar. In March of 1962, the big three eastern refiners
were charged with conspiring to lessen competition unduly in the production
of refined sugar under the Criminal Code. All three subsequently pleaded
guilty and were convicted. Each was fined $25,000 and made subject to an
order prohibiting the continuation or repetition of the offence.15
One can view Redpath's adoption of the base stock method of pricing
refined sugar as a benefit to the eastern refiners. It provided the means of
coordinating their pricing in the face of the price fluctuations of raw sugar
without resort to collusion, of which they had previously been convicted. As
the president of Atlantic Sugar Refineries Co. Ltd. put it, "... I applauded
the management of Redpath at the time for finding this basis of relating re-
fined to the LDP... we were very happy to follow that."' 51 Coordination in
this industry was much easier in a number of respects than in the case of
metal culverts. While excess capacity existed, entry into the industry was
146 Id. at 96.
147 ld. at 99.
148 1d. at 96.
149 Report Concerning the Sugar Industry in Eastern Canada (Ottawa: Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission, 1960) at 312.
150 Report of the Director of Investigation and Research, Combines Investigation
Act, for the year ended March 31, 1963 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1963) at 16. Atlantic
Sugar appealed the terms of the Prohibition Order. A final decision upholding the Crown
and the original terms of the order was not rendered until July 21, 1967 by the Quebec
Court of Appeal. Although the indictment specified only the period 1950 to 1953, the
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission indicated in their report that it had "extended
over a considerable number of years." (Supra, note 149 at 9).
151S upra, note 135 at 95-96.
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expensive in terms of time and capital. More important, in the early 1960's
there were only three sellers of refined sugar in eastern Canada. 5 2 Finally,
the industry was characterized by a stability of demand and, hence, during
recessions the pressure of high fixed costs did not lead to price cutting.
Mackay J. pointed out that "price conformity and identical price lists
are characteristic of an oligopolistic industry" and that they may well be con-
sistent with independent competitive decisions" or be the result of an agree-
ment.153 Citing Lerner J. in the Armco case,' 54 he stated:
... if conformity is the result of price leadership by the industry leader and a
conscious effort by other members of the industry to follow the leader, to parallel
its prices, then, although the result might be an undue prevention of competition,
"it would not offend the [Combines Investigation] Act because there would have
been no agreement or arrangement, direct or tacit."1i 5
Mr. Justice Mackay clearly indicated that conscious parallelism without col-
lusion does not violate the Act. He stated: "I am of [the] opinion that while
identical price lists might give rise to an inference of arrangement to fix
prices, such inference is unwarranted where it is shown that conformity of
prices was not arrived at as a result of collusion."' 6 He cited and apparently
adopted D. H. W. Henry's view of price changes of staple commodities.
Except during brief periods of change, the price of any homogeneous commodity
will tend to be the same for all sellers and buyers in a given market area. At the
first suggestion of any permanent differential, buyers will switch their custom to
the company offering the lowest price and sellers therefore will have to bring their
prices to meet that of the lowest competitors. Consequently, in those commodity
markets where sellers are few and many sales are made daily to wholesalers, re-
tailers and consumers, a price change instituted by any one seller will usually be
communicated within the hour to his competitors and the necessary adjustments
made almost instantly.157
After reviewing the testimony of executives of all the other eastern sugar
refiners, Mr. Justice Mackay concluded:
Since the Act does not prohibit a member of an industry from taking into account
and following his competitors' price changes, be they up or down, it follows that
he is not prohibited from taking into account and following the system upon
which these price changes are made.'5 8
By 1973 a total of six refiners served the market from Ontario to New-
foundland, but coordination in this oligopoly was even easier than the number
suggests. Quebec Sugar Refinery sells all its output in a semi-refined form to
Redpath. Cartier Sugar is a wholly owned subsidiary of Steinberg's Limited
152 There were four producers but Quebec Sugar Refinery sold all its output to
Redpath. Cartier Sugar did not begin operation until 1963.
153 Supra, note 135 at 96.
154 Supra, note 62 at 187.
155 Supra, note 135 at 97.
156 Id. at 98.
157 Id. The words originally come from Report of the Director of Investigation and
Research, Combines Investigation Act, for the year ended March 31, 1966 (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, 1966) at 13.
'58 Id. at 100.
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which absorbs a substantial portion of its output; Westcane Sugar is a
wholly-owned subsidiary of George Weston Limited whose retail and manu-
facturing operations are also large buyers of sugar. The big three (Atlantic,
Redpath, and St. Lawrence) jointly account for over ninety per cent of the
market.159 The remainder of the country is subject to the complete monopoly
of B.C. Sugar, which in turn, bases its prices on the lowest list price issued
by the eastern refiners plus freight from its basing points. 160 Unlike the metal
culvert manufacturers, oligopolistic coordination in sugar did not apparently
require exhortation, education or tacit agreement. The big three have jointly
dominated the market since before the turn of the century. They are highly
experienced and practiced oligopolists. They achieved through conscious
parallelism that which had previously required collusion.
a. Price Shading and Market Sharing
Having ruled that price leadership-followership is not prohibited by the
Combines Investigation Act, Mr. Justice Mackay went on to review the testi-
mony of a number of large industrial purchasers of sugar, accounting for
sixty per cent of all sugar consumption. He observed: "although all Canadian
refiners had identical price lists there were.., exceptions when the actual
sales prices varied as a result of customers' discounts, not including discounts
for prompt payment.... Testimony of the officers of... industrial sugar
users . . .was to the effect that the refiners' quotes invariably differed ap-
preciably."'16
Two important points should be made here. First, when a few sellers
face a relatively small number of large buyers the outcome in terms of price
and output is indeterminate. The fact that such large buyers obtained their
sugar, or a portion thereof, at less than the list price is a reflection of their
oligopsony power. It is a fairly common occurrence for large industrial buyers
to be served at negotiated prices while smaller buyers pay the higher list price.
A related phenomenon may also be present-price discrimination. With dif-
ferential price elasticities and some degree of separability between the indus-
trial and consumer markets, sellers with market power may find it more pro-
fitable to charge a different markup, above the relevant marginal costs, to
different customers. However, lower prices to big buyers may not involve
price discrimination, but rather the recognition of their buying power together
with the fact that the costs of serving such customers are lower than those
for smaller purchasers.
Second, the industry-wide adoption of Redpath's prices, which included
a large refining margin, provided a safe plane from which deviations, such as
lower prices to large buyers, did not seriously erode profitability and essential
price stability. Evidence of the high refining margin in Canada is provided in
159 This figure was calculated from the following plant capacities (in thousands of
pounds per day): Atlantic, 2,400; Redpath, 4,300; St. Lawrence, 1,900; Quebec Sugar
Refinery, 350; and Cartier, 500. Westcane (900) did not come into full operation until
the end of 1974. See Sugar Prices II. The Canadian Refining Industry (Ottawa: Food
Prices Review Board, 1975) at 6.
160 Supra, note 135 at 96.
101 Id. at 100-01.
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a Tariff Board Report on sugar published in 1971.162 In eight of the years
between 1961 and 1970 the Canadian refiners' margin exceeded that of their
American counterparts. In all ten years the Canadian margin exceeded that
in the United Kingdom. Despite rather substantial differences in costs of pro-
duction all refineries in Canada earned rates of return well above other indus-
tries. In the late 1960's, the sugar refiners' before tax profits, as a percentage
of sales, were more than double the average in manufacturing. Apparently,
any discounts from list prices given to industrial buyers did not prevent
the sugar refiners from enjoying the economic benefits of their oligopoly
position.
In addition to the allegation of price fixing, the Crown argued in Atlantic
Sugar that there was an agreement among the companies in the industry as
to the market share to be enjoyed by each. The shares allotted to the firms
during World War II and their shares in 1949 were as follows: 10
W.W. Il 1949
Atlantic 35.5% 35.6%
Redpath 43.0 42.7
St. Lawrence 21.5 21.7
Mackay J. then described what happened with respect to market shares:
During the next decade, the market shares varied slightly. But in 1958, Red-
path having just opened its Toronto refinery and being anxious to increase sales
and recoup some of the heavy expenses involved, surreptitiously began to cut
prices in the Toronto area. Atlantic felt the loss of sales in that area and so began
to cut its prices there, although this represented a serious expense, due to the
absorption by Atlantic of the unsubsidized portion of the freight from the refinery
in St. John to the nearest basing point which was now Toronto instead of Montreal
as it had been before the new refinery was constructed. The price war spread to
include St. Lawrence. There were two results-first: Redpath increased its market
share at the expense of the others from 42.8% in 1957 to 46.6% in 1958. Sec-
ondly: it lost the price war against its two well-funded opponents, and having
sustained serious financial losses it was ripe for a take-over by Tate and Lyle.
Thereafter, each of the accused settled down to a policy of maintaining their
traditional market shares.164
Mackay J. drew the following conclusion: "Although each stressed that this
was the result of an independent decision, one would be ingenuous not to be
aware that there was and continues to be a tacit agreement to this effect."10 5
He then went on to expand on this point, saying,
On the evidence, I find that the maintenance of traditional market shares--
which were adjusted but in the same proportion when Cartier came on stream-
was the result of a tacit agreement between the accused. But in my opinion, it
has not been shown that this agreement was arrived at with the intention of
162 Report by the Tariff Board (Ref. No. 146: Sugar) (Ottawa: Information Canada,
1971) at 68, Table 24.
163 Supra, note 135 at 101-02.
164 Id. at 102.
165 Id. It is very hard to imagine how conscious parallelism with respect to the price
of 40% of the industry's output and negotiated prices to large buyers who account for
most of the other 60%, could result in such highly stable market shares without at
least a tacit agreement.
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unduly preventing or lessening competition. The reason for maintaining traditional
market shares was to avoid a price war which would have resulted had the ac-
cused taken the only method of increasing them by price cutting through exten-
sive discounts. Nor am I able to infer from the totality of the evidence on this
point, including overt acts, that market shares were maintained for the purpose of
stifling competition.' 06
His reasoning may be challenged on several points. First, where the accused
jointly account for over ninety per cent of the market it seems impossible that
any market sharing agreement could be other than undue. Mackay J. appears
to have agreed with this proposition earlier in his judgment:
Where the accused at the beginning of the period controlled 99.8% of the eastern
Canadian market, an agreement to lessen competition would be tantamount to
extinction, and so would be undue. The extinction of competition would in those
circumstances require the combined action of all the accused to be effective, for
if one decided to allot a portion of its market share to a newly arrived competi-
tor, whatever the other two planned would be for nought. 67
With respect to this last statement, the defendants' gentlemanly accommoda-
tion of Cartier, whose entry added less than six per cent to the capacity of
the industry at the time, is proof of their ability to coordinate their behaviour
so as to avoid effective price competition and lessen competition unduly.
Second, the Crown should not be required to prove that the accused
entered into an agreement with the intent to lessen competition unduly, but
only that they entered an agreement, which if carried out, would lessen com-
petition unduly. This point was made by Kerwin J. in Container Materials
Ltd. v. The King where he said,
It was argued that it was not sufficient for the Crown to show an agreement or
arrangement, the effect of which would be unduly to prevent or lessen competition,
but that the agreement or arrangement must have been intended by the accused
to have that effect. This is not the meaning of the enactment upon which the count
is based. Mens rea is undoubtedly necessary but that requirement was met in these
prosecutions when it was shown that the appellants intended to enter, and did
enter, into the very arrangement found to exist.1 68
Mackay J. used this passage only to support the proposition that: "It need
not be shown that if the agreement was put into effect, that prices were en-
hanced, but simply the agreement must have been intended to have that
effet."1'
For both of these reasons, it is difficult to accept Mackay J.'s conclusion
that there was a market-sharing agreement, but that it did not unduly lessen
l6O 6d. at 103 (emphasis added).
167 Id. at 30.
168 Container Materials, Ltd. v. The King, [1942] S.C.R. 147; 1 D.L.R. 529; 77
C.C.C. 129 at (C.C.C.) 140.
169 Supra, note 135 at 23. Perhaps Mackay J. was exhibiting great prescience. On
April 29, 1977 in Aetna Insurance Company v. The Queen (1977), 34 C.C.C. (2d)
157, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, per Ritchie J., accepted the view
that "what is criminal is an agreement that is intended to lessen competition improperly,
inordinately, excessively, oppressively or one intended to have the effect of virtually
relieving the conspirators from the influence of free competition," at 170. The Chief
Justice, with Judson J. and Spence J. concurring, wrote a dissenting opinion citing the
words of Kerwin J. as we have done.
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competition. There is other evidence to suggest, in the case of Cartier, that
tougher tactics having failed to prevent entry, accommodation to preserve
oligopolistic stability was the strategy employed. 170
4. The Large Lamps Case: R. v. Canadian General Electric Company Ltd.
Canadian General Electric Company Limited (CGE), Westinghouse
Canada Ltd., and GTE Sylvania Canada Limited were charged with two
counts of monopoly and one of conspiracy during the period January 1, 1959
to August 25, 1967.171 It is the conspiracy charge, under section 32(1) (c) of
the Combines Investigation Act, which is germane to this discussion of con-
scious parallelism cases in Canada. Mr. Justice Pennell summarized the Crown's
charge of conspiracy as follows:
. .. the accused conspired to lessen unduly competition by an agreement or ar-
rangement to adopt simultaneously and follow religiously a virtually identical
sales plan for the distribution and pricing of electric large lamps through the
medium of consignment agents, inter alia, and the practice of inducing distributors
to maintain sales prices .... 172
The defendants contended that there was no agreement among themselves to
adopt and follow the sales plan first put forward by CGE in 1959 and modi-
fied in 1961. Pennell J. stated their position:
... the behaviour under attack represents no more than rational individual deci-
sions in the light of relevant economic facts; that this industry is an oligopoly with
a homogeneous product; that natural oligopolistic pricing does not violate the Act;
that the structure of the market demanded the published price list of the compe-
tition and thus prices could not be different for a substantial period of time; and
that the actions of the accused were based on pure, non-collusive, oligopolistic
parallelism of action, a practice described by the term "conscious parallelism.' 173
Describing conscious parallelism as "one of the great battlefields of anti-
combines litigation," Pennell J. defined it as the "pricing that emerges out
of an oligopolistic market setting without communication or agreement
170 Mackay J. indicated that Cartier Sugar's initial difficulties (until it was pur-
chased by Steinberg) were not due to its inability to obtain a share of the market.
Earlier the judge had cited the testimony of a Cartier executive that it followed Red-
path's price list in which he said "if I had a lower price, I would be swamped [with
orders] and I wouldn't be able to satisfy my customers." (at 100) The point the judge
ignored (although he reviewed the testimony earlier in his opinion) was the effort by
Atlantic Sugar's president to have Cartier's entry "nipped in the bud" (at 89) by Senator
Salter Hayden, who was also a director of Atlantic and Chairman of the powerful
Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Finance. The major refiner's efforts
to block the entry, and later to reduce the competitive effectiveness of Cartier, are set
out in a 60-page letter, dated December 11, 1970, to the Minister of Finance by Robin
Austin (the founder of Cartier). Their tactics, (according to Austin) included: attempts
to block financing, attempts to cut off the supply of raw sugar, bomb threats, threats
of refusal to deal with suppliers who dealt with Cartier, and sabotaging raw sugar
cargoes with bailing twine.
171R. v. Canadian General Electric Company Limited (1976), 29 C.P.R. (2d) 1;
34 C.C.C. (2d) 489.
172 d. at (C.C.C.) 498. All further references will be to the C.C.C. report of the
case.
173 Id. at 499.
[VOL. 15, NO. 3
Conscious Parallelism
among the sellers."'' 4 He went on to say, "The crux of the theory of con-
scious parallelism is . . . that the oligopolists are interdependent in their
pricing: they base their pricing decisions in part on anticipated reactions to
to them.1175
a. Facts of the Case
In his findings of fact, Pennell J. held that electric large lamps, which
include incandescent, fluorescent and mercury lamps, were an essentially
homogeneous product; that they constituted a distinct segment of the lamp
industry in terms of manufacture and sale; that the market for such lamps
was national; and that the three accused accounted for ninety-five per cent of
domestic sales and manufacture. He asserted that the difference between the
ninety per cent share admitted by the defendants and his finding of ninety-
five per cent was "purely academic."' 76
The motivation for the establishment of the large lamp sales plan of
1959 was that prior to that time, "the industry had gone through a period of
intense pricing cutting."'1 77 Although such competition had not resulted in
losses,'1 7 CGE anticipated that the plan would reduce price competition and
increase profits. CGE's first sales plan, dated January 6, 1959, "covered all
aspects of distribution, sales and supply of large lamps by CGE to its agents
and distributors and by such agents and distributors to their trade customers
and to customers who purchased by tender."' 79 The price to each of the
various distributors and customers was determined by the specified list price
less the discount set out for each distributor and type of customer. Agents
accounting for three-quarters of CGE large lamp sales were put on consign-
ment.180 By January 19, both Westinghouse and Sylvania had obtained copies
of the sales plan which was not to become effective until April 1, 1959. The
Crown argued that the advance circulation of the 1959 plan was to allow
the market leader to signal to its competitors a change in market strategy.
To this CGE replied that common sense required advance publication in
order for CGE to ascertain whether its competitors would follow.181 Both
Westinghouse and Sylvania did adopt plans very similar, but not identical,
to CGE's. As a result, two-thirds of Westinghouse's lamp sales were made
on consignment.182 Beginning in the summer of 1963 and ending in the spring
of 1964 Sylvania placed its agents selling to the commercial and industrial
market, representing 75 per cent of its sales, on consignment. 188 Following
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 502.
177Id. Electric Large Lamps (Ottawa: Restrictive Trade Practices Commission,
1971) at 7 indicates that such price cutting occurred during 1956, 1957 and 1958.
178 Supra, note 171 at 504.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 505.
181 Id. at 506.
182 Id. at 507.
183 Id.
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the introduction of CGE's 1959 sales plan, "[t]he price lists and discounts
under the three plans were substantially identical to the knowledge of the
accused." 84
While the 1959 plan sharply reduced the extent of price competition a
certain amount of hidden discounting did occur. Mr. Justice Pennell con-
cluded: "a survey of the prices of the three accused as published and as re-
flected in actual sales, shows remarkable stability and co-ordination over the
alleged conspiratorial period. By contrast, the conditions in the market-place
prior to 1959 were chaotic."' 85 There were also problems in discount struc-
ture for various types of distributors; the market was not perfectly seg-
mented. 86 Again CGE acted as the industry leader, announcing its 1961
sales plan at a meeting of the Canadian Electrical Distributors Association in
April 1961. The plan, based on net prices, became effective on September 1,
1961. If the 1959 plan was good for CGE, the 1961 plan would be even
better. As one CGE internal communication put it:
... if we can introduce this new Large Lamp Sales Plan as it stands and main-
tain our present volume of business, we should increase our profits something like
$300,000.00 annually.' 8 7
The author of this statement, a top CGE sales executive, concluded: "These
are big stakes and I am sure you will agree, well worth taking some short
term risks for."' 88
CGE's 1961 plan was distributed to its own agents on or about July 5,
1961. As in 1959, both Westinghouse and Sylvania "came [to] an early deci-
sion . . . to coordinate their activities and implement substantially similar
plans based on the same distribution scheme and price schedules and with
the same commencement date. .. ,"19 Although Westinghouse did not distri-
bute its own plan until November 1961, it followed the CGE plan from the
date of its introduction, September 1, 1961.
Through the use of price schedules based on net prices, the lamp manu-
facturers hoped to completely eliminate price competition that might occur
by design or as the result of error. After the introduction of the 1961 plan,
even greater efforts were made by all manufacturers to ensure that the prices
established in their plans were enforced. As Pennell J. put it: "The three
defendants strictly and closely monitored their agents in all their dealings";
he went on to assert, "the presence of enforcement activities may be relevant
to a consideration of a charge of conspiracy."' 90 Westinghouse agents were
required to calculate their price quotations to three decimal places. Agents
who cut prices were threatened with the loss of their franchises. CGE re-
184 Id. at 508.
18 5 Id. at 509.
186 Id. at 510.
187 Electric Large Lamps, supra, note 177 at 69.
'
8 8 Id.
189 Supra, note 171 at 511-12.
190 Id. at 513.
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quired its agents to withdraw tenders which did not exactly conform to prices
set out in the sales plan.
Defence counsel cited the ruling in R. v. Canada Cement Lafarge Ltd.191
that conscious parallelism without collusion is not an offence. However, Pen-
nell 1. refused to accept the idea that conscious parallelism has read conspir-
acy out of section 32 of the Combines Investigation Act. He said, "I am of
the opinion that the theory of oligopoly pricing is irrelevant to the determi-
nation of whether or not the accused have offended the proscription on them
under the conspiracy section of the Act."'192 Later he stated: "I do not say
that proof of parallel business behaviour conclusively establishes an agree-
ment contrary to the provisions of the Combines Investigation Act."19 3
b. Finding of an Agreement
Mr. Justice Pennell found the three lamp manufacturers guilty of the
conspiracy charge. He found an agreement among the defendants, later held
to be an undue lessening of competition, on the basis of at least eight pieces
of documentary evidence, including letters to competitors. For example, after
one of CGE's agents won a tender by quoting a five per cent discount for
cash rather than the two per cent specified in the sales plan, a CGE execu-
tive wrote to the Westinghouse district manager indicating that the agent
would receive no profit on the transaction as the difference between the
tender price and the franchised dealer's price was to be donated to charity!
The CGE executive described this as "the only fair solution to the problem"
and invited the Westinghouse executive to call him if further information was
required. 19 4 Pennell J. drew the following conclusions:
It contradicts experience that a man occupying the position of a sales manager of
C.G.E. should inform his competitor of a breach of C.G.E.'s sales plan by a
C.G.E. agent unless there was an arrangement between the competitors.195
Describing the letter as "a document which speaks volumes" the Judge went
on to say:
Genuine competitors do not make reports of their business transactions to their
rivals.... This was not the conduct of a competitor but of a sales manager who
believed that the accused were united in an agreement, express or implied, to act
together and pursue a common purpose.196
He then quoted a Sylvania inter-office memorandum which indicated that Syl-
vania had notified Westinghouse and CGE about a $60.00 "error" in a quo-
tation to the Vancouver School Board. Mr. Justice Pennell asked the follow-
ing questions:
Why should there be need to inform a competitor of an error made within one's
191 Supra, note 59.
102 Supra, note 171 at 517. It is unclear from the context to what "them" refers.
103 Id.
194 Id. at 518.
'10 Id. (emphasis added).
196 Id.
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own marketing system? What right would a competitor have to complain to a
rival's head office of genuine competition?' 97
He then points out, "the document is very intelligible if there was an agree-
ment among the accused to abide by their sales plans."'198
Similar letters and memoranda are cited. In one, a CGE executive, in
reference to tenders submitted to the Federal Government, stated: ". .. it is
obvious that Sylvania is not operating under the policy we established many
years ago."'199 In another, a Sylvania executive, concerned over some anom-
alies in the various pricing schedules stated: "Propose that someone will be
in touch with their friends up the river [Westinghouse] regarding these dif-
ferences and an understanding will be reached before any action is taken."'200
A confidential Sylvania memorandum of October 3, 1963, would appear to
indicate that the agreement between the big three lamp makers restricted the
variety of lamps to be produced. It stated:
.. we are all in agreement that this [the addition of more 750 hour lamps] would
not be in keeping with our main objective of recent years to reduce the number
and quantity of types that have to be supplied to the C&I (commercial and in-
dustrial] market.2 01
After reviewing the eight pieces of documentary evidence, Mr. Justice
Pennell noted that there were sound business reasons for Westinghouse and
Sylvania to adopt the CGE sales plans. 202 He also noted that all three were
"sophisticated companies" and "through a sophisticated set of signals, the
defendants had the potential to communicate effectively with one another
and co-ordinate their activities without conspiratorial meetings. '208
Mr. Justice Pennell concluded that the published price lists of Sylvania
and Westinghouse were aligned to those of CGE and that "list prices were
usually-but not invariably-the market price. '20 4 Because CGE did not
initiate all the price changes, which were immediately followed by all firms,
it could only be considered a "barometric" price leader.
He also concluded "[t]hat the continuing communications among the
defendants went far beyond the alleged business purpose of purchasing lamps
from one another." 205 Pennell I was most concerned about the substance of
these communications. In addition, "there were intra-defendant company
communications, direct and indirect, at several levels of the distribution sys-
tem, checking on deviations by competitors on price quotations and on prices
charged by competitors for like products.1206
"' Id. at 519.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 520.
2 0 0 Id.
2
ol Id. at 521.
2 02 Id. at 522.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 523.
205 Id. at 524.
206 Id.
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In general, Mr. Justice Pennell was not able "to reconcile the substantial
unanimity of action taken by the accused with price conscious parallelism. '207
In other words, the defendants' actions were more closely coordinated than
would result from non-collusive oligopoly through conscious parallelism
without communication among the firms. He went on to assert:
Communication is the essence of every conspiracy for only by it can common
purpose be proved .... Sustained consideration of the evidence brings conviction
to my mind that there was an agreement among the accused to introduce and
maintain an industry sales plan, thereby eliminating and suppressing price com-
petition among themselves 2 08
Quaere whether Mr. Justice Pennell would have found that an agreement
existed in the absence of the documentary evidence described above. It
should be apparent that oral or written communication is not necessary for
firms in an oligopoly to effectively communicate with one another. Actions
often speak louder than words. Donald F. Turner writes
• ..there is no reason to exclude oligopolistic behavior from the scope of the
term agreement simply because the circumstances make it possible to communi-
cate without speech. It is not novel conspiracy doctrine to say that agreement can
be signified by action as well as by words2 09
One obvious form of indirect communication occurred when COE announc-
ed its new sales plan in 1959 almost three months before it was to become
effective. Its 1961 plan was announced in April to become effective in Sep-
tember. Such announcements were bids by CGE to become the price leader.
The lead times are designed to ensure that potential followers have enough
time to evaluate the proposal and indicate their acquiescence or disapproval,
possibly by indirect means. Other evidence of non-verbal communication can
be found in the fact that each of the three firms closely policed their distri-
butors and punished price cutters. Word of this would reach rivals. Such
actions are aimed at reassuring rivals that price competition is still held in
very low regard and that they should not retaliate with an aggressive pricing
policy. Compared to the behaviour in the Armco case, the various acts in
this case would require a greater inferential leap to arrive at a finding of
conspiracy, but not so large as to fail to meet the test in Hodge's Case.
c. Competition Lessened Unduly?
Having found that an agreement existed, Mr. Justice Pennell had to
determine whether it lessened competition "unduly." In reviewing the inter-
pretation of "undue" in Canadian jurisprudence, he considered the following
cases: R. v. Elliott,2 10 Weidman v. Shragge,21 per Duff J., and R. v. Howard
Smith Paper Mills Ltd.,2'2 per Cartwright J. The virtual monopoly doctrine
enunciated by Mr. Justice Cartwright in 1957 was not followed in R. v.
207 Id.
208 d.
200 Turner, supra, note 41 at 665.
210 (1905), 9 O.L.R. 648; 9 C.C.C. 505.
21 (1912), 46 S.C.R. 1.
2 12 Howard Smith Paper Mills Limited v. The Queen, [1957] S.C.R. 403; 8 D.L.R.
(2d) 449; 118 C.C.C. 321.
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Abitibi Power & Paper Ltd.213 or by Laskin J.A. in his dissent in R. v. J. J.
Beamish Construction Co. Ltd.21 4 Pennell J. then reviewed the behaviour of
the defendants during the course of the conspiracy, finding that the allega-
tions of predatory conduct were untenable and that imports had not been
impeded.2 15 He also held that consignment contracts are not illegal, but he
indicated that the test under the Combines Investigation Act "looks past the
form of the arrangement to the use which is being made of that arrange-
ment."216 Pennell J. stated that "[tihe distinctive feature of the agreement was
not the advance announcement of sales plans or prices but a requirement of
adherence without deviation to the prices and terms publicly announced....
The surveillance of the consignment system is significant as it shows the
degree to which the accused were concerned to escape the influence of the
competitive market."217 He held:
Any one of the accused acting alone perhaps might legitimately have required
total adherence to its sales plan. An act harmless when done by one takes on the
form of conspiracy when done by three dominating the market and acting in
concert.2
18
Pennell J. ruled that as a result of the three firms adopting very similar
sales plans, including the consignment system, "price competition was stifled
.... When the product is homogeneous, price is a fortiori the most important
aspect of competition." 219 He acknowledged that while price competition did
occur, more so during the 1959 plan, it was of the "sporadic hit-and-run"
variety and not the "free and open competition to which the public is en-
titled."' 20 In holding the lessening of competition to be undue, Mr. Justice
Pennell adopted the words of Cartwright J. that "the accused had arrogated
to themselves the power to carry on their activities virtually unaffected by
the influence of competition."' 1
5. R. v. Aluminum Company of Canada Limited222
a. The Preliminary Hearing
The decision in the Canada Cement Lafarge case was cited with ap-
proval to support the discharge, in May 1975, of four aluminum extruders
accused of violating section 32(1) (c) of the Combines Investigation Act in
the Alcan case. Joncas J. noted that the four accused accounted for about
eighty-six per cent of aluminum extrusions produced in Canada and that
213R. v. Abitibi Power & Paper Company, Limited (1961), 131 C.C.C. 201; 36
C.P.R. 188.
214 Rv. .J. Beamish Construction Company Ltd., [1968] 1 O.R. 5; 65 D.L.R. (2d)
260; [1968] 2 C.C.C. 5; 53 C.P.R. 43.
215 Supra, note 171 at 528-30.
216 Id. at 530.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 531.
220 Id. at 533.
221 Id. All of the accused were acquitted on both monopoly counts.
2 M Supra, note 63.
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the Aluminum Company of Canada Limited (Alcan), the largest producer,
was the price leader in the industry. The judge described the situation as
follows:
In 1967, the co-accused abided by Alcan's new price list and so informed their
clients. Alcan followed its competitors' activities closely and noted that some of
them occasionally did not follow the price list. In January, 1967, Alcan had itself
increased the cost of its aluminum ingot by .011/4 per pound.
In 1968, Alcan increased its prices again, followed by the co-accused. Alcan con-
tinues to follow the market closely. The raw material increased in price again by
.014 per pound.2 2 3
Judge Joncas cited a letter written to an Alcan executive, by an executive in
a firm which was named as a co-conspirator, and was the parent company
of one of the accused corporations which stated:
You will recall that it was you, Alcan, that approached me early in the year re a
new list and we went along with you step for step.224
He asked, "Is it possible to conclude from the evidence that there was collu-
sion to the detriment of the public?" He concluded: "Alcan, the leader, twice
increased its prices, and the co-accused, and Daymond [a co-conspirator],
followed suit," and then he said: "It appears from the evidence that competi-
tion between the accused was very strong before, during and after the
increases. '"m
In a preliminary hearing, a judge is obliged to commit the accused for
trial under section 475 of the Criminal Code, "if in his opinion . . . the
evidence is sufficient .... ,"2 Joncas J. put the point as follows:
If the evidence made before this Court was presented to a reasonable and properly
instructed jury, would it on such evidence render a guilty verdict?227
He concluded that the evidence was not strong enough to warrant committing
the accused for trial and discharged the four accused companies. It is difficult
to make sense of his decision because of its disjointedness. Despite the repre-
sentations by the defendants to the Department of Justice, after the strong
urgings of officials in the Bureau of Competition Policy, the Crown pro-
ceeded by way of preferred indictment and a trial on the merits was held in
the fall of 1976.
b. The Trial Court's Decisionma8
In a decision rendered on November 22, 1976, Mr. Justice Rothman
acquitted all five defendants of a single count brought under section 32(1)(c)
2 Id. at 220.
22 4 Id.
225 Id. at 221.
226R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-34.
2 27 Supra, note 222 at 221.
2 28 R. v. Aluminium Company of Canada Limited (1976), 29 C.P.R. (2d) 183.
In the final indictment, five companies were named: Aluminum Co. of Canada,
Reynolds Extrusion Company Limited, Indalex Limited, Kaiser Aluminum Chemicals of
Canada Limited and Daymond Company Limited. The latter was named as a co-con-
spirator in the original information resulting in the Preliminary Hearing.
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of the Combines Investigation Act. He concluded that the Crown had not
succeeded in "proving beyond a reasonable doubt that there was an agree-
ment between Alcan and Indalex as alleged .... ,,20 While it was unneces-
sary to do so, Rothman J. considered the question whether, assuming there
was an agreement, it unduly lessened competition. He said:
I have no doubt that any agreement to which [the accused] were all parties and
which, if carried into effect, would have substantially lessened competition would
have been undue. All of the [five] accused together accounted for over 80% of
the total Canadian market while Alcan and Indalex alone accounted for well over
90% of the market in British Columbia. Alcan and Reynolds were the only
Canadian sources of extrusion ingot and Alcan alone supplied far more of the
aluminum metal [primary aluminum ingot] than all of the other sources of supply
combined. 23 0
The issue of conscious parallelism was of minimal concern in the Trial
Court's reasoning, but the judgment is significant in that it indicates the
demanding requirements for finding an agreement under the conspiracy sec-
tion, section 32, even where direct communication on prices has taken place.
The Crown alleged that in June of 1968 the five aluminum extruders
conspired to pass on to their customers an increase in the price of billet or
aluminum extrusion ingot. On June 3, Alcoa in the United States, followed
by Kaiser Aluminum & Chemicals Canada Limited and Reynolds Extrusion
Company Limited, announced an increase of 1 l per pound in the price of alu-
minum ingot and an increase of four per cent in most fabricated products.231
On June 4, executives of Alcan met to decide what should be done in Cana-
da. A memorandum of that meeting stated:
In all the circumstances, Mr. Culver [an Alcan executive] felt that we should not
miss this special opportunity, in a highly competitive market to achieve the in-
crease in the ingot price we have wanted for a long time in order to improve our
return on capital 232
Alcan proposed to increase the price of extrusion ingot by 1.2 cents per
pound effective June 5. The Crown alleged the conspiracy took place on
June 5 as a result of a series of telephone calls by Mr. G. K. Clement, man-
ager of the Extrusion Division of Alcan, to a number of extruders.233 In
Rothman 's words, the "cornerstone" of the Crown's case was the following
memorandum, Document 15406, dated June 5, 1968, which was sent by
Clement to an Alcan vice-president.
I have talked to everybody on basis of 1.2 cents/pound extrusion ingot price
increase across the board and carried over into extrusion [shapes] prices. All have
agreed to implement accordingly. Bob Weber [Reynolds] in favour of any in-
229 Id. at 209.
2o Id. at 209-10. The phrase "substantially lessened competition" is of some impor-
tance in the definition of "unduly." Rothman I. rejected the virtual monopoly doctrine of
Cartwright J. in the Howard Smith case, supra, note 212 at (S.C.R.) 426, and endorsed
the position of Batshaw J. in Abitibi, supra, note 213 at (C.C.C.) 251, saying, "It is
sufficient, in my view, if it is established that the agreement would have the effect of
lessening competition substantially."
2311d. at 197.
2,82 Id.
233 d.
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crease; J. Erickson [Kaiser] agrees that there is little point in trying for additional
extrusion [shapes] price increase; W. Stracey [Indalex] feels we are brave to try to
increase at this time. John Parsons of Daymond is happy and will go along. Tony
Kingsmill [Alcan's western manager] will follow same.23 4
A better understanding of the relationship of the various companies and
the stages of production may be reached by examining Figure 1.
FIGURE 1
EXTRUDED ALUMINUM MARKET IN CANADA
Billet or Extru-
sion Ingot (an
alloy, cylindri-
cal in shape)
- Alcan
- Canadian British
Aluminum (partly
owned by Reynolds
of the U.S.)
Extruded
Shapes
Fabricated Prod-
ucts for final
use, i.e.,
- windows
- doors
- containers
- siding
- conduit
- Alcan (40+%) - Alcan
- Reynolds* - Reynolds
- Indalex** (16%) - Indalex
- Kaiser - Kaiser
- Daymond - Daymond
% V -, - many "Inde-
these 5 accounted pendents"
in 1968 for about
86% of the Canadian
market
* owned by Reynolds of the U.S.
** until March 1968, 20% held by Alcan
Alcan operates at all levels in the aluminum product chain, from ingot to
fabricated products. The central issue is whether Alcan reached an agreement
with its competitors in the production of extruded shapes to increase their
prices to reflect the increase of 1.2 cents per pound in extrusion ingot. Note
that Alcan's competitors in extruded shapes are its customers for extrusion
ingot.
In addition to the memorandum quoted above, the Crown introduced
two handwritten notes of Mr. Clement prepared a few days after June 5,
1968. They stated:um
Check with Reynolds, Kaiser, Daymond, Indalex-three out of four suggest the
most you can do is pass on metal cost.
Check with Kaiser, Indalex, Daymond, Reynolds-three out of four agree you
cannot up price further now.
These notes, said Rothman J., are "susceptible to a different interpretation
as to the subject-matter of these conversations."mse He concluded,
Neither of these documents suggest an "agreement" to increase extrusion prices
234 Id.
235Id. at 197-98.
236 Id. at 197.
Primary
Aluminum
Ingot
- Alcan
- U.S. pro-
ducers
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any more than they suggest an "agreement" in the sense of similarity of opinion
that the market could not absorb a price increase beyond the increase in metal
cost.237
In other words, these documents could be interpreted as evidence of an
agreement or simply as evidence of an "exchange of views" to use the words
of Mr. Clement of Alcan.238 In terms of the theory of conscious parallelism
of action, the Alcan executive was getting information about the likely re-
sponse of competitors to a change in prices. He was seeking to facilitate the
smooth coordination of behaviour by all the leading firms. Clement testified
that one purpose of the calls was to obtain evidence for his view that the
Canadian market would not support an across-the-board increase of four per
cent which had been adopted in the United States.239
Although the document quoted above indicates that Clement talked to
four executives in other companies and one in his own, he testified at the trial
that he did not make all of the calls personally, but rather they were made
by his staff. At the earlier Restrictive Trade Practices Commission hearings,
he testified that he had spoken to the individuals named in Document 15406.240
The indicated recipients of the calls had no recollection of any call from
Clement. Rothman J. concluded that "there is at least a reasonable doubt
that Clement made these calls himself." 241 Despite Clement's explanation of
the document as reflecting his responsibility for the calls, the Trial Court
very narrowly construed the evidence as not being indicative of agreement.
Once again, we find oral evidence vastly outweighing documentary evidence.
Rothman J. concluded that "very little weight" could be attached to Docu-
ment 15406 because if Mr. Clement "did not himself speak to some of these
people [he testified he did speak personally to Mr. Stracey of Indalex], he
would be unable to give direct evidence of any 'agreement' made with them
so that it is difficult to conceive how the document can be accepted as proof
of such an agreement."242 Rothman J. ruled that section 45 of the Combines
Investigation Act, which provides in part that a document proved to have been
in the possession of a participant is prima facie proof that anything recorded
in or by the document as having been done, said or agreed upon by any
participant, was done by the participant, does not overrule the general pro-
hibition against hearsay evidence.243
As additional evidence of the existence of a conspiracy, the Crown
pointed to the fact that the accused had announced increases in their extru-
sion prices after June 5, 1968; that the accused tended to use and follow
237Id. at 198.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 1d. at 199.
241 Id. at 200.
242 Id.
243 On this point, he followed Pennell J. in R. v. Canadian General Electric, supra,
note 171 at 494.
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Alcan's price list; and that all of the accused were on Alcan's mailing list for
its price lists. Rothman J. also indicated that "the Crown contends that the
evidence of intense competition in the industry," together with the other
factors, "tend to support the conclusion that a conspiracy existed and that
there was a common design."2 44 While intense competition might well moti-
vate the companies to seek an agreement, it is difficult to see how it could be
evidence of an agreement to increase prices by the same amount. Rothman J.
evaluated the evidence on each of these points, including that of Dr. D. E.
Armstrong of McGill University who testified for the defendants. The Judge's
findings are implicit in his conclusion:
Given the relatively small number of producers, the importance of raw material
cost in relation to total cost [about 50%] and the dissimilarity of prices actually
charged to customers, I do not consider one can safely presume that the price
increases of 1.2g per pound announced by Alcan, Reynolds, Daymond and Indalex
within a few weeks following June 5, 1968, could have resulted only from agree-
ment on their part. On the evidence, it would not be unreasonable to conclude
that the increases announced by the accused resulted not from an agreement but
from independent decisions to cover increases in metal cost. A45
In view of the communication between Alcan as major supplier of extru-
sion ingot and its customers/competitors in the extruded shapes market, their
decision to pass on the 1.2 cents per pound increase in ingot prices is hardly
"independent." We concluded above that independent behaviour by oligopo-
lists can only mean that they make their pricing and other decisions without
any attempt to communicate, not that they fail to recognize their mutual
dependence. The effect of the exchange of views as to the state of the market
was to permit the leading firm in an oligopoly to act on the interdependence
inherent in the situation with a high degree of confidence that others would
act in a parallel fashion.
In the absence of the exchange of views, Alcan's 1.2 cents per pound
increase in extrusion ingot might not have been passed on to the buyers of
extruded shapes. In fact, the intensity of competition might have forced the
extruders to absorb part or all of the increase in ingot prices.2 46 The fact that
actual transaction prices varied considerably below Alcan's list prices both
before and after the 1.2 cents per pound increase of June 5 does not mean the
"consensus building" exercise between Alcan and its customers/competitors
was without real economic effect. The probable effect of the communications
among the accused was to shift the average price received by the extruders
up by as much as 1.2 cents per pound over what it would have been in the
absence of interfirm communication.
244 Supra, note 228 at 201.
246 Id. at 203.
246 At page 204 of the judgment, Rothman J. states "Kaiser did not issue any an-
nouncement increasing its prices, and ... it seems doubtful that the ingot price increase
was in fact carried through into extrusion prices. Although Mr. Erickson [of Kaiser]
recalled that Kaiser attempted to increase extrusion prices to reflect the billet increase,
he felt that the attempt was not very successful." In terms of the law, it is irrelevant
whether or not the conspiracy succeeded in raising prices once an agreement to do so is
shown and that such an agreement was "undue."
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Figure 2 has been drawn on the assumption that all price deviations
consisted of price cuts below Alcan's list prices. L1 represents Alcan's list
price for a given type of extrusion prior to the increase of June 5, 1968.247
A1 represents the average price received by the five major extruders based on
Alcan's list price of L. The effect of the communication among the firms was
to shift the new Alcan list price to L2. Assuming the same variance in actual
as opposed to list prices due to competition, we find the average price re-
ceived by the extruders after the increase (A 2) has shifted up by 1.2 cents
per pound.2 48 This point was not taken by Mr. Justice Rothman, for after
noting the Crown's allegation that the accused agreed to pass along a price
increase, rather than fix a common price, he said, ".... in the absence of any
evidence of agreement to follow it or that it had some relationship to real
prices, it is difficult to see how the use of the Alcan's price list as a guide can
have much relevance.1 249 The point is that Alcan's price list set the plane
of prices from which competitive deviations were calculated and the plane
may well have been shifted up by 1.2 cents per pound from what it would
have been otherwise.2 50 Mr. Justice Rothman would obviously disagree for
247 An executive of Reynolds "confirmed . . . that the list prices were simply a
point of departure or maximum from which salesmen and customers would negotiate
real prices according to a variety of factors." Id at 205.
24 8 It might be argued this would have occurred without interfirm communication.
Mr. Clement of Alcan testified that most of the ongoing contracts with extrusion cus-
tomers had "escalator" clauses providing for an increase in extrusion prices in the event
of an ingot price increase and that it was almost automatic that the 1.2V/1b increase
would be passed along. If this is the case why was it necessary to call Alcan's customers
to see if they would be sufficiently unhappy to try to develop other sources of supply?
He testified he was looking for support among the other extruders to resist the 4%
increase (about 1.7¢/lb) proposed by his superiors. Id. at 198.
249 Id at 202.
250 Figures for the average selling price received by Kaiser appear to contradict this
argument. First, one should note that the average prices are not adjusted for changes in
the composition of output over time which is unknown. Second, these are the prices
Kaiser received, not the average for the industry. Third, if holding the composition of
output constant, the average price received was constant or declined, the exchange of
information (opinions) about the state of the market may have prevented an increase
or an even greater decline than was observed in the price data. The point is that the
exchange of information raised the plane of prices by 1.2 cents over what it would have
been in the absence of the establishment of consensus. Id at 205.
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he said, "there is no indication whatever that the proposed increase was to
have any relationship to real prices."2t 51
The evidence of the relationship between Alcan and Indalex was highly
complex and comprehensive252 (e.g., Clement of Alcan and Stracey of Indalex
confirmed they talked to each other on June 5 and that on other occasions
Indalex had exhorted Alcan to maintain prices and avoid price-cutting), yet
Rothman J. concluded that "motives and desires and even intentions are insuffi-
cient to constitute a conspiracy."2 3  He then set out the test which must be
met: "there must be evidence [beyond a reasonable doubt] of mutual consent
to a common design or purpose and there must be an agreement by both
parties to carry the design into effect.",254
Near the outset of his judgment Rothman J. noted that in cases of con-
spiracy to be proved by circumstantial evidence, it "need [not] be proved that
the parties actually met or corresponded or that they even knew each other
if it can be concluded, beyond reasonable doubt, that their conduct and their
actions could only have resulted from the pursuit of a common design."255
In the final analysis, he has imposed what appears to be a tougher standard,
buttressed by an exaggerated faith in the testimony of businessmen seeking
to closely coordinate the activities of their firms in an oligopoly without
appearing to have executed an agreement to do so.256
6. Summary
To date, the decided cases in Canada offer relatively little by way of a
guide to the determination of whether the present conspiracy provisions, if
intelligently interpreted, are adequate to combat at least some of the un-
desirable implications of conscious parallelism in an economy whose markets
are predominately oligopolistic in character.
In summary, this body of jurisprudence is not adequate to either confirm
or deny the utility of the current section 32 in attacking a typical case of
conscious parallelism. Some possible implications of the application of the
conspiracy provision to conscious parallelism can be obtained by an analysis
of the interpretations of section 1 of the Sherman Act257 in the United States.
251 Id.
2 521 d. at 206-09.
2
53 Id. at 209.
24 Id.
255 1d. at 191.
25G The judgment has some other disconcerting characteristics. The Trial Court
argued that there are three parts to an offence under section 32: (a) the establishment
of an agreement; (b) proof that the agreement would prevent or lessen competition;
and (c) that this prevention or lessening of competition was "undue." Id. at 191-94. The
Court found there was no agreement, but then proceeded to pronounce on the other two
parts of the offence. The Court concluded that the behaviour of the accused did not
lessen competition but, at the same time, concluded "I have no doubt that any agreement
to which [the accused] were all parties and which, if carried into effect, would have
substantially lessened competition would have been undue." Id. at 209.
257 15 U.S.C. 1.
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D. REVIEW OF THE AMERICAN CASES
The application of the American law on conspiracy to the problem of
conscious parallelism will be reviewed as part of the determination of appro-
priate public policy in this difficult area. It does not seem desirable to erect
a new legal framework if one can utilize current and reasonably anticipated
interpretations of the existing rules to ameliorate the problem at hand. Not
only have more cases been decided, but also a far wider range of facets of
the conscious parallelism problem have been considered by the American
courts. Section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 32 of the Combines Investi-
gation Act both prohibit combinations, conspiracies, or agreements in restraint
of trade. Under both statutes the crime lies in the conspiracy or agreement.
While section 1 is interpreted as prohibiting price fixing and market sharing
agreements per se,2 58 section 32 requires that such agreements lessen com-
petition unduly before they are illegal. Since the "agreement" aspect of the
offence is the one most relevant to conscious parallelism, the differences be-
tween sections 1 and 32 do not detract from the value of American cases as
an aid in developing public policy in Canada.
1. What Constitutes An Agreement?
The use of either the Sherman Act or the Combines Investigation Act
to strike at conscious parallelism requires that the court find an agreement
existing between two or more firms. This agreement may be overt or tacit;
it may be found by way of documentary or oral evidence or it may be in-
ferred on the basis of circumstantial evidence. If an agreement can be estab-
lished by documentary evidence, the case becomes a more routine conspiracy
charge. This was the situation in the Large Lamps case. The central issue is
to determine what type and how much circumstantial evidence is required
before a judge can properly infer an agreement. Proof of conspiracy outside
the field of antitrust entirely by the use of circumstantial evidence is, of
course, not new, "but the matter of what kinds of indirect evidence will be
judicially recognized as probative of conspiracy is important." James A. Rahl
continues:
Inferences drawn from documents, gestures, paradoxical behavior and other indicia
of a state of mind are one thing. Inferences drawn from purely external market
data and analysis demonstrating non-competitive uniformity of action, but not
necessarily any particular subjective facts, are something else.2509
Because the law on conspiracy is interpreted in terms of "a meeting of
minds," "concerted action," "unity of purpose," "common design" or "collu-
sion," it is essential to discover their analogy in cases of conscious parallel-
ism. A. D. Neale points out:
The underlying issue is what, at the minimum, constitutes that 'meeting of the
minds' which must be directly or circumstantially established; what degree of
mutual knowledge and confidence among businessmen amounts to a common
258 See Addyston Pipe and Steel Company v. U.S., 175 U.S. 211 (1899); U.S. v.
Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. U.S., 288 U.S. 344
(1933); U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. Inc., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
259 J. A. Rahl, Conspiracy and the Antitrust Laws (1950), 44 111. L. Rev. 743 at
757-58.
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understanding and hence, if there is a restrictive effect on competition, to an
illegal conspiracy [within the meaning of the statute]....ss0
The definition of this minimum is crucial in determining whether the old
legislation has sufficient range to deal successfully with the new disease. A
discussion of a number of conscious parallelism cases in the United States and
the standards implied by the judicial rulings although not exhaustive, 261 is in-
dicative of the range of jurisprudence on the issue under section 1 of the
Sherman Act.
a. Interstate Circuit=2 (1939)
This case, one of the earliest and most ambitious cases to use the con-
spiracy provisions of the Sherman Act in attacking cases of conscious paral-
lelism, reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 1939. It involved two groups of
defendants: eight distributors of motion pictures which accounted for seventy-
five per cent of the first class movies in the industry, and two large affiliated
cinema circuits operating in Texas and New Mexico. Interstate Circuit Inc.
had an almost complete monopoly of first-run theatres in six Texas cities. The
manager of both circuits sent to each of the eight distributors an identical
letter naming all of the distributors as addressees and making two demands:
first, that the distributors maintain a minimum admission price of twenty-five
260 A. D. Neale, The Antitrust Laws of the U.S.A. (2d ed. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1970) at 81.
261 This survey does not examine the cases brought by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion under section 5 of the F.T.C. Act which simply states: "Unfair methods of competition
in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared un-
lawful." (15 U.S.C. 45 (1958)). We do so because in F.T.C. v. Beech-Nut Packing Co.,
257 U.S. 411 (1922) the F.T.C. ruled that a violation of section 5 could occur even
though the restraint of trade falls short of conspiracy. More recently, the Supreme Court in
F.T.C. v. Sperry and Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972), held that the F.T.C. is em-
powered under section 5 of the F.T.C. Act without regard to whether such practices
violate the Sherman or Clayton Acts.
In the Cement Institute case (333 U.S. 683 (1948) at 708), the Supreme Court
held that
[WIndividual conduct, or concerted conduct which falls short of being a Sherman
Act violation may as a matter of law constitute an "unfair method of competition"
prohibited by the Trade Commission Act. A major purpose of that Act, as we
have frequently said, was to enable the Commission to restrain practices as "un-
fair" which, although not yet having grown into Sherman Act dimensions, would
most likely do so if left unrestrained.
In other words, it is possible for cases of conscious parallelism to violate section 5 of
the F.T.C. Act, but not section 1 of the Sherman Act. The important cases under section 5
are: F.T.C. v. Salt Producers Association, 34 F.T.C. 38 (1941), 134 F. 2d 354 (1943);
F.T.C. v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); F.T.C. v. Triangle Conduit and Cable
Co., 38 F.T.C. 534 (1944), 168 F. 2d 175 (1948) affirmed per curiam subnom Clayton
Mark & Co. v. F.T.C., 336 U.S. 956 (1949)-known as the Rigid Steel Conduit case.
These cases are reviewed in Sumner S. Kittrelle and George P. Lamb, The Implied
Conspiracy Doctrine and Delivered Pricing (1950), 15 Law and Contemporary Prob-
lems 227. This survey also does not examine the early "information dissemination"
cases in which some writers find elements of conscious parallelism. A useful review of
these cases is contained in L. A. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust (St. Paul:
West Publishing, 1977) at 265-73. See also, G.B. Richardson, Price Notification Schemes
(1967), 19 Oxford Economic Papers 359.
262 Interstate Circuit Inc. v. U.S., 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
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cents on subsequent runs of pictures first shown in theatres of the two cir-
cuits; second, that these pictures not be shown as part of a double feature in
subsequent showings. These demands were backed up by the threat that
Interstate would refuse to place the distributor's films in their first-run thea-
tres. After the letters there followed conferences between Interstate and the
distributors as a result of which Interstate's demands were met.
Even though there was no evidence of any oral or written communica-
tion or agreement between the distributors, the Trial Court inferred the
existence of a price fixing conspiracy and convicted the distributors. The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision saying that the Trial Court properly
inferred the existence of an agreement from
... the nature of the proposals made on behalf of Interstate and Consolidated;
from the manner in which they were made; from the substantial unanimity of
action taken upon them by the distributors; and from the fact that appellants did
not call as witnesses any of the superior officials who negotiated the contracts with
Interstate or any official who, in the normal course of business, would have had
knowledge of the existence or non-existence of such an agreement among the
distributors.203
The letter from Interstate named all the distributors as addressees. Each
knew that the others had received the same demands. The Supreme Court,
therefore, concluded that "without substantially unanimous action with re-
spect to the restrictions for any given territory there was risk of a substantial
loss of business and good will of the subsequent-run and independent exhi-
bitors, but that with it there was the prospect of increased profits."20'
The conspiracy was inferred from the course of conduct of the defend-
ants. The Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice Stone, said:
It taxes credulity to believe that the several distributors would ... have accepted
and put into operation with substantial unanimity such far-reaching changes in
their business methods without some understanding that all were to join, and we
reject as beyond the range of probability that it was the result of mere chance.... 2 05
The Court also ruled that the District Court's finding of an agreement need
not be shown.
It was enough that, knowing that concerted action was contemplated and invited,
the distributors gave their adherence to the scheme and participated in it. Each
distributor was advised that the others were asked to participate; each knew that
co-operation was essential to successful operation of the plan . . . . It is ele-
mentary that an unlawful conspiracy may be and often is formed without simulta-
neous action or agreement on the part of the conspirators. Acceptance by
competitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation to participate in a plan,
the necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint of interstate com-
merce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act.20 0
To some observers, this decision constituted the high water mark in cases
263 Id. at 221.
264 Id. at 222.
265 Id. at 223.
2 66 Id. at 226-27.
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dealing with conscious parallelism. 267 Peter Asch writes that, in Interstate
Circuit, "it appeared that proof of conspiracy was divorced from questions of
overt or formal agreement; the issue had become one of judging the market
behaviour of competing firms. 268 A violation could occur, "if such behaviour
seemed consistent only with a mutual understanding of some kind."269
According to Rahl, the decision demonstrated that "[tihe conspiracy
may creep into existence from the merging of unilateral actions upon a com-
mon course if at some time stage, not necessarily simultaneously, the defend-
ants take on the feeling of common cause."270 Neale, on the other hand,
argues that Mr. Justice Stone's words, "clearly show that in his view the
Court was doing no more than infer [sic] collusion from circumstantial evi-
dence."271 Particularly damning to the accused was the fact that they failed
to present witnesses to explain their uniformity of behavior and to argue that
no agreement had been made. As Asch points out, "the court could not
reconcile the actions of the eight distributors with an assumption of
independence."272
b. Masonite 73 (1942)
The Masonite Corporation began production of its patented hardboard
building product in 1926. In 1933 and 1934 Masonite invited each of its
competitors to become del credere agents for its products. Each agency
agreement, which contained a price fixing clause, was made independently.
However, as in the Interstate Circuit case, each firm knew of the terms of the
agreements made with its rivals.
The District Court dismissed the government's complaint on the ground
that the del credere agency agreements were true agency contracts.274 There-
fore, the price fixing through consignment selling arrangements was not in
restraint of trade.
The Court of Appeal, citing Mr. Justice Stone in Interstate Circuit,
reversed the Trial Court and convicted Masonite and the other nine com-
panies. It ruled that through the series of agency agreements, "it is clear that,
as the arrangement continued, each [competitor] became familiar with its
purpose and scope.' 275 The Appeal Court found that through its agency
agreements, Masonite had the power to fix prices and that such power "is a
powerful inducement to abandon competition. . . ." It concluded that "the
267 See Michael Conant, Consciously Parallel Action in Restraint of Trade (1954),
38 Minn. L. Rev. 797 at 801; B. F. Turner, supra, note 12 at 212. L. A. Sullivan, supra,
note 261 at 315, calls it "the leading case on conscious parallelism."
268 Peter Asch, Economic Theory and the Antitrust Dilemma (New York: John
Wiley, 1970) at 269.
269 Id.
2 70 Rahl, supra, note 259 at 759.
2 71 Neale, supra, note 260 at 94.
272 Asch, supra, note 268 at 269.
273 U.S. v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
274 20 F. Supp. 868 (N. D. Texas, 1937).
275 306 U.S. 208 at 227 (1939).
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power of this type of combination to inflict the kind of public injury which
the Sherman Act condemns renders it illegal per se."'276
In discussing the Interstate and Masonite cases, J. P. Dunn argues that
both involved a "link," i.e., "the parties to the parallel behaviour were related
through their common ties. '2 7 He continues: "the 'link' was an established
conspiracy and the court held that by joining in the scheme and adhering to
its principles by parallel behaviour the joiners became conspirators."278 He
notes that in the Interstate case, the link was not a pre-existing conspiracy,
but rather a common exhibitor. Michael Conant says the two cases "initiated
the trend away from stress upon the agreement aspect of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act... to group adherence to an unreasonable restraint of trade,
the illegal objective of Section 1.1'2 79
c. Goldman v. Loew's2 8 (1944)
The Trial Court held that refusals by distributors of first-run motion
pictures to deal with a theatre not controlled by a Warner Brothers subsidi-
ary, with whom all the defendant distributors had exclusive working arrange-
ments, did not violate section 2 of the Sherman Act.28s The Court ruled that
the behavior did not unreasonably restrain trade and that a concert of action
had not been established.
Following the Interstate decision, the Court of Appeal found evidence
of concerted action and observed that the defendants jointly controlled more
than eighty per cent of feature pictures in the United States. It ruled that
Uniform participation by competitors in a particular system of doing business
where each is aware of the other's activities, the effect of which is restraint of
interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the
statutes before us.282
The decision does not appear to support the conclusion that parallel action,
per se, amounts to conspiracy. The Appeal Court stated earlier in its deci-
sion that, "We think there must have been some form of informal under-
standing.... Here, the conclusion is justified that defendants acted in concert
in excluding the plaintiff."28 3 This finding was reinforced by the defendants
failure to testify that there was no agreement among themselves.
d. American Tobacco284 (1946)
The three largest tobacco producers in the United States were charged
with conspiracy in restraint of trade, monopolization, attempts to monopolize
276 Id. at 282.
277 Dunn, supra, note 11 at 231.
278 Id.
2 79 Conant, supra, note 267 at 802.
280 William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 150 F. 2d 738 (3rd Cir., 1945).
28154 F. Supp. 1011 (E.D. Pa., 1944).
282 150 F. 2d 738 at 745 (3rd Cir., 1945).
283 Id. at 743.
284 American Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781 (1946). Conflicting views of this
case can be found in Turner, supra, note 12 and Posner, supra, note 29.
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and conspiracy to monopolize under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The
market share of the "big three" declined from ninety-one per cent of cigarette
sales in 1930 to sixty-eight per cent in 1939 in the face of competition from
cheaper brands. As in other conscious parallelism cases, there was no evidence
of an express agreement; the existence of a conspiracy was inferred from
wholly circumstantial evidence.
The case revealed a wide variety of behavior by the defendants which
was impossible to describe as independent and from which the conspiracy
to monopolize was inferred: (i) they entered the market for low grade
tobacco and bid up the price to raise the costs of firms producing the cheaper
"109 brands." It was not known what the "big three" did with this type of
tobacco which was not used in the manufacture of their own brands; (ii) each
of the accused refused to bid at raw leaf auctions unless the others were
present. Each set strict limits on the maximum price it would pay and it was
believed that these prices were the same for all three. The total effort in
purchasing tobacco was to ensure that all paid the same price; (iii) from
1923 to 1928 the prices charged by each of the "big three" to its wholesalers
were substantially identical, from 1928 to 1940 they were absolutely identi-
cal. In the latter period only seven price changes were made. In all cases
they were first announced by Reynolds; (iv) in 1931, when tobacco prices
had dropped to their lowest point in over two decades, Reynolds raised the
price of its "Camel" brand from $6.40 to $6.85 per thousand cigarettes. The
same day the other two big companies raised the price of their major brand
to the new price. The market share of the "100 brands" increased from .3
per cent in June 1931 to 22.8 per cent in November 1932. The "big three"
reduced their prices to $5.50 per thousand and two firms lost money on their
leading brands. By May 1933, the share of the "100 brands" was only 6.4
per cent of the market. The "big three" raised their price to $6.10 in January
1934; and (v) the "big three" used a variety of threats and inducements to
have retailers maintain a differential of not more than three cents per package
over the "109 brands."
The central issue decided by the U.S. Supreme Court was whether actual
exclusion of competitors was required to show monopolization under section
2 of the Sherman Act. The Court, per Mr. Justice Burton, said it was not.
It was required only that the,
parties .. . combine or conspire to acquire or maintain the power to exclude
competitors from any part of the trade or commerce among the several states or
with foreign nations, provided they also have such a power that they are able,
as a group, to exclude actual or potential competition from the field and provided
that they have the intent and purpose to exercise that power.285
The decision was hailed as providing a precedent with which to attack classi-
cal oligopoly behavior. This was certainly the view of Professor W. H.
Nicholls.286 More recently, Sullivan reminds us that "the evidence of concert-
285 328 U.S. 781 at 809 (1946).
280 William H. Nicholls, The Tobacco Case of 1946 (1949), 39 American Eco-
nomic Review 284.
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edness entailed far more than non-collusive, interdependent conduct ... ". ,287
As Mr. Justice Burton himself stated:
No formal agreement is necessary to constitute an unlawful conspiracy. Often
crimes are a matter of inference deduced from the acts of the person accused and
done in pursuance of a criminal purpose. Where the conspiracy is proved, as here,
from the evidence of the action taken in concert by the parties to it, it is all the
more convincing proof of an intent to exercise the power of exclusion acquired
through that conspiracy. The essential combination or conspiracy in violation of
the Sherman Act may be found in a course of dealing or other circumstances as
well as in an exchange of words.2 88
A close reading of these words, together with the entire decision, suggests
that while some new language is employed, e.g., "course of dealing," the
Supreme Court is still grounding its decisions firmly in the law of conspiracy.
It may be argued that the inferential leap, based entirely on circumstantial
evidence, is greater than in other cases, but the decision evolves quite natural-
ly from the law of conspiracy.
e. U.S. v. Paramount28 9 (1948)
The defendants, eight motion picture producers and distributors, were
charged with monopolization and with conspiracy to restrain and monopolize
trade in the distribution and exhibition of motion pictures. The defendants
had engaged in a number of parallel business practices, but the conspiracy
aspects of the case focussed on their price-fixing behaviour and on their im-
position of unreasonable clearances between first and subsequent runs in their
copyright licencing contracts.
The District Court rejected the monopoly charge but made the follow-
ing observations with respect to the conspiracy to restrain trade:
[the defendants'] licenses are in effect price-fixing arrangements among all the
distributor-defendants, as well as between such defendants individually and their
various exhibitors .... [Thus] there was a general arrangement of fixing prices in
which both distributors and exhibitors were involved. 9 0
... the [motion picture distributors] acted in concert in the formation of a uni-
form system of clearances for the theatres to which they license their films and that
the exhibitor-defendants have assisted in creating and have acquiesced in this sys-
tem... in violation of the Sherman Act.291
The Court ruled that tacit participation in a general scheme to control prices
287 Sullivan, supra, note 261 at 361.
288 Supra, note 285 at 809-10.
The Court of Appeal reviewed carefully the evidence as to the finding of a con-
spiracy and concluded that the jury's inference was justified. The Appeal Court ruled:
The agreement may be shown by a concert of action, all parties working together
understandingly, with a single design for the accomplishment of a common pur-
pose . . . . It is the common design which is the essence of the conspiracy or
combination; and this may be made to appear when the parties steadily pursue
the same object, whether acting separately or together, by common or different
means, but always leading to the same unlawful result.
(147 F. 2d 93 at 107 (6th Cir. 1944))
289 U.S. v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
290 66 F. Supp. 323 at 334-35 (1946).
291 Id. at 343.
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is as violative of the Sherman Act as an explicit agreement. Hence, the sepa-
rate contracts between the distributors and exhibitors, individually executed,
did not prevent a finding of illegality. Mr. Justice Douglas endorsed the lower
court's finding of conspiracy "inferred from the pattern of price-fixing dis-
closed in the record." He continued:
It is not necessary to find an express agreement in order to find a conspiracy. It is
enough that a concert of action is contemplated and that the defendants con-
formed to the arrangement.292
With respect to the uniform system of clearances, Mr. Justice Douglas
did not indicate that the evidence involved a "meeting of minds." He con-
cluded:
The evidence is ample to support the finding ... that the defendants either par-
ticipated in evolving this uniform system of clearances or acquiesced in it and so
furthered its existence. That evidence ...is therefore adequate to support the
finding of a conspiracy to restrain trade. . ..0
With respect to the first passage, presumably Justice Douglas meant
that it is not necessary to find evidence of a direct agreement to sustain a
conviction for conspiracy. With respect to the second passage, as Neale has
pointed out, "'to participate in evolving' a system or to 'acquiesce? in a sys-
tem and so 'further its existence' are tests that seem to fall well short of a
'meeting of the minds.' "94 Therefore, the Paramount decision moves further
from the requirement that a conspiracy be inferred from the parallel behavior
of the defendants than any of the earlier cases.
f. Ball v. Paramount95 (1948)
Like Goldman v. Loew's, this case involved uniform refusals to deal by
the distributors of first run films. The Appeal Court also reversed the trial
court's decision296 and held that there did exist an inference of conspiracy
among the distributors. In doing so, the Appeal Court relied on the decisions
in Goldman v. Loew's, Interstate Circuit and Paramount. J.P. Dunn argues
that this case is "a stronger authority for the per se rule than is Goldman. '297
But he also notes that the Appeal Court ruled that ". . . conspiracy may be
inferred when concert of action could not possibly be sheer coincidence.'u s8
In other words, it appears that the decision rests more on the inference of an
agreement than it does on the idea that conscious parallelism per se is illegal
under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
g. Pevely Dairy2 99 (1949)
This case provides authority for the proposition that conscious paral-
29 334 U.S. 131 at 142 (1948).
293 Id. at 146-47.
294 Neale, supra, note 260 at 167, n. 3.
215 Ball v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 169 F. 2d 317 (3d Cir., 1948).
296 67 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Pa., 1946).
297 Dunn, supra, note 11 at 235.
2 98 Id. at 236.
29 Pevely Dairy Co. v. U.S., 178 F. 2d 363 (8th Cir., 1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 942 (1950).
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lelism alone is not equivalent to an agreement and that evidence of parallel
behavior may be explained on the basis of common economic factors which
would predispose the defendants to parallel action.3 00 Pevely and its co-
defendant milk distributor accounted for about sixty-three per cent of the
market in the St. Louis area. They charged the same price and changed prices
by the same amount at the same time.
No evidence of a written or oral agreement was introduced. The defend-
ants were convicted at trial, but this was reversed by the Court of Appeal.
It was adduced that the quality of the product was specified by a St. Louis
ordinance and that the cost of the milk to the dairies was fixed by govern-
ment regulation. Both dairies were organized by the same union and subject
to the same wage rates. Each price change was associated with changes in
costs. Jardner J. stated:
The milk as handled by appellants was a standardized product. Its cost items
being substantially identical for both appellants, uniformity in price would result
from economic forces. 801
He went on to say that
... every price change was made, not as the result of any understanding or
agreement, but because of economic factors, and the same economic factors
prompting a change by one of the appellants were equally applicable to the
other.80 2
In conclusion, he ruled that uniformity of prices of a standardized commodity
is itself not evidence of a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
h. Milgram v. Loew's303 (1951)
Milgram, the owner of a new drive-in theatre in Allentown, Pennsyl-
vania, alleged that eight motion picture distributors conspired in refusing to
supply him with first-run films even though he offered to pay more than the
prevailing price for such films. The distributors argued that they had reached
their decisions independently and that their classification of theatres was
based on independent business judgment taking into account the limited
drawing power of a drive-in, the susceptibility of the business to seasonal and
weather changes, and the reduction in prestige and income if first-runs were
shown in drive-ins. They held to their refusal to deal despite the fact that
Milgram's theatre was an excellent facility within the city limits and despite
the fact that none of the downtown theatres were owned by the distributors.
The Trial Court found the distributors guilty of a violation of section 1
of the Sherman Act. The trial judge asserted that, "It is incredible that each
[distributor] proceeded in ignorance of how the others were dealing with
it ... it is simply not possible that branch managers did not keep track of
800 Asch, supra, note 268 at 275.
801 178 F. 2d 363 at 368.
802 1d. at 369.
0SWMilgram v. Loew's Inc., 192 F. 2d 579 (3d Cir., 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
929 (1952).
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what their competitors were doing."204 The Trial Court apparently adopted
the per se approach to parallel behaviour:
It may be taken as settled that proof of concert of action is of itself sufficient
evidence from which an 'agreement', as that term is used in the Act, may be
found. In practical effect, consciously parallel business practices have taken the
place of the concept of meeting of the minds which some of the earlier cases
emphasized. Present concert of action, further proof of actual agreement among
the defendants is unnecessary, and it then becomes the duty of the Court to
evaluate all the evidence in the setting of the case at hand and to determine
whether a finding of a conspiracy to violate the Act is warranted. 05
Alternatively, agreement is traditionally necessary to establish a conspiracy;
conscious parallelism shows an agreement; conscious parallelism to restrain
trade may amount to conspiracy under the Sherman Act. 06
The Third Circuit Court of Appeal upheld the decision in language
very similar to that used in the Interstate Circuit case:
Uniform participation by competitors in a particular system of doing business,
where each is aware of the other's activities, the effect of which is restraint of
interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy .... 307
At the same time the Appeal Court noted:
This does not mean, however, that in every case mere consciously parallel business
practices are sufficient evidence, in themselves, from which a court may infer
concerted action 2 08
In this case, the Appeal Court gives with one hand and, if it does not take
away with the other, it surely limits the application of its dicta with respect
to conscious parallelism per se being a violation of the Sherman Act. Dunn
argues that "the case ultimately holds not that a per se rule is the law, but
only that conscious parallelism may serve as the basis for an inference of
agreement."309
Hastie J.'s dissent provides a useful analysis of the relationship between
conscious parallelism and a finding of conspiracy. He asserted that the Dis-
trict Court erred in its conclusion that a conspiracy existed. For example, he
said, "I think it is clear that the court repeatedly used the phrase 'concert of
action' to mean no more than 'consciously parallel business practices' . . ..
Hastie J. continues:
[T]he court seems to have reasoned that it is permissible to proceed to a legal
conclusion of conspiracy in restraint of trade from an ultimate factual finding of
"consciously parallel action" without any finding of a "meeting of the minds" ...
in the sense of agreement upon a common course of action reached by collabora-
804 94 F. Supp. 416 at 418 (E.D. Pa., 1950).
805 Id. at 419.
8o Supra, note 11 at 237.
307 Supra, note 280 at 745, as quoted in Milgram, supra, note 303 at 584.
808 Milgram, id. at 583.
309 Supra, note 11 at 238. Neale, supra, note 260 at 85, argues that this case "goes
furthest in purporting to develop the law of conspiracy." He notes that the Court of
Appeal "did, however, feel it necessary to hedge somewhat on the [trial] judge's state-
ment that conscious parallelism had 'taken the place' of meeting of the minds as the
criterion of conspiracy." (at 86).
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tion, however effected. This reasoning was decisive here because on the evidence
the court was unable to conclude that there had been even the most informal col-
laboration among the defendant distributors.310
The dissenting justice argued that section 1 of the Sherman Act required a
"finding of actual, if informal agreement" for the words "conspiracy" and
"combination" in the section "connote collaboration and agreement both in
understanding and as normally applied in anti-trust cases."
i. C-O-Two Fire Equipment31 (1952)
Four manufacturing corporations of portable carbon dioxide fire extin-
guishers and three individuals were charged with violating section 1 of the
Sherman Act between the beginning of 1947 and mid-1949 in the Southern
California area. The defendant companies charged identical prices to all pur-
chasers for identical size and design of extinguishers by using a delivered
price system. At various times the accused published and distributed price
lists. In addition, they submitted identical bids to public agencies and had
uniform.licensing agreements to fix price, terms, and conditions of sales with
their distributors. Their sales accounted for more than ninety per cent of the
market. Each defendant pleaded guilty except C-Q-Two Fire Equipment and
one of its executives. Both were convicted at trial.
Upon appeal, the defendants challenged the point that the evidence
presented by the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
they conspired to fix prices. They argued that the product was "naturally
standardized" and therefore resulted in price uniformity. The court disagreed.
It held that the product was artificially standardized, to the point where the
only difference was the label, by adhering to the requirements set up by
Underwriters Laboratories. The Court also noted the detailed parallelism in
the companies business practices and their history of coordination. The Ap-
peal Court found the set of facts not only consistent with the existence of an
agreement, but also inconsistent with any other reasonable hypothesis.
In this case, the term "plus factors" was introduced. The Court stated
that It
regarded this evidence [of artificial standardization] as being another one in a
series of "plus factors" which, when standing alone and examined separately, could
not be said to point directly to the conclusion that the charges of the indictment
were true beyond a reasonable doubt, but which, when viewed as a whole, in their
proper setting, spelled out that irresistible conclusion.3 12
Other "plus factors" mentioned by the Court were association meetings, price
increases in periods of excess supply, the publication and distribution of price
lists at various times and the use of a uniform delivered price system. 18
310 Supra, note 303 at 590-91.
811 C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co. v. U.S., 197 F. 2d 489 (9th Cir., 1952), cert.
dented, 344 U.S. 892 (1952).
3
'
2 1d, at 493.
313 This case is contrasted to Pevely Dairy by Sullivan, supra, note 261 at 318.
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j. Theatre Enterprises14 (1954)
Although in a number of decisions, beginning with the Supreme Court's
ruling in Interstate Circuit in 1939, the courts had begun to convict on little
more than evidence of conscious parallelism, Mr. Justice Clark's decision in
this case retreated to a stricter, more traditional interpretation of the law on
conspiracy. He ruled that:
The crucial question is whether [the defendants'] conduct . . . stemmed from
independent decision or from an agreement, tacit or express. To be sure, business
behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence from which the fact finder may
infer agreement .... But this Court has never held that proof of parallel business
behavior conclusively establishes agreement or, phrased differently, that such
behavior itself constitutes a Sherman Act offense. Circumstantial evidence of
consciously parallel behavior may have made heavy inroads into the traditional
judicial attitude toward conspiracy; but "conscious parallelism" has not yet read
conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely 3 15
The case resulted from a private treble-damage action by the owner of a
suburban Baltimore theatre against the eight largest film distributors in the
United States. The distributors, approached individually by the owner, who
had a new, high quality theatre, had refused to provide first-run films. The
distributors owned three of the eight theatres in downtown Baltimore to which
they supplied first-run films.
All the defendants asserted the same reasons for denying the plaintiffs
offers: the plaintiff's theatre would provide additional competition for the
downtown theatres; the suburban location of the theatre had less than one-
tenth of the drawing area of a downtown theatre; and that the downtown
theatres permitted the full exploitation of first-run movies and gave oppor-
tunities for widespread advertisement which maximized overall returns.
The jury at the trial found for the distributors. The Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeal affirmed this decision.3 16 The Supreme Court upheld the Appeal
Court's decision holding that the crucial question was ".. . whether [the dis-
tributors'] conduct toward [the theatre owner] stemmed from an independent
decision or from an agreement, tacit or express. 317 Since there was no evi-
dence of a direct agreement and the distributors provided evidence of inde-
pendent action which refuted the inference of conspiracy, the Supreme Court
ruled in favor of the distributors. The decision was consistent with the dis-
senting judgment of Hastie J. in Milgram v. Loew's a few years earlier.
Neale summarizes the significance of the Supreme Court's decision as
follows: ".... it is clear that the attempt to extend the meaning of 'conspiracy'
to cover parallel courses of action-an attempt intended to enable antitrust
to be brought to bear more easily on oligopoly situations-has failed."318
314 Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537
(1954).
315 Id. at 540-41.
816 201 F. 2d 306 (1953).
317 Supra, note 314 at 540.
818 Neale, supra, note 260 at 87.
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In contrasting Mr. Justice Stone's ruling in Interstate Circuit with that of the
Court of Appeals in Milgram v. Loew's and with Mr. Justice Clark's decision
in this case, Neale argues, "the root of the trouble is ambiguity in the use of
apparently simple terms like 'know' and 'mutual awareness'.... Whenever
there is a plan, there is mutual awareness among the participants; but it does
not follow that whenever there is mutual awareness, there is a plan."3 191 It is
Neale's contention that "a plan implies some assurance of reliable action in
the future ... ,,20 and that its breakdown will result in reproach. However,
conscious parallelism is without this "quasi-moral element.) 321
Dunn's view of Theatre Enterprises is that the Supreme Court "is saying
consciously parallel action is, at most, only evidence which, in conjunction
with other evidence, (such as complexity of pricing formulae, number of
firms, past history, etc.) may support an inference of agreement. Thus, the
element of agreement must still be dealt with and some species of that crea-
ture found."322 Nye points out that while the decision holds that conscious
parallelism, per se, will not compel an inference of conspiracy, the trial court
is still permitted to draw that inference from such evidence. 23
k. Orbo Theatre2 4 (1957)
This case was a private treble-damage action by a Rockville, Maryland
theatre owner against a number of film distributors. He alleged that in refus-
ing to grant him fourteen day clearances and offering him only the regular
practice in the Washington, D.C./Maryland area of twenty-one day clear-
ances, the distributors violated section 3 of the Sherman Act. This section is
identical to section 1 except that it applies to the District of Columbia.
The identical request for films on a fourteen day clearance basis was
made to each of the distributors, but none of the letters indicated that the
same demand was being made to any other distributor. The trial judge
pointed out that to have yielded to the demand would have resulted in dis-
crimination against a successful drive-in theatre nearby which operated nine
months of the year. Each distributor refused the demand, but instead offered
a system of competitive bidding between the plaintiff's theatre and the drive-
in on the basis of a twenty-one day clearance.
At trial, the branch managers of the defendant distributors, other execu-
tives and house counsel who participated in the decision gave evidence and
were subjected to cross examination. The trial judge concluded from the evi-
dence: "There was no evidence, direct or circumstantial, oral or docu-
mentary, from which an inference of even remote cooperation among the
defendants in this matter could be derived."32 5
319 Id. at 88.
820 Id.
821 Id.
322 Dunn, supra, note 11 at 228.
323 Stephen A. Nye, Can Conduct Oriented Enforcement Inhibit Conscious Paral-
lelism? (1975), 44 Antitrust LJ. 206 at 207. See also, Asch, supra, note 268 at 277.3 24 0rbo Theatre Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 1957 Trade Cases, Par. ir 68,869, 73516.
2 5 Id. at 73520.
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Citing Theatre Enterprises and five other cases for support, the trial
judge ruled as follows:
The fact that parallel action was taken by alleged conspirators may under certain
circumstances justify the Court in drawing the conclusion that the parallel action
was concerted action. Such an inference is permissible, but is not compelled.
Whether to reach it in any particular case depends on the remainder of the
evidence and the surrounding circumstances. Parallel action may indeed be con-
certed action, but may also be due to the fact that the persons concerned arrived
at the same simple solution of a common business problem. Here the problem was
a comparatively simple one, and the solution reached was more or less obvious. If
the various officers and employees involved in the decision refrained from testifying
on this point, the court might well draw an adverse inference. On the other hand,
considering the fact that there was absolutely no evidence of the alleged con-
spiracy, beyond the taking of parallel action; that each of the participants denied
any communication or consultation with any of the co-defendants; and that none
of the witnesses was in any way impeached or gave any testimony that was in-
herently incredible, several of them being members of the bar, the Court is not
justified in finding that the actions were jointly planned or concerted.3 26
The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision;327 certiorari was denied by the
U.S. Supreme Court. s8
1. Salk Vaccine Case29 (1959)
The five pharmaceutical companies licenced to manufacture and sell the
Salk polio vaccine were charged with a "continuing agreement, understand-
ing, plan and concert of action" to "submit uniform price quotations,"
"adopt uniform and noncompetitive terms and conditions for sales" and
"adopt uniform and noncompetitive methods" for pricing the vaccine in sales
to government agencies. 330 The government charged that the agreement could
be inferred from circumstances ranging from uniformity in pricing sales to
government agencies, to the defendants' proclivity to discuss prices to varia-
tions in prices and terms quoted to foreign purchasers. In each instance, the
trial judge decided there was a reasonable explanation of the defendants'
behavior which was consistent with a finding of "not guilty." For example,
with respect to price uniformity, he accepted the argument that the "most
favored nation" clauses in the contracts produced the uniformity. He refused
to accept the government's contention that uniform behavior together with
a number of "plus factors" provided the basis for an inference of conspiracy.
In deciding against the Department of Justice, the District Court appears
to have gone beyond the rule in Hodge's Case, for it stated:
...The Government [must] not only prove the defendants' guilt based on a
reasonable hypothesis beyond a reasonable doubt, but also ...simultaneously
eliminate every other reasonable hypothesis of innocence.331
320 Id.
827 261 F. 2d 380 (D.C. Cir., 1958).
328 359 U.S. 943 (1959).
329 U.S. v. Eli Lilly & Co., Crim. No. 173-58 D.N.J, Nov. 30, 1959 at 54, as cited
in Almarin Phillips and George R. Hall, The Salk Vaccine Case: Parallelism, Conspiracy
and Other Hypotheses (1960), 46 Virg.L.Rev. 717.
330 Id. at 718.
331 Id. at 717.
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Almarin Phillips and George Hall argue that such a test is "unrealistic" and
that "it limits the doctrine of conscious parallelism to the point that it is vir-
tually indistinguishable from overt agreements in restraint of trade."3 2
m. Delaware Valley Marine Supply 333 (1961)
Delaware Valley, a newly formed tax-free seller of liquor and tobacco
to foreign trade vessels entering the Port of Philadelphia, sued the five largest
tobacco companies in the U.S. and an established tax-free seller alleging viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act. When approached by the new firm, all
the tobacco companies refused the new firm a "direct listing" to enable it to
purchase cigarettes on a tax-free basis. The new firm never commenced
business.
There was no direct evidence of a conspiracy, i.e., concerted refusal to
deal. Two of the firms denied the application by letter, two did not even
answer Delaware Valley's letter and one refused orally after an initial inter-
view and adhered to its decision after an extensive investigation and valua-
tion. All but one defendant denied that they had knowledge that Delaware's
application had been or would be denied by any other company.
After reviewing the evidence, the Appeal Court found it "sufficient to
support a finding by a jury of conscious parallelism," but that the type of
behavior shown, "standing alone," was insufficient to sustain a finding of con-
spiracy.3 34 The Court noted that the tobacco companies' actions were limited
to saying "yes" or "no." Therefore, "the suspicion which would be created
by the unlikelihood of numerous firms reaching one of many conclusions is
lacking . . . . What is more, it was the plaintiff's contention that to be
successful, a tax-free outlet must have all major brands available for sale.
The refusal by one major cigarette producer could cause the enterprise to
fail.
With respect to the application of section 1 to conscious parallelism, the
Appeal Court stated:
... it is a fact that conspiracy remains an essential ingredient of a case based on
Section 1. Conscious parallelism... is of aid in demonstrating the existence of
sophisticated and silent agreements which so often have injuriously restrained
trade. But conscious parallelism is not yet a conclusive legal substitute for proof
of conspiracy.33 6
The Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Theatre Enterprises and
on its own decision in Milgram v. Loew's.
832 Id.
833 Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 1961 Trade
Cases, Par. Ir 70, 170, 78682.
.434 Id. at 78687.
335 Id.
836 Id. at 78685. In U.S. v. FMC Corp. (1969 Trade Cases, Par. Ir 72,901, 87405
at 87431) the District Court held that "proof of an agreement, express or implied, is
essential to proving a conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act."
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n. Naumkeag Theatres337 (1965)
The Appeal Court's decision, affirming the District Court's directed ver-
dict for the defendants (six film distributors and two theatres), follows the
major line of cases in the wake of Mr. Justice Clark's ruling in Theatre En-
terprises over a decade earlier. The decision is interesting for two reasons:
an observation as to what constitutes conscious parallelism, and its statement
in respect to the "conscious parallelism plus" approach.
The defendants argued that there was not even any evidence of con-
scious parallelism. The Appeal Court recognized the serial nature of oligopo-
listic interdependence and replied:
This argument, that it did not appear that any distributor knew what the others'
decision "would be" at the time when it made its own decisions, overlooks the
obvious fact that decisions (to act or not to act) are made continuously and not
once and for all. A defendant at all times could look at the past inactivity of its
competitors and eventually draw conclusions that if it did not change, neither
would they.338
With respect to the test to be applied, the Appeal Court stated:
... conscious parallelism is concededly not enough [citing two cases]. Plaintiff's
burden is to show that there was evidence warranting a finding of something
additional from which a reasonable inference of conspiracy may be made, or, as
it puts it, of conscious parallelism "plus."339
The key "plus factor" in this case, the plaintiff argued, was the fact that its
theatre was ranked behind the two defendants' theatres--even though it was
not in substantial competition with them. However, the Court found that "the
plaintiff's contention that placing it behind [the defendant theatres] was con-
trary to defendant exhibitors'3 40 best financial interests, independently consid-
ered, totally unsubstantiated." 341 The other "plus factor," the Court concluded,
showed a departure from parallelism, conscious or otherwise. The Supreme
Court denied certiorari.342
o. Wall Products3 43 (1971)
This case was a treble-damage action by a group of building supply and
wallboard dealers against three manufacturers of gypsum wallboard who in
1968, accounted for sixty-one per cent of the U.S. market. The producers were
alleged to have violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. There were two main
elements to the case: (i) exchanges of price information which the producers
argued were necessary to verify prices to protect themselves against buyer
3 37 Naumkeag Theatres Co., Inc. v. New England Theatres, Inc., 1965 Trade Cases,
Par. .r 71,455, 80994.
338 Id. at 80995.
339 Id.
840 Id. From the text, it is clear that "distributors" should be substituted for "ex-
hibitors."
841 Id. at 80997.
342 382 U.S. 906 (1965).
S43 Wall Products Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 1971 Trade Cases, Par. 7r 73,523,
90121.
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misrepresentations to avoid violations of the Robinson-Patman Act and (ii)
"interdependent conscious parallel action" by the producers whereby they
withdrew all exceptions to published list prices, ignored competition from
single-plant producers, centralized pricing decisions in one officer and with-
drew extended credit terms. The first element should be classified as an "in-
formation dissemination" case and will not be dealt with here, but the second
is of interest in the development of jurisprudence on conscious parallelism.
The defendants' expert described the industry as "a classic type of un-
differentiated oligopoly."3 44 Between 1960 and 1968 industry capacity rose
by about thirty per cent. The number of single-plant producers tripled during
the period and their share of the market increased from 3.8 per cent to 7.8
per cent of industry capacity. In 1968, the time at which the alleged con-
spiracy began, the industry had fourteen producers. The two largest pro-
ducers accounted for 56.4 per cent of sales; the five largest accounted for
68.3 per cent. In both the San Francisco Bay Area and the nation, the mar-
ket shares of United States Gypsum (USG), which was the largest producer
with 33.2 per cent nationally in 1968, and those of the other defendants ex-
perienced a "substantial decline." A similar decline occurred in the rate of
return of USG and National Gypsum, the two largest producers. District
Court Judge Zirpoli concluded that "the overwhelmingly important factor
influencing the buyer's decision as to which brand of wallboard to buy is
price." 345
In the spring of 1965, USG decided to change its policy of "defensive
pricing." The period 1964-65 had been a period of price cutting by the wall-
board producers as single-plant producers who, lacking the services available
from established multi-plant firms, undercut list prices. The established firms
matched and the single-plant firms cut again. Mill net prices in mid-1965
were lower than at any time since the mid-1950's. USG hoped that by with-
drawing "P.A.'s" (price deviations) to meet competition and republishing its
prices at lower levels, prices would stabilize. In addition, USG decentralized
pricing authority, limited P.A.'s to five per cent off list price for volume pur-
chasers and extended its zone pricing system throughout the rest of the United
States.
USG expected its competitors to follow. They did not; the five per cent
discount was given to all accounts and prices continued to decline. By Sep-
tember 1965, USG was selling below its list price to thirty-eight per cent of
its dealers to meet competition. The firm's gross profit in 1966 was anticipated
to be $29,000,000 below that of 1964.
In October and November USG developed a new strategy to stop the
erosion of its prices, profits and market share. On November 17, 1965, it
mailed announcements to the trade that, effective December 15, 1965, it
would withdraw all price exceptions and adhere strictly to its published list
prices. Two parts of the strategy were not made public: (i) that USG would
not meet the prices of single-plant producers, and (ii) that pricing authority
344 Id. at 90127.
845 Id. at 90130.
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would be centralized in two senior officials (the Chief Executive Officer and
the Vice-President of Marketing) with no delegation of authority.
Within two weeks, the other defendant producers refused to meet the
competition of single-plant producers and centralized their pricing authority
in their Chief Executive Officer. Judge Zirpoli noted, with emphasis, that
USG's witnesses unanimously testified that the success of the new pricing
policy was dependent upon its other major competitors following USG's
initiative. The defendants adhered to the new policy until the end of 1967.
Judge Zirpoli said that the behavior of the defendants went beyond
"mere conscious parallelism" and he concluded that the wallboard producers
conspired to stabilize and maintain the price level of their product "through
a course of interdependent conscious parallel action pursuant to a tacit un-
derstanding by acquiesence coupled with assistance . . ."346 from USG's
three-part policy of December 15, 1965. But he also cited evidence which
indicated that more than a tacit understanding existed. With respect to
National Gypsum, there was documentary evidence that its "Plan of Action,"
incorporating the unannounced features of USG's plan, was written prior to
November 17, 19 65.347 On the basis of this and other evidence, Judge Zirpoli
concluded that "National had advance notice of USG's action; [and] had
agreed to follow a similar policy .... ,,348 This constituted a per se illegal
conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act.
With respect to the actions of another defendant (Kaiser Gypsum, 6.5
per cent of the market in 1968), Judge Zirpoli recognized how "offer and
acceptance" of an oligopolistic agreement can occur. Prior to USG's an-
nouncement in November 1965, the chief executive of Kaiser had requested
that USG and National stop deviating from list price. After quoting the ruling
in Interstate Circuit, Judge Zirpoli stated:
Thus, when [the chief executive of Kaiser] suggested to his competitors that they
cease granting off-list prices he was effectively conveying his offer to participate
in a plan to withdraw discounts and fix prices at list. An exchange of words is not
required.349
He then quoted the following rule from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's
decision in Esco v. United States:
Written assurances it concedes, are unnecessary. So are oral assurances, if a
course of conduct, or a price schedule, once suggested or outlined by a competitor
in the presence of other competitors, is followed by all-generally and custom-
arily-and continuously for all practical purposes, even though there be slight
variations.3 50
If "outlined by a competitor in the presence of other competitors" ex-
tended to the public announcement of a price list (or changes in an estab-
lished price list), this last ruling could have real force. Why should it be
346 Id. at 90149.
347 Id. at 90144.
848 Id. at 90145.
849 Id. at 90146.
350 304 F. 2d 1000 at 1008 (1965).
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necessary for competitors to be present in the same room as they were at trade
association meetings when the metal culvert producers were exhorted to fol-
low an open price policy in the Armco 51 case? Why, too, should the rule be
limited to a competitor suggesting or outlining a course of conduct or price
schedule? In the Armco case, officials of two major suppliers to the industry
met with the metal culvert producers individually apparently to advocate
adoption of an open price policy.
To return directly to Wall Products, quaere why it was necessary for
Judge Zirpoli to add to the plethora of terminology by using the term "inter-
dependent conscious parallelism." Clearly, he wanted to indicate that the be-
haviour in the case went beyond "mere conscious parallelism." Almost by
definition, conscious parallelism grows out of the interdependence of firms in
an oligopoly, particularly those products homogeneous products.
p. Bogosian v. Gulf 0iI352 (1975)
Here the plaintiffs wished to test "whether pleading no more than inter-
dependent consciously parallel action is sufficient to support a claim under
Serman Act S..... ,,3 The District Court rejected the argument that "the
critical factor is that Sherman Act S.1 requires concerted action" and that the
phrase "'interdependent conscious parallel action' fails to satisfy [section
i].,,54
The plaintiffs relied on Wall Products, but the District Court pointed
out that in that case "a classic Sherman Act S.1 combination, contract, or con-
spiracy could be found without resorting to interdependent conscious parallel
action."3 55 The Court then reviewed American Tobacco, discussed supra, and
summarized its own position as follows:
In its usual contest [sic, context] conscious parallelism or interdependent conscious
parallelism is circumstantial evidence of agreement. While interdependent con-
scious parallelism may often be based upon agreement such business behavior
may be the result of rational individual decisions of competitors. The latter, if
without any agreement, is not actionable ... interdependence is merely additional
circumstantial evidence or indicia of an agreement. Conscious parallelism has
become a shorthand term for parallel business behavior where a Sherman Act
S. 1 violation is attempted to be proven without benefit of a formal agreement.
It is not necessary to burden the language of antitrust law with another nonopera-
tional term, viz., interdependent consciously parallel action.8 56
2. Summary
The importance of judicial rulings in specific cases is dependent upon a
considerable number of factors: (i) the specific facts of the case-individual
rulings are not based on issues submitted for consideration in the abstract,
they are made in the context of a set of facts virtually unique in each instance.
Generalizations must be made with care; (ii) the rulings are seldom unadorned
S51 Supra, note 62.
3 52 B ogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 1975 Trade Cases, Par. Ir 60,284, 66104.
353 Id. at 66107.
S54 Id.
355 Id. at 66108.
856 1d. at 66109.
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by qualification; they are often accompanied by contradictory statements with-
in the same case. This is why different passages within the same case can be
cited to sustain conflicting statements; (iii) interpretations are given at a spe-
cific moment in time and can only reflect the cumulative thinking of previous
cases. Therefore, an appreciation of the significance of a ruling is very much
time-dependent. Statements as to what the law is must be time-related.
L. A. Sullivan points out that the government, in order to succeed in a
conscious parallelism case under the conspiracy provisions of the Sherman
Act, must show more than mere parallelism of action. The evidence must be
sufficient for the judge or jury to conclude "that the participants have become
a group acting together, rather than individual competitors who happen at
the moment to be doing the same thing. '357 The evidence as a whole must
indicate there has been common conduct. He argues that the evidence must
reveal "that they have, in one way or another, communicated, and given as-
surances, one to another. 358
E. THE OPTIONS FOR CANADIAN PUBLIC POLICY
Conscious parallelism, particularly in the form of closely coordinated
oligopoly behaviour without apparent collusion, constitutes one of the major
problems of competition policy. The Canadian courts have, to date, refused
to condemn even consistent and closely parallel action by members of an oli-
gopoly unless the Crown can show that there was, or the Court can infer,
either a tacit or express agreement. While the law on conspiracies has long
held that direct proof of an agreement is unnecessary and that it may be in-
ferred from the whole of the circumstantial evidence, an inference prejudicial
to the accused must be based, not simply on the basis of whether the facts
are consistent with the accused's guilt, but on whether they are inconsistent
with any other rational conclusion. Although it may be difficult, using econ-
omic analysis, to meet the second part of the test, it may be quite easy for
Canadian judges to find other "rational" explanations of parallel behaviour
by businessmen.
One must recognize that oligopoly involves a mixture of interdependency
and conflict. In game theory terms, it is a variable-sum, mixed-motive game,
the outcome of which is determined by bargaining and quasi-bargaining be-
haviour.3 59 While it may be too strong to define "solutions" to oligopoly con-
flict and cooperation as "agreements" in the usual legal sense, they do involve
mutual recognition and acquiescence through complementary actions and
reactions. Conflict may never be reconciled in the sense of a "permanent"
peace, but a modus vivendi does occur through actions which coordinate inter-
firm behaviour where the firms either "cannot or will not negotiate explicitly
or when neither would trust the other with respect to any agreement explicitly
reached."3 60
857 Sullivan, supra, note 261 at 317.
358 Id.
359 This view is adapted from T. C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (London:
Oxford University Press, 1969) at 89.
80 Id. at 53.
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In oligopoly, as in life, all behaviour is communication.3 01 Apparently
unilateral behaviour by oligopolists contains information relevant to other
firms who "decode" it and utilize it in choosing their own actions, which also
convey information. Information and communication are unavoidable in the
situation itself.3 62 In the mixed-motive game of oligopoly, "hardly anything
epitomizes strategic behaviour... so much as the advantage of being able to
adopt a mode of behaviour that the other party will take for granted."3 6 3
Schelling points out that in a mixed-motive game:
• .. two or more centers of consciousness are dependent on each other in an
essential way. Something has to be communicated, at least some spark of recogni-
tion must pass between the players. There is generally a necessity for some social
activity, however rudimentary or tacit it may be; and both players are dependent
to some degree on the success of their social perception and interaction. Even two
completely isolated individuals, who play with each other in absolute silence and
without knowing each other's identity, must tacitly reach some meeting of
minds.3 64
It is generally observed that public policy formation proceeds in a dis-jointedly incremental fashion.36 5 Changes in policy tend to be small relative
to existing policy and they are often initiated by a number of actors whose
actions are often ill-coordinated. A common failing of the policy formulation
process is that few alternatives are articulated and the evaluation of their
potential consequences is inadequate, 6 6 even recognizing the costs of informa-
tion and limitations in the cognitive capacities of analysts and decision makers.
With these concerns in mind, we offer the following alternative public poli-
cy approaches to the problem of conscious parallelism in Canadian industry:
1. No new legislation, make do with section 32 of the Combines Inves-
tigation Act.
2. Adopt the joint monopolization provisions of the proposed Competi-
tion Act of 1977.
3. Direct intervention by the government in industries where the per-
formance of firms is unsatisfactory.
4. Adopt new civil legislation which would condemn persistent con-
scious parallelism when accompanied by one or more specified "plus
factors."
5. Adopt a program of time-staged tariff reductions for all concentrated
industries which exhibit long-term poor economic performance.1
361 The proposition that all behaviour is communication comes from Gregory
Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind (St. Albans: Paladen, 1973) at 334-45.362 Supra, note 359 at 115.
363 Id. at 160.
3 64 Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
365 David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision (New
York: The Free Press, 1970) Chapters 5, 6.366 See R. M. Cyert and J. G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Engle-
wood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963) and Herbert A. Simon, Models of Man: Social and
Rational (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957).
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6. Establish a per se proscription of all forms of refusal to deal and
exclusive territorial distribution systems together with a per se pro-
hibition of selective geographic price discrimination by dominant firms.
We will now discuss the nature of each alternative approach in more detail
and assess its potential effectiveness. It should be apparent that alternatives
one to four are mutually exclusive, but five and six could be adopted in con-
juction with any of the other approaches.
1. No New Legislation
In the face of vociferous and well-organized business opposition to all
changes in Canadian competition policy which would inhibit the use of market
power by firms,3 67 soldiering on with section 32, as it now exists, is an alter-
native which would be relatively easy to implement. The Armco cases68 could
be used to support the argument that section 32 is adequate to combat cases
involving conscious parallelism. This argument, of course, ignores the fact
that in Armco, it was necessary for the trial judge to infer the existence of an
agreement before a violation of section 32 could be found.
What is apparent is that the courts are beginning to grapple seriously
with the problem of oligopoly without direct agreement as they become cogni-
zant of the subtleties of oligopolistic competition. The Atlantic Sugar cases 6
illustrates the difficulty of attacking a close knit oligopoly with the conven-
tional legal tools of conspiracy. Agreement in the legal sense was unnecessary.
The three dominant firms were able to obtain the same result by consciously
parallel behaviour. When the number of firms with significant shares of the
market is small and the product is homogeneous, each firm without com-
municating verbally or in writing is able to independently arrive at the same
price structure. All exhibit very similar behaviour patterns and interfirm com-
petition is confined to activities which are unlikely to really hurt financially.
As Donald Eldon points out, an oligopoly
. . . tends to develop a plane of competition, some recognition by the group of
sellers as to the forms which competition will ordinarily take. Marked cutting
of prices tends to occur only when the stable pattern of the industry is temporarily
broken, as by the entry of a new firm into the market or by a determined bid by
an established firm for a larger share of the market.8 70
The effect, in terms of prices, profits and productive efficiency of a typical
collusive oligopolistic solution is unlikely to be different from an oligopolistic
arrangement obtained by conscious parallelism. Closely coordinated be-
haviour, achieved by "independent" action through conscious parallelism is
apparently beyond the reach of section 32 of the Combines Investigation Act.
For the present conspiracy provisions to be of real effect in conscious
367 See W. T. Stanbury, Business Interests and the Reform of Canadian Competition
Policy, 1971-1975 (Toronto: Carswell/Methuen, 1977); H. G. Thorburn, Pressure
Groups in Canadian Politics: Recent Revisions of the Anti-Combines Legislation (1964),
30 Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 157.
368 Supra, note 62.
369 Supra, note 135.
870 Supra, note 5 at 151.
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parallelism cases there is a need to reinterpret the traditional legal concept of
agreement. Conant puts the point this way:
Although [firms engaging in conscious parallelism] do not meet or communicate
directly, theirs is a "meeting of the minds" that each will be non-aggressive in
price or marketing policies in the then existing manner as long as his rivals are of
the same mind. There is a "unity of purpose" to keep prices stable, not to spoil
the market, and to avoid "cutthroat" competition. And this same purpose may be
called a "common design," though reached independently by each firm in adjust-
ing to the presence and possible reactions of his rivals in the market.8 71
If this view was accepted, the requirements of finding an agreement would be
more easily met and persistent conscious parallelism could be successfully
attacked. Phillips and Hall emphasize that an agreement can be effected with-
out verbal communication:
Economists and lawyers have recognized for many years that firms in oligopolistic
markets may behave as though there were an agreement restraining trade when
there has been no verbal communication among them. This recognition is the very
essence of the conscious parallelism doctrine. Parallel behavior cannot be ex-
plained as chance or random behavior, yet there is no discernable way to explain
it as open agreement.. . . it is pointless to ask if the parallel behavior of oli-
gopolists is the result of communication and agreement. Their indirect, nonverbal
communication is both effective and inevitable. Their agreement, while varying
in subject matter, duration and effectiveness, may be as complete as that reached
through the use of explicit and overt communication .... 872
From the point of view of economic effects it does not matter whether they
were achieved by direct agreement or sophisticated conscious parallelism.
However, it is a large step to infer that the traditional interpretation of the
law of conspiracy should thereby be changed to successfully attack the new
forms of behaviour. Would it not be preferable to pass new legislation aimed
at the new problem?
If we do not pass new legislation, but rather continue to rely on section
32, what can we expect? In our view, the best that we could hope for is that,
in time, the Canadian courts will adopt interpretations like those of the U.S.
courts following the Interstate Circuit73 case in 1939 and prior to the Theatre
Enterprises374 case in 1954. As we have seen, after that time the U.S. courts
reasserted the view that the parallel behaviour together with the ancillary evi-
dence must be sufficient for the jury to infer that an agreement has been made
by the defendants for a conviction to be registered.
It is unlikely that the more "liberal" interpretation of the U.S. courts
between 1939 and 1954 will be followed in Canada. More recent U.S. inter-
pretations go against the Supreme Court's view in Interstate Circuit. What is
more, Canadian judges seem less willing to innovate in the interpretation of
anti-combines law than those in the United States.
There is a more important reason for not relying on section 32. If it is
to be used to strike at most conscious parallelism cases, it will be necessary
for the courts to "stretch" the well-established interpretation of the law of
3 71 Conant, supra, note 267 at 817.
872 Phillips and Hall, supra, note 329 at 726-27.
37 8 Supra, note 262.
374 Supra, note 314.
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conspiracy. Rather than do this, it is preferable to introduce new legislation
aimed specifically at conscious parallelism and retain section 32 to deal with
direct agreement or those that can properly be inferred according to the long
established rule in Hodge's Case.75
2. Adopt the Joint Monopolization Provisions of the Proposed
Competition Act
On March 16, 1977 the Stage 11 amendments to the Combines Investiga-
tion Act, Bill C-42, were given first reading in the House of Commons.87 6
Included in the Bill was a new civil provision, section 31.73, dealing with
"joint monopolization." Joint monopolization was defined to mean a situation
where (i) a small number of firms (not all affiliated) achieve or seek to
achieve substantial control of a market; (ii) these firms do so by adopting
closely parallel policies or closely matching conduct; and (iii) the policies or
conduct have the effect of restricting entry, foreclosing a competitor's sources
of inputs or sales outlets, eliminating a competitor by predatory pricing, coerc-
ing or disciplining a competitor or restraining economic activity by other
means. Section 31.73 (3) provides that a finding of joint monopolization could
be made "notwithstanding that the parallel policies or matching conduct...
was based on nothing more than a mutual recognition of ... interdependence
and that there was no agreement or arrangement between or among [the
firms]. 377 Where joint monopolization is found, the Competition Board, the
proposed quasi-judicial tribunal, is empowered to issue a prohibition or reme-
dial order or, where these would fail to restore competition, to require dissolu-
tion or divestiture as specified. However, no order shall be made where the
Board "is satisfied that the policies or conduct [of the person] solely reflects
superior efficiency or superior economic performance."378
Business reaction, as indicated by the many briefs from trade associations
and individual firms to the House of Commons Standing Committee on
Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs, was almost uniformly hostile to section
31.73 . 79 An analysis of 50 of the approximately 80 business briefs indicated
375 Supra, note 78.
376 Proposals for a New Competition Policy for Canada, Second Stage (Ottawa:
Dept. of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, 1977). For a review of the Bill, see Martin
J. Rochwerg, Proposed Stage II Amendments to Canadian Combines Legislation-Bill
C-42 (1977), 15 Osgoode Hall LJ. 51.
377 Proposals, id. at 192.
3 78 Id. at 193, section 31.73 (5) errata.
379 The Committee received a total of 147 briefs, 38 of which were accompanied
by testimony at the hearings on Bill C-42. The following indicates the distribution of
the briefs by source: individual business firms (43); trade organizations (38); farm
organizations (12); marketing boards (22); academics (8); provincial governments or
their departments (6); individuals (8); lawyers/Canadian Bar Association (5); union!
Canadian Labour Congress (2); consumer organizations (2); and other (1). The briefs
from farm organizations, marketing boards and provincial governments were almost
exclusively devoted to objections to sections 4.5, 4.6 and 27.1 of Bill C-42. These sec-
tions deal with regulated conduct, the conditions for the exemption of federal and
provincial marketing boards, and the power of the Advocate to intervene in a matter
before any federal board; they accounted for 81 of the 147 briefs; with the exception
of the Canadian Bar Association's brief, the other four from lawyers should be classified
as "business briefs."
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that one-half requested that section 31.73 be deleted from the bill. Much of
the criticism of the section was based on the view that any parallel conduct
could be reviewable by the Competition Board. The House Committee in its
report on Bill C-42 emphasized that ". . . it is not parallel conduct per se
that is subject to review but only parallel conduct that restrains economic
activity in the manner described in subsection 31.73 (1) ."380 The House Com-
mittee recommended only two relatively minor amendments. However, the
Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce recommended
that section 31.73 be deleted entirely.38 1
On November 18, 1977, Bill C-13, the successor to Bill C-42, was given
first reading in the House of Commons. It embodied some seventy amend-
ments, including some to section 31.73. The cumulative effect of the changes
in the joint monopolization section is to weaken its ability to strike at parallel
behaviour which has a predatory or exclusionary effect. For example, Bill
C-13 defines joint monopolization as a situation where a small number of
firms "achieve substantial control or entrench such control . . .", whereas
C-42 used the words "achieve or seek to achieve substantial control ...." Is
C-13 aimed at joint monopolization in its incipiency or only after it is an ac-
complished fact? Second, section 31.73 of Bill C-13 describes the reviewable
behaviour as "adopting closely parallel policies or closely matching conduct
of an exclusionary character . . ." which has the effect of restricting entry,
foreclosing a competitor's outlets or sources of supply, and so on. Bill C-42
did not require that the parallel policies be of an "exclusionary character."
Such words may be construed by defence counsel so as to require the Com-
petition Board to examine the intent of the firms involved. This will add
another hurdle for the Crown to overcome. Third, the subsection specifying
that the Board can make an order against joint monopolization, even if there
was no agreement among the firms involved, has been retained. But the words,
"based on nothing more than a mutual recognition of their interdependence
.." have been deleted. Fourth, the efficiency defence has been made easier
to sustain. Bill C-42 prevented the Board from making an order if it was satis-
fied "that the policies or conduct ...solely reflect superior efficiency or
superior economic performance." In C-13 the word "clearly" replaces the
word "solely." Fifth, the range of remedies for joint monopolization is re-
stricted in Bill C-13 to partial divestiture. In Bill C-42, the Competition Board
could make an order "to dissolve the monopoly or reduce the degree of
monopoly.. ." as alternatives to divestiture. In addition to these changes in
section 31.73, under section 31.91 of Bill C-13, defendants faced with a
partial divestiture order for joint monopolization may appeal to the Cabinet,
380 Proposals for Change, Fourteenth Report of the Standing Committee on Fi-
nance, Trade and Economic Affairs Respecting Stage II Competition Policy (Ottawa:
Supply and Services Canada. 1977) at 63. A critique of the amendments proposed by
the Committee in respect to administration and enforcement is found in M. T.
MacCrimmon and W. T. Stanbury, Policy Death by Administrative Restriction: The
House Committee's Report on Bill C-42, The Competition Act of 1977 (1977), 15
Osgoode Hall L.J. 485.
881 Can. Senate Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Proceed-
ings, (July 6, 1977).
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upon the recommendation of the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs,
to annul the order.
Although Bill C-13's treatment of joint monopolization is less stringent
than Bill C-42's, it goes well beyond the existing legislation in dealing with
parallel policies or coordinated behaviour in oligopoly. Its scope, however, is
limited to situations where the parallel policies have one or more predatory
or exclusionary effects. Ordinary parallel behaviour which does not have such
an effect, but which still might result in excess profits and/or inefficiency,
would not be within the purview of the proposed legislation. The fact that
joint monopolization is to become a civil reviewable matter is highly desirable.
The scope of remedies available is enlarged and the standard of proof is on
the basis of the balance of probabilities, rather than on proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt as required for criminal offences.
As desirable as section 31.73 is, in that it moves in the right direction,
it does not go far enough. The law should permit the Competition Board to
take action in cases of conscious parallelism in a larger variety of instances
of restraint of trade than simply those which involve predatory or exclu-
sionary action. Skeoch and McDonald deal with a broader conception of
joint monopolization under their proposal in respect of "misuse of dominant
position":
(a) "dominant" means the power to choose the rate of profits or share
of the market to be enjoyed by the person or group of persons
possessing the power, largely undeterred by any existing ability of
rivals to compete away those profits or share of the market by offer-
ing for favorable terms to customers;
(b) "misuse" means any form of competitive conduct that constitutes,
or has the effect of creating or enhancing, a significant artificial
restraint in a market, and which is not justified or offset by real-
cost economies resulting from that conduct.382
The focus of the Skeoch and McDonald proposal is on both unsatisfactory
conduct and on unsatisfactory performance. While it appears to reach be-
havior not reached by the proposed 31.73 we feel that the conscious parallel-
ism plus approach outlined in the fourth alternative is preferable. If this
alternative is politically infeasible, but section 31.73 can be made into law,
then we should be pleased to see it as a complement to the existing section 32.
3. Direct Government Intervention
Direct intervention by the government in light of undesirable economic
performance by an industry or group of firms, would represent a major de-
parture in Canadian public policy. Combines law has historically been con-
duct or behaviour oriented. For example, in conspiracy cases the approach
might be characterized as "once undue then per se illegal." That is, the judges,
once proof of a conspiracy has been established by direct evidence or by
proper inference, have specifically refused to consider the economic perform-
82 L. A. Skeoch and B. C. McDonald, Dynamic Change and Accountability in a
Canadian Market Economy (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1976) at 156.
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ance which has or would have resulted from the illegal agreement.88 The
determination of what constitutes an agreement to restrain or lessen compe-
tition unduly has been based on the proportion of the market which has been
subject to the conspiracy. While Canadian judges have not espoused any spe-
cific structural standard, by inference from the decided cases it would appear
that if one-half or more of the output in the relevant market is produced by
firms party to the arrangement, it will constitute an undue lessening of
competition384
David Cayne has suggested that the most serious deficiency of the judge-
made combines law in Canada has been the development of "rigid rules which
vary with the form of industrial conduct rather than with its substance or
consequences .... "38 5 He goes on to say:
... judicial rejection of the concepts of market power and economic efficiencies
in the evaluation of the behaviour of firms has led to the failure to apply similar
standards to horizontal integration effected through different means.880
Cayne's term "horizontal integration" includes both mergers and oligopolistic
interdependence. With respect to the latter, he points out that the only differ-
ence between price leadership and conscious parallel action in an oligopoly
2s In general, two points are being made here. First, it is irrelevant whether or
not the agreement was necessary for the protection of the business interests of the parties
to it. This point was first established by Anglin J. in Weidman v. Shragge (1912), 46
S.C.R. 1 at 42-43, where he said,
under [S. 498] the prime question certainly must be, does [the agreement], however
advantageous or even necessary for the protection of the business interests of the
parties, impose improper, inordinate, excessive, or oppressive restrictions upon
that competition the benefit of which is the right of everyone?
These words were quoted and adopted by Mignault J. in the second Supreme Court
case, Stinson-Reeb Builders Supply Co. Ltd. v. The King (1929), 52 C.C.C. 66 at 69
and also by Kerwin J. (Rinfret J. concurring) in Container Materials Ltd. v, The King,
supra, note 168 at (C.C.C.) 140-41.
Second, Canadian judges refuse to consider the reasonableness of prices subject to
the agreement or to evaluate the behaviour in terms of the economic conditions facing
the industry. The classic statement was given by Spence J. in R. v. Howard Smith Paper
Mills Ltd., [1954] O.R. 543; 4 D.L.R. 161; 109 C.C.C. 65; 19 C.R. 1 at (C.C.C.) 95-96:
Surely the determination of whether or not an agreement to lessen competition
was "undue" by a survey of one industry's profits against profits of industry
generally, and a survey of the movement of the prices in that one industry against
the movement of prices generally, would put the Court to the essentially non-
judicial task of judging between conflicting theories of economy and conflicting
political theories. It would entail the Court being required to conjecture--and by
a Court it would be nothing more than mere conjecture, since the Court is not
trained to act as an arbitrator of economics-whether better or worse results
would have occurred to the public if free and untrammelled competition had been
permitted to run its course.
Mr. Justice Spence later stated, at 97:
.. I am not free to find that the lessening intended was not undue on the basis
of any necessity of the industry, reasonableness of prices resulting or reasonable-
ness of profits obtained.
38s4 Supra, note 213.
S85 David Cayne, Market Power, Efficiencies, and the Public Interest in Canadian
Combines Law (1970), 16 McGill L.J. 488 at 489.
386 Id.
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and other forms of collusive action is that "the communication [among com-
petitors] can take place indirectly through the market system itself. ' 387 He
argues that since the effects are the same, "it is meaningless to predicate the
legality of the resulting market power upon the character of the communi-
cative process itself."3 8 A policy of direct intervention based on performance
criteria would overcome this difficulty.
However, government intervention in cases of "unsatisfactory" economic
performance obviously begs the question of what measures of performance
should be used. Many industrial organization economists would include at
least the following elements of market performance: level and variability of
prices and profits, technical efficiency (including the question of X-ineffi-
ciency), allocative efficiency, rate of innovation and technological change, the
nature and persistence of excess capacity and the types of restrictive trade
practices (e.g., price discrimination, resale price maintenance, etc.) that exist
in the industry. This list is not exhaustive. With multiple criteria, problems of
commensurability arise, and the necessity to make tradeoffs is obvious. What
is the minimum socially acceptable level of performance for each of the meas-
ures of firm and industry performance? What do we do if an industry exhibits
significant excess profits over a span of five to ten years, while at the same
time is perceived as an aggressive innovator in methods of production and in
introducing new products? These are difficult questions. They must be an-
swered correctly before a policy of direct intervention has any hope of success.
Certainly not the least of our problems with this approach is to determine
the appropriate remedy if the government deems performance to be unsatis-
factory. Simple injunctions prohibiting parallel conduct may be ineffective.
Neale argues:
It is no good telling the businessman to stop conspiring if all that is meant by
'conspiring' is reacting intelligently to the situation in which he finds himself. How
can he make decisions independently if the very structure of his industry makes
him and his main rivals interdependent?3 89
The U.K. Monopolies Commission, in its 1973 report on parallel pricing,
perceived the remedy in terms of limiting the extent of the damage to the
public interest. First they proposed to restrict the development of situations
where the practice could arise, i.e., careful scrutiny of mergers which in them-
selves could significantly increase concentration ("a prerequisite of parallel
pricing") or could trigger a series of mergers having the same effect.390 Second,
"to ensure that, where it has arisen and is found to be operating contrary to
the public interest, either pressure be introduced of a kind likely to force
the sellers concerned into more active competition or, failing this, steps are
taken to reduce the damage which might flow from the continuation of the
practice." 91 The Commission recognized the very limited utility of breaking
up the leading firms, rather it spoke of tariff reductions, the weakening of
287 Id. at 519.
388 Id.
389 Neale, supra, note 260 at 176.
39o Supra, note 7 at 37.
391 Id.
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entry barriers and of direct supervision of prices (and possibly of costs) in
the industry concerned. 892
In its report on the breakfast cereal industry, in which the largest firm
accounted for sixty per cent of the market and the next two a combined thirty
per cent, the Commission opted for the direct supervision of prices:
We see no practical means of changing the structure of the industry or the nature
of competition in the industry in such a way as to ensure the maintenance of price
restraint on Kellogg. . . . We therefore recommend that Kellogg's profit rates
should be kept under review and that Kellogg should be required to seek Govern-
ment approval before making any increase in the prices of its breakfast cereals 398
It is difficult to generate any enthusiasm for additional direct government
intervention in the economy. 9 4 This is not simply because the problem of
defining remedies is difficult for it is difficult in every alternative proposed, or
because the administrative mechanism to carry out the surveillance and inter-
vention is hard to specify. The central issue is the potential costs and benefits
of direct intervention as opposed to the other alternatives public policies
available. Anyone concerned with diffusion of power and the efficacy of
government intervention in the economy must look askance at any proposal
that would increase it.
4. Conscious Parallelism Plus
Under this alternative, Canada would adopt new legislation which would
make reviewable in civil proceedings those cases of persistent conscious paral-
lelism which are accompanied by one or more specified "plus factors." These
factors would include various kinds of economic conduct which have the
effect of facilitating the close coordination of interfirm behaviour in an oli-
gopoly or other undesirable aspects of economic performance. While the fol-
lowing list is not exhaustive, it does indicate the behaviour which should be
defined as a "plus factor": 95
(a) Conduct Factors:
- contrived or exaggerated product standardization
- exchange of detailed price and transaction data either ex ante or
ex post
- use of uniform basing points in delivered pricing schemes
- uniform refusal to deal (by buyers or sellers)
- uniform exclusive territorial agreements
- uniform licencing arrangements
- parallel buying activity to collectively support the price of a substitute
or an input used by competitors
892 Id. at 38.
893 United Kingdom Monopolies Commission, Report on Breakfast Cereals, (1973)
at para. 102.
894 See Skeoch and McDonald, supra, note 382.
395 These lists were compiled from the relevant Canadian and American cases as
well as from Posner, supra, notes 29 and 43 and Nye, supra, note 323.
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- price leadership-long continued uniform prices
- any conduct individually irrational but collectively profit maximizing
- exhortation (direct and indirect) to maintain or increase prices
- advance notification of price changes without legitimate business
justification
(b) Performance Factors:
- persistent excess profits by the group (not explained by proper use of
intellectual property rights)
- persistent excess capacity (allowing for seasonal and cyclical swings)
- submission of identical tenders on non-standard items or on large
orders of standard items (relative to the producer's annual output)
- systematic price discrimination
- long term fixed market shares
- perverse price movements, e.g., price increases during periods of ex-
cess capacity
We must recognize that the single most important industrial phenomenon
facing competition policy-closely coordinated oligopoly without collusion-
is beyond the reach of legal tools originally fashioned, not to deal with the
economic behaviour and effects of oligopoly, but to deal with agreements
among individuals to commit acts clearly defined to be illegal. Eldon puts
the issue this way:
The root of the [oligopoly] problem lies partly in the fact that antitrust law in
North America antedates the time economists became generally greatly concerned
with oligopoly. As a result, the law is designed in the less sophisticated terms of
pure monopoly and perfect, pure or free competition.3 96
The point of the conscious parallelism plus approach is to obtain price and
output combinations closer to the competitive equilibrium than would occur
if we left non-collusive oligopoly alone. Since, in many oligopolies, the close
coordination of interfirm behaviour is facilitated or even brought about by
the type of "plus factors" indicated above, one practical alternative for public
policy is to attempt to severely inhibit their use of these aids. It is unneces-
sarily pessimistic to say that nothing can be done, outside of preventing col-
lusive agreements, to upset the high price-high profit, and perhaps inefficient,
oligopolistic equilibrium. We believe that energetic and consistent attacks on
cases of conscious parallelism accompanied by one or more of these "plus
factors" (and any new ones that may be developed) will result in greater
variability in prices and, on average, lower prices than would occur if the
authorities permitted oligopolists to use these coordinating devices. Conant
points out that
... an oligopolistic market structure need not necessarily result in market per-
formance that fails to approach the competitive ideal. Dynamic market factors
may induce rivalry whose consequence is effectively competitive market perform-
anre.39 7
396 Eldon, supra, note 5 at 150.
897 Conant, supra, note 267 at 812.
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The object of public policy is to ensure that the potential dynamic factors are
not inhibited. While we are not sanguine that the result will closely approxi-
mate the outcome if a genuinely competitive market structure prevailed, we
are confident that the benefits outweigh the costs.
Support for the conscious parallelism plus approach is not hard to find.
Stephen Nye, a Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission remarks:
I suspect that in almost every instance of prolonged uniform pricing among oli-
gopolistics, it is possible to uncover evidence of measures taken by the industry
members and calculated, it may fairly be inferred, to ensure the smooth working
of a system of administered pricing.38
In our discussion of interfirm coordination in an oligopoly we noted that
a number of factors tend to limit the close coordination of oligopolists. We
also noted that persistent, non-competitive parallel behaviour by oligopolists
can only occur if one or more "props" are used to permit firms to act on the
recognition of their mutual dependence. While Posner labels persistent con-
scious parallelism accompanied by one or more plus factors as evidence of
"tacit collusion,"3 99 there is no substantive difference between the approach
he advocates and the one we call "conscious parallelism plus." In his 1971
article, Posner describes "noncompetitive pricing by oligopolists without de-
tectable collusion" as "nothing more than a special case of cartelization.
" . .-400 He proposes a two-stage inquiry.40 1 First, he would identify those
markets whose characteristics predispose them toward price fixing, e.g., oli-
gopoly structure, a homogeneous product for which there are no close sub-
stitutes, infrequent entry etc. Second, he would apply certain tests in suspect
markets to determine if output was, or was likely to be, restricted significantly.
Posner would look, inter alia, for evidence of fixed market shares, economic
discrimination, exchanges of price information, and identical bids on non-
standard items.402
Even Donald F. Turner would support the "conscious parallelism plus"
approach although he argues that conscious parallelism is not evidence of
agreement unless there is evidence that "the decisions of the alleged conspira-
tors were interdependent, that the decisions were consistent with individual
self-interest of those concerned only if they all decided the same way."408
Turner observes that "in reality a stable and firm pattern of non-com-
petitive prices is rarely achieved without some kind of agreement. '40 4 He notes
that parallel delivered pricing systems, for example,
are adopted primarily to eliminate a kind of uncertainty that is a potent force
disrupting stable noncompetitive oligopoly pricing . . . rigid price systems are
398 Nye, supra, note 323 at 210-11.
399 Posner, supra, note 29 at 1578-82.
400 Posner, supra, note 43 at 509.
4 0 1 1 d. at 514-15.
402 Id. at 516-22.
403 Turner, supra, note 41 at 658.
404 Id. at 662.
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adopted in order to make parallel oligopoly pricing possible, to prevent the
necessity of pricing competitively.4 0 5
This is precisely the sort of plus factor, which, if used to facilitate persistent
conscious parallel pricing, would be subject to attack under this policy pro-
posal. However, it is important to be mindful of the fundamental public
policy dilemma with respect to oligopoly. If we condemn conscious paral-
lelism, price leadership and other forms of legally non-collusive oligopoly
behaviour and require that firms behave independently, to the extent of ignor-
ing their self-interest in the context of their mutual dependence, we are asking
them to behave irrationally. But one of the characteristics of firms operating
in an oligopoly is that they are motivated both to compete and to cooperate
on the recognition of their mutual dependence. The "conscious parallelism
plus" approach seeks to ensure that oligopolists compete more actively by
striking at the means by which cooperative behaviour is effected. Since the
plus factors include both performance and conduct elements, firms which are
able to effect close coordination without one of the conduct "props" will still
be subject to attack. This approach is justified by the theory of Posner,40 6
Turner,40 7 and Nye:408 that persistent excess profits, inefficiency, fixed market
shares or identical tenders for non-standard items are not the result of "pure
interdependence," but rather the result of non-detectable collusion. In effect,
collusion may be inferred in such cases, even though it may not be appropri-
ate to do so under section 32 of the Combines Investigation Act.
The determination of appropriate remedies, however, raises difficult
problems. In the Canadian setting, in which the small size of the domestic
market, together with economies of scale, 40 9 results in a relatively small
number of domestic producers in many industries, structural remedies will
rarely be feasible. Injunctive orders, in theory, prevent the use of conduct plus
factors, but businessmen will find other means of coordinating their be-
haviour. Such orders will have to be broadly framed and directed to the pur-
pose of these plus factors, rather than their specific form. In the case of
tariff-protected oligopolies, a potentially useful remedy would be to lower
tariffs and increase the opportunities for foreign producers. Government pro-
curement policies can be used to "reward" firms who deviate from parallel
pricing or price leadership in oligopolies. In some cases, it may be necessary
to consider direct regulation of prices, advertising expenditures or additional
capital investment. In any event, we must recognize that while the remedies
available may ameliorate the present problem, they are unlikely to provide
simple solutions to the complex problem of conscious parallelism.
5. Tariff Reductions
There is an old saying attributed to the organizer of the great U.S. sugar
4 05 Id. at 674.
4 06 Supra, notes 29 and 43.
4 07 Supra, note 41.
408 Supra, note 323.
4 09 See Paul K. Gorecki, Economies of Scale and Efficient Plant Size in Canadian
Manufacturing Industries (Ottawa: Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs,
1976).
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trust of 1887 that "the tariff is the mother of trusts." 410 Industrial organiza-
tion economists have long sought to use the tariff as an active instrument of
competition policy. 41 ' Because of Canada's small domestic market, coupled
with important economies of scale, the number of domestic producers must,
for efficiency reasons, be small in many Canadian industries.41 2 Under such
conditions we expect that the domestic producers will practice limit pricing:
the price set by domestic producers will be equal to the price of the closely
substitutable products made abroad plus tariffs and transportation costs. Where
the effective rate of protection is such that the limit price permits inefficiency
or excess profits, there is a strong case for reducing or eliminating it. Cur-
rently, under section 28 of the Combines Investigation Act, the Cabinet is
empowered to reduce tariffs in conspiracy, merger and monopoly cases where
the "disadvantage to the public is presently being facilitated by the duties of
customs imposed on the article or on any like article ..... ',41 This potentially
powerful weapon has been used in only one case.41 4 Skeoch and McDonald
challenge the idea that tariff reductions alone will assure long term dynamic
efficiency. 418 They state that the available evidence from other countries sug-
gests that tariff reductions are unlikely to result in the rationalization of Cana-
dian industry, enabling firms to meet import competition and expand their
export opportunities. They cite Britain and Sweden as historical examples to
buttress their point.410 To achieve their objective of dynamic economic change,
"freer trade requires to be used, with appropriate timing, in combination with
positive and prohibitory measures to facilitate, and to create pressures favour-
ing the process of economic change in terms of the firm and the market.41 7
The efficacy of staged tariff reductions in oligopolistic industries whose
longer term economic performance has been unsatisfactory is an empirical
question. Policymakers should test the idea; the fact that a remedy is limited
should not deter the government from using it at all.
6. Per Se Prohibition of Refusal to Deal
The policy actions outlined in this alternative have been proposed by
Milton Moore.418 Essentially, Moore proposes to challenge many of the tra-
ditional "rights" of business firms. Refusal to deal would be prohibited per se
as "it is in direct conflict with the consumers' interests, and.., is a necessary
condition for increased efficiency and reduction in the major forms of eco-
410 Hans B. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy (Stockholm: Norstedt and Soner,
1954) at 72.
4 11 F. W. Taussig, Some Aspects of the Tariff Question (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1915).
412 See Gorecki, supra, note 409.
413 Supra, note 22.
414 This case is described in V. W. Bladen, An Introduction to Political Economy
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1941) at 202.
415 Skeoch and McDonald, supra, note 382 at 38.
416 Id. at 35-3 6.
417 id. at 36.
418 S-upra, note 14 at 130-78.
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nomic waste. 41 9 This rule would apply to sales to both retailers and distri-
butors. Second, Moore would prohibt regional price discrimination per se, for
"the main hope for inducing a steady pressure upon price levels of any oli-
gopoly lies in the strengthening of the position of the small company, whose
only effective competitive strategy consists of under-cutting the prices of its
established rivals.1420 Third, Moore would impose mandatory f.o.b. pricing
"if the product is fairly homogeneous and where freight costs are a substantial
proportion of the wholesale price excluding sales taxes-say, 5 percent."'421
He emphasizes that this rule must be accompanied by the ban on price dis-
crimination to a single class of customers who compete with each other.
Moore's recommendations also apply to forms of economic behaviour
other than conscious parallelism. He argues that competition policy actions
should be judged by two criteria: the rule of consumers' sovereignty and the
rule of fair competition among companies.422 The former specifies that the
consumer is entitled to be provided with the goods and services of his choice
at the lowest attainable cost, to be offered as much or as little service with a
commodity as he wishes to buy and to be accurately informed. The latter
holds that no party in the economic process is to have a privileged position,
that each person is free to engage in the business of his choice, subject to the
efficient operation of the price system, and that competitive advantages should
rest solely upon superior efficiency.
Like the tariff, Moore's proposals do not constitute a complete remedy
to the problem of closely coordinated oligopoly without collusion. Used in
conjunction with the first, second or fifth alternative, however, they offer a
potentially useful, if limited, remedy.
7. Conclusion
In 1960, appearing before the House of Commons Standing Committee
on Banking and Commerce in regard to proposed amendments to the Com-
bines Investigation Act, Professor Skeoch made the following statement:
... in the United States they have had cases in which they tried to condemn what
they call conscious parallelism of action .... They have not really enjoyed much
success. I am always a believer that there is a good deal of competition, as long
as you do not overtly try to eliminate it. You cannot force businessmen, as one
Swedish industrialist said in an article, to tear at one another's throats like
wolves-and I do not think you have to. But price leadership practice, the whole
range of these intermediate problems, the oligopoly behavior-that is what we
call it technically-this conscious parallelism, as the Americans have it . . . are,
I think, on the borderline of anti-trust. We have plenty of other problems to keep
us busy, I think for quite a long while before we turn our attention to that.4 2 3
Time has, however, exacerbated the problem of conscious parallelism in
Canada. It should now be near the top of our competition policy agenda. Of
419Id. at 143.
420Id. at 155.
421 Id. at 167.
422 Id. at 68-75, 127.
423 Can. H. of C. Standing Committee on Banking and Commerce, Proceedings,
No. 7 (June 30, 1960) at 461.
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the six alternatives discussed, the most effective appears to be that of adopting
new civil legislation, which would condemn persistent conscious parallelism
accompanied by one or more conduct or performance "plus factors." Next
best would be the enactment of section 31.73, as proposed by Bill C-13. If
this was accompanied by the use of tariff reductions in appropriate cases and
the adoption of Moore's proposals, vaulable improvements might be made.
Regrettably, a public policy attack on the plus factors necessarily implies
that policy actions will be aimed mainly at business conduct rather than at the
structural causes of the ability of firms to closely coordinate their behaviour.
The mutual dependence of firms in an oligopoly is unavoidable. Our policy
actions must be aimed at reducing their ability to act on the recognition of
their interdependence to the detriment of the public interest.
